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INTRODUCTION
This paper presents a study of the Twenty·-Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States of A1nerica.

The Am.endment

\vas first proposed to Congress as Senate and House Joint Resolutions
in February 1965. It became law in February 1967, when Nevada
secured the distinction of being the 38th state to ratify it, thus fulfilling the required agreement by three·-fourths of the states.
The Amendrr1ent has not yet been tested.

It is the first compre-

hensive legislative attempt to solve three related problems that have
plagued the executive branch of our government since the earliest
days of the Union.

The nwst hnpo:rtant of the three problems is Presidential inability or disability (the two words are used int'~Tchangeably throughout this paper).

What happens when the President, because of illness

or other reasons, is unable to discharge the duties and powers of his
office? Article II, SeCtion 1, Clause 5 of the Constitution provides
that:
In Case of the Removal of the Presi.dent from Office, or
of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the
Powe:t·s and Duties oE the said Office, the San1e shall devolve on the Vice-President, . . .
In spite of this provision, no Vice

Pn~sident

has dared to take over

the President's office, even temporarily, while the President lived.
One result of this inactivity was that the United States has been without
an active Chief Executive for periods o£ time totaling one year.
second problern, created by the first, is the problem of Vice

11

This

iii

Presidential succession to the Presidency.
The third of the problerns can be phrased as Vice Presidential
vacancy.

Following the one occasion on which a Vice President

resigned, the seven on which a Vice President died while in office,
and the eight on which a Vice President succeeded to Presidency
(see Appendixes A and B), there has been no way to fill the Vice
Presidency until the next Presidential election. For rnuch of our
history this void has troubled us very little but, since the Eisenhower
Adr.n.inistration, the office of the Vice President has been evolving
from one of relatively little importance in political powe1· to sornething 1nore nearly approxi1nating the office of an assistant President
or Deputy Chief Executi\re.

This growth coincides with a growing

awareness that in this nuclear age we cannot afford to wait until the
next election to assure that there is a back--up to the Corrnnander in
Chief.
This historical development of the proble1ns and of attempts to
solve therr1 are sumrnarized i.n the first three chapters of this paper.
Much 1nore definitive studies of these aspects already exist.
Cha.pter IV describes,

1

in greater detail, the drafting and Congressional

passage of the Twenty-Ti'ilth Amendment, and Chapter V follows its

.

------~-- ---~~~L------

1

A;:non!?' the n1ost authoritative wo1·ks are:
Ruth
Silva, Presidential Succession (Ann Arbor: Uni.verGity
of Michigan Press, lrT51).------·-··-----------Richa rd B. Hansen, The Year We Had No President (Lincoln:
Universi.ty of Nebraska,· 196?;r~--···----------------·-··---------John D. Feel"ick, Frorn. Failing Hands (New York: Fordha1n
University Press, 19 65) .·--·----------·-----·-----

c·:

iv
ratification through the states.

Chapter. VI is devoted to an evaluation

of the Arnenchnent itself: its intent as well as its strengths and weak-nesses.

Definitive evaluations will be possible only after the Am.end-

ment m.ust actually be used to solve the

proble~ms

of Presidential.

inability, Vice Presidential succession, and Vice Presidential vacancy.
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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEMS AND THEIR POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

At least three times during this nation's history the President
has been unable to carry out the duties of his office. James A.

Garfield

lay dying for eighty days after he was shot; Woodrow Wilson, following
a stroke, spent the last eighteen months of his tenn as a semi-invalid;
President Eisenhower had three separate and serious illnesses.

1

Yet

no Vice President has been able either to substitute temporarily for the
Chief Executive while retaining his Vice Presidential office or to succeed
to the office of the President so long as the Chief Executive lived.

Never-

theless, in at least two of the three cases, the Presi.dent'::; disability
was clea:dy apparent.
Because the Constitution was ambip,uous and precedents had been

set, no disabled President has felt a.ble to call upon his Vice President
to act as his substitute,
own disability.

2

even though the President might recognize his

Similarly, no Vice President has been willing or able

1

Raynwnd J. Celada, Presidential Continuity and Vice Presiden-tial Vacancy Arnendment (Wasli1ngf6n~-TY. c:·:ceg1srillve lTcTei;ence-··-----·--------··----;:--·)---------Service, l9o7 , p. 2.
2

The only exception took place when Wilson went to Paris for the
treaty m.eetings following World War I. At Wilson's request, in his
absence Thomas R. Marshall beca:me the first Vice President to preside over Cabinet meetings, Marshall, however, had doubts about the
legality of presiding, and he ernpbasized that he would not be responsibJe for any consequences. Donald Young, Arnerican Roulette
(New York: Ffolt, Rincbart and ·winston, 196S)-i)-:--T:rO-:-------··-

1

2
to take the

initi.ati~le

to declare his Chief disabled or to declare hhn-

self to be acting Chief Executive while the President lived.

On reason

for the Vice President's refusal to act is the lack of both legal and
constitutional machinery for certifying the disability of a Chief Executive.

Another is the danger that an honest atternpt to

p~ck

up the reins

of goverm:n.ent frorn his disabled Chief n1ight be misconstrued as usurpation.

The results of such Inisunderstanding might be tantamount to

political suicide for the Vice President, or create a power struggle so
damaging it could, one Vice President has suggested, end in civil war.

3

Until recently, Presidents have consistently refused to 1·equest
that their Vice Presidents act for them in time of disability out of fear
that, once having "given up" the Presidency, it could not be constitu-tion<).J.ly returned to them.

In so1ne cases, Presidents have concealed

a disability so that fh.c problem could be avoided.

4

The refusal of the President and the Vice President to act in
cases of Presidential disability stems from. two sources.

The first

3

Louis W . .Koenig, The Chief Executive (New York: Harcourt,
Brace & World, Inc., 19"64y;-p:-,ro---:·---···--··
If he acted as President, [Vice President Thoma.s R. Marshall
told Ira E. Bennett, editor of the Washington Post, he would surely
be ass<:tssinated and the country thrown "into civil war."
Young, op. cit., p. 138, reports that Vice President Marshall
confided to hfs-\v1Ie-;·- "I could throw this country into civil war, but I
won't. " Ma:r shall did not explain to his wife what action. he. might take
that could re[;ult in civil war. He did, however, rernark to his secretary, Mark Thistlethwaite, "I an1 not going to seize the place [the
White House] and then have Wilson, recovered, corne around and say
'Get off, you usurper!' " Perhaps he feared that a civil conflict might
result from. such a situation as this in which there would be two rnen
clair.ning the Presidency.

J

%ee
thesis.

Presidents Cleveland and Wilson in Chapter II of. this

3
is the gramm.atical construction of Adicle II, Section 1, Clause 6, of
the Constitution, and the resultant controversy over the antecedent of
the word

11

sa1ne".

That clause reads in part:

In case of the removal of the President from office, or of·
hi.s death, resignation, o1· inability to discharge the powers
and duties of said office, the sarne shall devolve on the Vice
President
Does the word "same'' mean that the office, or merely the powers and
duties of the office, shall devolve on the Vice President?
If only the powers and duties fall to the Vice President, the ap-

parent intentions of the writers of the Constitution would be fulfilled:
the Vice President would become an acting or substitute President.
However, if it is the offic;e that "same" refers to then the Vice President who acts during his Chief's disability would become President
until the end of his Chief's tenure, although the disability may have
been of only a ternpora.ry duration.
The former argument seems to be the stronger.

The language

of the Twelfth An1endment, which became a part of the Constitution on
September 25, 1804, would indicate that "same II referred to duties and
·powers:

11

•••

then the Vice President shall act as President, as in

the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President.
As discussed rnore fully at the end of this chapter, the writers of the
original succession clause also intended that a Vice President .should
be able to become Acting President during a period of temporary Presidential disability.

It also seems to have been the intention in cases

of permanent disability that, contrary to established practice, the
Vice President would continue as Acting Chief Executive either until
such tin-teas Congress might call a special election or until the end of
the ele etc d terrn.

11

. 4

The second of the two sources of inaction in

di.sabili~y

Tyler "precedent" and the usage which grew fron1 it.

is the

John Tyler

assumed the office of President following the death of President
William Henry Harrison.

In sor:nething of an inaugural speech, on

April 9, 1841, Tyler asserted: "For the first time in our history the
person elected to the Vice Presidency of the United States .
devolved upon hirn the Presidential office. "

5

. . has had

The Tyler precedent is

more fully discussed in Chapter II.
The Tyler precedent taught Vice Presidents how to deal with a
President's death, but not with his temporary disabilities.
President,

No Vice

from Tyler's time to the present, has even given the ap··

pearance of acting as President until the President's actual death; then
the Vice President has assumed the office, taken the :Presidential oath,

and se:n·ecl out the rernainder of the term as a full--fledged President.
Since the problern of disability was ignored as long as the Pre···
sident lived,

certain awkward questions that might have arisen during

the President's life did not.

For example, what constitutes executive

disability'? Is it only a medical condition or could it also be a psychiatric condition? Can the President be considered as disabled if,

through

force of circumstances, he is unable to cornrnunicate with his government?

6 One ;might logically conclude that any condition which causes

5
Young,

9..E.:__ci!:..•

p.

45.

6President Wilson asked his Vice President to handle certain
formaliti.es for hirn when he went to Paris following World War I.
.Marshall complied by presiding over Cabinet meetings, "the first of
which Wilson him.seH actually directed by wireless." Ruth G. Silva,
Presidenti.al Succession (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,

-r951}";-···r-:---q-T:·---:-----

5
the President to be unable to exercise his authority is a disability,

and

that any legal or constitutional definition must, of necessity, be faidy
broad for [ear of excluding sorne unforeseen, yet truly disabling conclition.
A related problem that the custom of ignoring disability has
supressed is: who should, will, or must m.ake the determination of
the President's disability? The best answer would be the President
hirnself, if he is able.

Had it not been for the question of how to re--

gain the "office" or its powers, there have been Presidents who would
have done as Lyndon Johnson did after the Eisenhower Letter precedent
was established. 7 A President would have notified the Vice President
of existing or irnpending disability, such as surgery, and further re-quested the Vice President to assume the role of Acting President.
But vlhat if the President is unable or unwilling to declare himself disabled? Woodrow Wilson, during the course of his illness,
rnay have been at first unable and later unwilling to admit to being disabled.

There have been a number of proposed answers to this vexing

question.

One is that the Cabinet should make .such a determination;

another is that the President might appoint a medical comrnission for
this pm·pose at the time of his inauguration.

7

However, in spite of

President Johnson twice asked his Vice President, Hubert
Hurnphrey, to stand by to make any necessary executive decisions
when he entered the hospital in 1965, and again in 1966. New York
Times, October 6, 1965, p. 1, and November 17, 1966, p-:-~---
----·-·president Eisenhower, on March 3, 1958, entered into a private
agreement with Vice President Richard Nixon that would have enabled
Nixon to act as President if circurnstances had required. Richard
H. Hansen, The Year We Had No President (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska, 1962}~-p·:--·ys-.-·---- . -·-------~-.---

6
inaction in the past, it appeared to rnoGt autho:dties that it was the
Vice President's duty to 1nake this deterrnination with, as Mr. Eisenhower put it in his letter, such consultation as he

rn~ght

find necessary.

A way was needed for the Vice President to declare his Chief's disability and assmne his authority, v;ithout appearing to usurp the President' s position.

The onus could be rernoved from a Vice Presiden-

tial declaration by giving some other group close to the President a
share in the decision and by making it clear when, how, and under what
circumstances the President may regain his office.

Historically, there

has been much fear but little evidence of power hunger in Vice Presidents.

On the contrary, Vice Presidents have been paralyzed by fear

of a·n.y suggestion that they were "making a power grab."
It follows that, if a Vice President who is acting as President

should disagree with a Chief who clai1ns to be recovered and who wishes
to resmne his duties, the procedures for resolving such a disagreem.ent must be both certain and swift.
of procedure
first place.

n~ight

The knowledge of .such certainty

act to prevent a disagree1nent frorn arising in the

If disagreement did arise, swift settlement would protect

the nation from the paralysis brought on by a protracted power struggle.

The certain knowledge that procedures exist for regaining his

office fl·orn his Vice President would also tend to encourage the Pre-sident to make a self-detel-rnination of disability whenever he might be
able. 8

8 For an extensive statement of inability problems see Silva,
Presidential Succession, Chapter IV, pp. 83-111. Also see Edward S.
·corviiri·,--TCTie-.fYresident: Office and Powers,

Fourth Revised Edition

( N';;w York--l'lev~-YOr k -Ullivei:-sity-Fi:-e-s·s~---19 57), pp. 53-· 59; and
Koenig, 01=:_:_52!.:...• pp. 71-83.

7

The Vice Presidency was created in the last days of the Constituti.onal Convention of 1787 as something of an afterthought.

The

Constitl1tion ga\re the Vice President only two duties: to preside over
the Senate and to fulfill Presidential duties in any circumstances that
n'light prevent the President from. so doing.

This unique combination

of legislative and executive functions was, perhaps, as at least one
delegate to the Convention argued, in violation of the principle of
separation of powers. 9
The original method of election assurned that Vice .Presidential
candidates would be persons of stature, cornparable to Presidential
c&mdidates.

But, after the adoption of the Twelfth Amendment, the

Vice Presidency rapidly declined.

Candidates for the office were se-

lected to give geographical balance to a party ticket or· to appease
dissident elements of the party.

Little attention, if any, was given to

the qualifications of Vice Presidential candidates to act as or to succeed
the President.
It was not until the second half of the twentieth century that the

decline of the Vice Presidency was arrested and the office began to
take on greater significance.

Today, the Vice President is a vital

member of the executive branch.

He is a me1nber of the Cabinet and

of the National Security Council.

He is often chairman of important

cornmitt.ees such as the Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity,

9John D. FeeJ~ick, From Failing Hands (Nevv York: Fordham
University Press, 1965), ·-p.-LJ7~-c1e_s.E1·1Sesaelegate Elbridge Gerry 1 s.
reactions.

8
the National Aeronautics and Space Council, and the Advisory Council
of the Peace Corp.

The Vice President also coordinates various gov-

ernment programs and can, if necessary, act as liaison between the
.President and Congress.

He serves as his Chief's personal repre-

sentati\re, both in dornestic and sometirnes in foreign affairs.

l:<'urther,

in this nuclear age, the 1nan who is but a heart beat away frorn the
Presidency m.ust be prepared to succeed to an off.i.ce having graver
responsibilities than ever before.
While the Vice President's prestige and duties have been limited
during much of our history, the office has proved to be of vital importance on the eight occasions when the Vice President has succeeded
to the Presidency upon the death of his Chief Executive. 10 On these
occasions the office of Vice President bccmne vacant.

It was also

vacant when seven Vice Presidents died in office and when one, John C.
Calhoun, resigned.

11

In spite of the number of tilnes the Vice Presidency has been
vacant, and in spite of the growth of the office from a Constitutional
afterthought to its present i1nportance, no serious effort was n1.ade to
devise a rneans for filling Vice Preside·ntial vaomcies until a(ter the
assassination of President Kennedy.

It was only after Vice President

10See Appendix A, Vice Presidents Who Succeeded to the
P1·esidency.

11 John D. Feerick, "The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment
to the Constitution, 11 Fordham Law Review, XXXIV (December, 1965),
p. 180. The Vice PresidenfSwEo ha-v:e-dleain office are George
Clinton, Elbridge Gerry, William R. King, Henry Wilson, Thornas A.
Hendricks, Garret A. Hobart, and James S. Shennan. See Appendix
B, Vice Presidential Vacancies.

9
Johnson had so s1noothly made the transition to Chief Executive that the
necessity for the office of Vice President to be always filled forced itself into public awareness.
Several ci.rcmnstances brought this necessity into focus.
there was the question of Mr. Johnson's own health.

Ii~irst,

With a history of

cardiac problerns, he might well not survive until the next election.
Second, there was the age of the potential successors to the Presidency.
Both the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the
Senate were of rather advanced age, a circun1stance not unusual, given
the system of seniority for these offices.
questioning of whether the Speaker was,

There was also sincere
in reality, the 1nan best pre-

pared to succeed.
All these circum.stances prompted consideration of how the office
of the Vice President might be kept filled.

Except in cases of multiple

disaster- -that is, the simultaneous death of both President and Vice
President·- -the con.cern was to assure succession to the Presidency
from within the executive branch.

Thus, the use of the llne of sue-

cession beyond the Vice Presidency might be avoided, if only for the
very practical reason that it is unlikely to be changed in the foreseeable
future.

This was true for two reasons: with all the discussion and

concern rega,rding Speaker 11/fcCormack's age,

12

there was also con-

12
There v;as even s01ne thought that Congress may have delayed
passage of the 25th Amendment until McCorrnack was re1noved fro1n
direct succession by the election of a Vice President: see Charles
J\!lohr, "Johnson Will Ask Curb on Electors," New York 'fhnes,
-··-----------·
January 5, 19 E
-,r:;, ·p. 18.

10

cern to avoid a personal affront to hirn; and, aside [rorn nonnal inertia -when there is no crisis, there is a kind of legislative jealousy that
would not pennit the Congress to give up the power of choosing

<.:..

poten-

ti.al President in the form of its speaker. 13

There has been a body of thought which suggests that the line of
succession beyond the Vice Presidency should be given careful consideration.

14

The viability of the 1947 succession statute was not tested

and, as already indicated, the ever pref>ent possibility of nuclear or
natural disaster, cornbined with the fear of what might have happened
had Mr. Johnson been kilLed along with President Kennedy at Dallas,
forced the conclusion that the line of succession may one day be of
n1.ore than theoretical i.mportance.
The 1947 statute placed the Speake:t· of the House next in line
after the Vice Pi"esident.

The Speaker, by the nature of things,

would

13

For a more complete statement of the problern of Vice Presidential Vacancy see Feerick, From Failing Hands , Chapter XX, "Vice
Presidential Vacancy, II pp. zs-rr:--z-rr.----·----14Feerick, From Faili.ng Hands, pp. 174-176, would appear to
favor a rctm·n to -tne-T8BO--caoui.eCTine of succession; Birch Bayh, One
Heartbeat Away (Indianapolis and :New York: The Dobbs-Merrill Com·:···
i>any;-J.t1c·.·-;--Ilj6B), pp. 350-352, includes his resolution 139 (original
fonn), Sec. G, of which very closely rese1nbles the 1886 success-ion
law; the Research and Policy Cmnrnittee of the Cornrnittcc for Econom.ic
Developrnent, Presidential Succession and Inability (New York: Comlnittee for Econ·o-mrc-~bevelopi1lerit,-19'b5);-pp-.--rr=I9, recommends the
restoration of the 1886 line of succession; and on CBS Reports, 11 The
Crisis of Presidential Succession, " as broadcast on January 8, 1964,
former President Eisenhower expressed a preference for a return to
the 1886 line o£ :;ucces.sion. For the texts of the three succession
statutes of 1792, 1886, and 1947, see Appendixes D, E, and F'.

11
bt:! a rnan of long standing cxpcrierlcc with the House and wi.th legislative matters.

He should certainly have the confidence of the legis-

lative branch and, after the President and Vice President, he might be
considered the highest elected official in the government.
little rnore to re~ornmcnd him.

But there is

On the contrary, (the Sp~aker 's lack of

participation in and, hence, preparation for executive responsibility
could rnake hirn a less preferred

candidat~Jhan

the Secretary of State

who, before the 1947 statute, was next in line to the Vice President.
Mr.

Truman justified the change by which the Speaker of the

House would head the line of succession, after the Vice President, by
the argument that the President should not have the right to appoint his
potential successor.

15

This argument nlay have some theoretical

merit but it runs counter to the long standing practice of allowing the
Presidential candidate to choose his successor in the fonn of his Vice
Presidential running rnate.

If. the goal of a succession statute is to assure the smooth and
uninterrupted continuity of government, then the Secretary of State
seerns at least as well qualified to succeed as is the Speaker of the
House.

The Secr·ctary would be an appointee of the President G.n.d thus

vwuld presmnably be in syrnpathy with the current executive policies .
.He would be familiar with the workings of the executive by virtue of
his participation in the Cabinet.

The Secretary would be both familial'

with and, it is hoped, capable of dealing with the nal;ion 's foreign

15
The thought was also expressed that Mr. Truman sought to
hono:r Speal.':er Sam Rayburn, a long ti1ne friend and fellow Democrat.
''( o u n g, ~~·--<::.~!:_.' p. 3 2 6 .

12
relations at a tirne of presupposed crisis.

He· would also likely be a

rnernber of his President's party, another factor tending to smooth the
transition.)
Although a case has been made for a return to the 1886 statute
which places the Secretary of State next in line of succession to the
Vice Presidency, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment does not specify suecession beyond the Vice Presidency.

At present, there is sxnall chance

of arousing interest, or overcoming enertia, to settle this problern
without so1ne dramatic event which, by its nature, might preclude any
consideration at all.

16

.T!_:_::_.S:_O_!lS!~!.utic:na_~__S:ol::_~.~~~-on as the Or~~in__9£ the Probl~m~

An examination of the records

17

of the Philadelphia Convention

leads to the conclusion that those who f.l·amed and ratified the suecession clause had three rnain intentions.

First,

in case of the P:re-

sident's death, resignation, or rernoval, the Vice President would act
as Chief Executive until the end of the term or until, and if, Congress
might call a special election.

Second, in the event of a Presidential

disability, the Vice President would serve as Acting President until the
disability was ended.

18

However, third,

the Vice President V/Ollld not

becorne President.

-------·-----·--16
The line of succession beyond the Vice Presidency is thoroughly
treated in Silva, Presidential Succession , Chapter V, pp. 112-151; and
in Feerick, From"1i"'";:.t1I1ngT!ana·.s-;--cnapter XXI, pp. 264-269. See also
Clinton Ross1rei~-;--,-rTi'e Am.erT·c-an Presidency, Revised Edition (New
York: Men tor Book s--:-I9 64}',-pp-:--2Ts:-zz--r.r:·-17.I.V£ost authorities have referred to Max JTarrand, The Records
of the Federal Convention of 178 7 (New Haven: Yale Uni vei-:-::sTfy...11re~ss,
.19TI-;:-lnd19 3 7).
------

18C'l
•.~t va, Preside.ntial Succession

p. 13,

13
A draft embodying these foregoing principles was submitted to
the c01nmittee on style.
com.pared with the draft

When the draft submitted to this cornmittee is
r·~turned

to the convention, it seems evident

that the committee introduced sorne confusing changes in the process
of revising the language of the succession clause:

Article X, Section 2: . . . and in case of his removal as
aforesaid, death, absence, resignation or inability to discharge the powers or duties of his office, the Vice President
shall exercise those powers and duties until another President be chosen, or until the inability of the President be removed.
Article X, Section 1: The Legislature may declare by law
what officer of the United States shall act as President, in
case of the death, resignation or disability of the President
and Vice President: and such Officer shall act accordingly,
until such disability be removed, or a President shall be
elected.
After Consolidation by the Cornmittee on Style and Later
i:C~?_rTe

cr----·---·---------------·

Article II, Section l, Clause 5: In case of the removal of the
president from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office,
the sam.e shall devolve on the vice-president, and the Congress rnay by law provide for the case of re1noval, death,
resignation or inability, both of the president and vice-pre-·
sident, declaring what officer shall then act a.s president,
and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be
rernoved, or a president shall be elected. 19
In joining the two separate clauses into one, the cornmittee:
dropped the ''absence" contingency; dropped the word "disability"
while retaining the looser tern1 "inability"; substituted the words
"the sar:ne shall dev-olve on the vice-president" for "the Vice President shall exercise those powers and duties 11 ; and left ambiguous the

---------
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length of time during which the Vice President might act as President. 20
With the .substitution of the words "the sarne shall devolve on the
vice--president'' for "the Vice President shall exercise those powers and
duties,

11

the succession clause becarne most troublesorne for those it

vvould rnost affect.

What devolved on the Vice President? Was it the

office of President, or only the powers and duties of that office? If the
Vice :President becatne President, he would probably re1nain so for the
rest o£ the tern1.

If. it were the powers and duties which devolved, the

Vice President would be only Acting President.

Whatever devolved, it

would do so in all cases- -Presidential removal, death, resignation,
- 1 'l't
an d 1nao1
1 y. 21

If one takes the grammatical approach, it can be argued that:

. The subject of. the clause "the same sball devolve on
lhe \rice-president" is th-e pronoun "same, ;r whose antecedent
is the object of the verb "discharge, 11 i.e., ''powers and
duties of the said oUice, 11 not "office, " which is the object of
the preposition "of. 11 On the other hand, it is argued that the
proper rule of construction is that where there is a relative
pronoun, it refers to the nearest precedp.g noun. In the case
of 11 f:Ja:cne" the nearest noun is "office. rr~
The debates at the Constitutional Convention indicate far rnore

clearJ.y than can the foregoing grannnatical gymnastics that the Vice
President was intended only to discharge the powers and duties of the
President; all drafts placed before the cornrnittce on style cor:tobo:t'ate
this conclusion.

23

2°Feerick,

However, the confusion and debate over g1·arnrnar
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did allow two events to occur the first tinJ.e a President died in office:
first the Vice President rnade a decision and took an action '\vhich, after
study, proved to be contrary to the intent of the Constitution; and second, once taken, the decision was debated in the legislature and press
hut was allowed to go unchallenged and to stand as prec!'!dent .
.:'?:-"g_umen~s to Support the Need for a Sol~:!.i:~-~.1_ C~nst~~:_tional

AmendnJ.ent
Although there were, and are, those wbo pointed to a long history of what might be termed "getting by,

11

and som.e few who believed

that the "Eisenhower--Nixon Letter 1124 had set a precedent for the .
n1<~st

pressing issue, a consensus grew, following the death of Presi-

dent Kennedy, that so!ne determined effort rnust be r:nade to find a
solution which was both Constitutional and dependable. It was generally agreed that action rnust be taken v:hi.le the n1atter of succession
was again of grave concern; otherwise it might, as in the past, be
pigeonholed once the atmosphere of crisis had passed.
In order adequately to correct the flaws in our. Constitutional
system or in its interpretation, it had beconH:i necessary to (l) clearly
establish that the Vice President would assume the Presidential office
in cases of the rernoval from office, death, or resignation of the
President; (2) p1·ovide that, in the event of inability, the Vice President
would exercise the powers and duties of the President as Acting President; (3) establish procedures for deterrnining the existence of in-

2 4nuoted in part on page 4 7 o£ this thesis.

16
ability and its tennination, with the resulting retu:rn of power to the
President; (4) provide for filling any vacancy occurring i.n the Vice
Presidency so that the use of the line of succession might, in all bllt
the most drastic situations, be avoided; 25 and (5) assure that at all
tirr1es it \VOuld be understood who is to act as, or is acting as, President.
Once the foregoing objectives were agreed upon, the question
arose as to how they might be achieved m.ost effectively.

The two

most likely solutions were by Congressional statute or Constitutional
amendrnent.

There was expert opinion in support of each of these

'b'l't'
pOSSl
1.1 1es.

26

Change by Congressional statute is a less cmnplicated procedure
than c.rnending the Constitution.
experience

dictat1~d.

It could be more easily m.odi.Hed if

Yet, a statute covering Presidential inability

and succession rnight be open to a court challenge at the very tirne
when certainty was most needed.

A Constitutional mnendment, on the

other hand, would be a more carefully studied, tightly defined solution with wide backing and acceptance.
fection as possible.

It would come as near to per-

The very difficulty of gaining the approval of

Congress and the ratification of the states would help assLire that an
amendn1.ent would produce the best solution obtainable.

It would

attempt to provide for the contingencies that are known and for those
that study indicate to be predictable. It could pennit change at some

/

,.
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future date of a given feature by statute, thLIS allowing for the unf.oreseen.

Such an arnendrnent would be unchallengeable in time of crisis

and thus, hopefully, provide a clear, certain set of answers. 27
There seem.ed to be general agreement that neither the statute
Ol'

the amendment, nor the specifics to be embodied in.either, was

capable of producing the perfect solution.

There was equally as gen-

eral agreement that this could not be allowed to delay the drafting and
enacting of the most suitable possible legislation.

With the best of

legislation, the President and Vice President would still have to be
relied upon to act with constitutional legality.

If it were assumed that

both men elected to the executive departrnent are scoundrels, there
could be no legislation that would reasonably assure legal succession.
Hence, the best possible solution lay in clarification as rnuch as in
protectioD..

------------·
27Hansen, op. cit., pp.
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CHAPTER II

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE
SUCCESSION PROBLEMS

The Tyler

Prece~en.!_

On April 4,

1841, William Henry Harrison died and the Presiden-

ti.al office was vacant for the first tirne.

A man never seriously con-

sidered as a potential President was to be the first to test the Constitution's succession clause.
John Tyler took the Presidential oath on April 6 and proceeded to
sign officia.l papers ''John Tyler,
Mr.

President of the United States.

11

Tyle1· thus made it evident that he intended to be President, rather

tltan sirnply exercise the po\vers of the office.

1

His motives, both for taking the oath and assuming the office,
have been debated without final agreement.

It is .not even certain that

it was Tyler himself who made the decision to assume the office.

How-

ever, publicly the new President gave the impression that the decision
had been his, and the basis for that decision was his conviction that the
word

11

sa1ne 11 in the succession clause referred to "office" rather than

powers and duties.
Tyler also sought to m.ake it clear that the office devolved upon
hixn before he had taken the oath of the Presidency.

1K
·
.oemg,

.t
_<?P:_~·

p. 82 .

18

He did so by having

19
Judge Cranch, who achnini.stered the oath, sign a sta tcrneut to that
Whatever devolves on a Vice-President in case of a Pre..:

effect: ".

sident' s death should do so at the thne of the President's death and
not when the Presidential oath is taken.

,,z

Tyler seems to have taken

the Presidential oath mainly to preclude any real challenge to the legitimacy of his succession, for he had expressed the belief that the sue-'cession to the Presidency was covered in his original Vice Presidential
oath of office.
Tyler's succession was not accepted as automatic by his conternporaries.

The question of his status was discussed and debated in

both Congress and the press.

Senator William Allan made the remark-

ably perceptive and prophetic staternent of the future complications
that might arise with regard to a Presidential disability if Mr.
accession to the oHice was allowed to stand.
of Congress,

3

Tyler's

However, both Houses

after debate, accepted Tyler's succession in their own

peculiar and indirect way, and eventually the opposition press grew
quiet on the su,bject.

Even old John Qu,incy Adams began to refer to

1\/Ir. Tyler as the President.

4

And yet Adams wrote in his journal

that the correct "style" for Tyler was "Vice-President . . . Acting
President. ".5
Althou~h

Congress was somewhat tardy in establishing a

2 Feerick, Frc)m Failing Hands, p. 92.
·----------~~·-----·-
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1nonum.<:mt to President Tyler, it is said that he created his own m the
precedent he set: the office of the Presidency devolves on the Vice
President when that office is vacant.

The resulting vacancy in the

Vice Presidency---particularly Tyler's suggestion that the second office
should devolve upon the President pro terrrpore of the S.enate- -was given
some consideration during his administration.

However, no action was

taken on this seemingly less itnportant n1atter, and thus a second precedent was allowed to establish itself: the Vice Presidency, when
vacated, remains so until the end of the term.

Garfield-Arthur and the Tyler Precedent
On the rnorning of July 2, 1881, President Garfield was shot by
Charles J. Gui teau,

a disappointed ofEice -seeker.

Mr.

Garfield lived

s01ne eighty days in a condition that aroused alternately hope and
despair.

On August 10, he performed the only official act during the

course of his illness--the signing of an extradition paper.

Much

tnore important 1natters demanded the attention of the Chief Executive
during this period: there were postal frauds; officers unable to perform their duties because the President had riot signed their commissions; and there seems to have been a serious deterioration in the
nation's fo1·cign relations.

6

During this first prolonged and publicized period of Presidential
disa.bility, Vice President Chester A. Arthur proved too weak to fulfill
his duties under the inability provision of the succession clause.

6
Ruth C. Silva, "Presidential Inability,
Law Journal, XXV (December, 1957), p, 140.

11

~2~-~_versi!L__~f.

All

Detroit

21.

the govertllnent leaders, including himself, seen1. to have viewed with
· al~nn the possibility of Arthur succeeding to the Presidency. 7 Headed
by the Secretary of State, the Cabinet provided whatever leadership
the government received.
to the Constitution,

11

Yet it had been described as a body

and the type of regency it

operate~

11

unknown

was certainly

never contem.plated.
At the time Garfield was shot, three Vice Presidents had sueceeded to the highest office and filled out the dead Presidents 1 terms
in accordance with Tyler's precedent.

As a result of this precedent,

it was argued that a Vice President actually becomes President for the
remainder of any term in which he acts as President. If Arthur
would Garfield also ren1ain President?

11

acted,

Could there be two Presidents

at the same time? JVIost critical question of all, would Garfield be
able to resun1e t.he exe1·cise of his power if his disability ceased to
exist? 8
Such uncertainties worked to prevent the Cabinet from inviting
Arthur to substitute temporarily for the President.

By the time Gar-

field had lived two n1onths, the Cabinet was in agreement on the desirability of such a course.

However, the majority of the Cabinet men1- ·

bers held that Arthu.r 1 s exercise of executive power vvould. be equivalent
to removing Garfield fron1. oHice. 9
And what of Garfield? Could he not himself decide how to re-

7

F'eerick,

8 suva,

11

.~r?rr:__!~iling H~n~-~-'

Presidential Inability,

9Ibid., p. 140.

11

p. 120.
pp. 139-140.

11

22
sol\re the situation? It i3 reported that for som.e tir:ne after the shooting he was, for the most part, alert and in possession of his faculties.
But he was discouraged from participating in government and deciding
the question of his own inability by the advice of his doctors, that his
only chance for survival depended on absolute rest and no involvement
in affairs of state.

10

The President, the Vice President, the Cabinet

and the press all appear to have accepted the physicians' advice.

In

addition, the personal history of Garfield's friends and their fear that
he would in effect abdicate the Presidency if its powers were exercised

by another led them to minimize the extent of his disability and the
~
nee d ror
an ac t"tve execut"1ve.

11

Another cause for inaction was the absence of clear guidelines
fm: deciding the issue of disability.
flicting.

Opinion on this question was con-

Although some thought that the courts, the Congress, the

President himself, or even the Cabinet ought to decide when the President was disabled,

most "informed" opinions agreed that it was the

Vice President's duty to deterrnine whether his Chief was incapacitated.

The question was how to compel the extrem.ely reluctant Vice

President to take such action.

12

Arthur found hhnseH in a delicate and somewhat embarrassing
position.

He had been nominated largely to placate the leader of the

Stah\,art Wing of the Republican Party and thus heal a schism.

1°F eertc.
. k,
11 s·1
1.

va,

Presidential Succession, p. 52.

This,

- 23
com.bined wi.th the deranged assassin's proclaimed loyalty. to Arthur
and to Stalwartism,

gave rise to false rumors that the Vice President

had been involved in a plot that would have put him in the White House.l3
Arthur's course n1i.ght not have been clear even had there been
no dispute over Garfield's right to resume control of his office.

For

the fact that Arthur was a Stalwart and the President a member of the
Halfbreed faction would have most likely led to charges of usurpation.
So Arthur did nothing but wait, and his contemporaries universally
agreed that in so doing he conducted himself in a manner above reproach.
Upon Garfield's death the Cabinet, which had at first treated
Arthur with "silent hosti.iity, 1114 notified him of the President's passing and advised him "to take the oath of office of President o£ the
United States, without delay. 11 15
It is to his lasting credit that President Arthur repeatedly ex-

pressed deep concern over the disability problem and asked Congress
to formulate legal answers in his message to that body in 1881, 1882,
and 1883.

No more complete statement of the manifold nature of the

problern has been rnade than that of Arthur in his special1nessage of
December 6, 1881:
What is the intent of the Constitution in Hs specification of
"inability 'to discharge the powers and duties of the said
office'' as one of the contingencies which calls the VicePresident to the exercise of Presidential functions?
Is the inability limited in its nature to long-continued

13:1Teerick, From Failing Hands,

14 Ibid., p. 123.

p.

120.

15Ib" ,

10. '

p. 129.
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intellectual incapacity, or has it a broader irnport? .
What

n~ust

be its extent and duration?

How must its existence be established?
Has the President whose inability is the subject of inquiry any voice in determ.ining whether or not it exists,
or is the decision of that m01nentous and delicate question confided to the Vice-President, or is it contemplated
by the Constitution that Congress should provide by law
precisely what should constitute inability, and how and by
what tribunal or authority it should be ascertained?
If the inability proves to be temporary in nature, and
during its continuance the Vice-President lawfully exercises the functions of the Executive, by what tenure
does he hold his office?

Does he continue as President for the rernainder of the
four years' term?
Or would the elected President, if his inability should
cease in the interval, be ernpowered to resume his
office'?
And i{, having such lawful authority, he should exercise
it, would th<:: Vice ·-President be thereupog empowered to
resum.e his powers and duties as such? 1

All three Congresses considered inability, its effect on the status a·nd
tenure of: the disabled President, and even the question of how disability should be established.

17

Instead of producing any solution to

these proble1ns, Congress in 1886 named a statutory successor to act
as President in case of v3.cancy or disability in both the Presidency
and Vice Presidency.

18

While this action may not be without merit,

I

16James D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents
(Washin.gton, D, C.: Bureau oCNationaf Literatur·e-ai1d ~T909T,-
Vol. VIII, p. 65.
17Silva,
18
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Congress appears to have found the problem of Presidential inability
as a whole so difficult that it turned to a facet with which it could cope.
With the enactment of this so-called succession law, the subject of
Presidential disability was again tacitly ignored.
Cleveland's Concealed Inability

-·------------

Shodly after beginning his second term, in May of 1893, Cleveland noted a. rough spot on the roof of his mouth.

A 1nonth later a

White House physician discovered a tumor, the size of a quarter.

A

biopsy was performed and a specimen sent to a leading pathologist
who con.firmed the diagnosis of malignancy and advised immediate
surgery.

19

However, at the sa1ne time there was a financial panic envelopi.ng the nation.

Cleveland believed that the prirnary cause of this panic

I
t

I

and the resulting depression was the Shennan Silver Purchase Act of

i

1890, and accordingly, on June 30, 1893, he called for a Special

-~

Session of Congress to convene on August 7.

The stated purpose of

[

It was believed that only

I

this call was the repeal of the Sherrnan Act.

Cleveland was capable of forcing through repeal and that,

i[

something

should happen to him, not only would the Shennan Act be permitted to
stand, but the Vice President, Adlai E. Stevenson, wonld bring the
nation to the silver stc1.ndard.

20

For these reasons, and the possibly adverse effects on the

--------· - - l9Karl C. Wold,
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public of a revelation that he had cancer.

Cleveland in;;;isted that the

operation be performed in the secrecy of a trusted friend's yacht.
On the same night that he issued the call for a Special Session, the
President boarded the yacht, Oneida, where, on July 1, the first
operation was performed.

On July 17, a second operation was under-

taken to remove some suspicious tissue. 21 By August 7, Cleveland
had recovered, returned to Washington, and addressed Congress
urging the repeal of the Sherman Act.

Ostensibly, he had been cruis-

ing on his friend's yacht and vacationing at a smnrner home.
Because of the lack of any scar and the norrnal, or perhaps even
improved, quality of Cleveland's speech, a contetnporary newspaper
account of the operation, which was essentially correct, was passed
off by the President's friends with the explanation that he had just had
sorne teeth extracted.

It was not until twenty-four years later that the

truth came to light in an article in the Sa~urd~y ~~~ning_Pos_!, written
by one of the doctors who had participated in Cleveland's operation. 22
Cleveland's reasons for concealing his disability stemmed h·orn
the political and economic conditions of his time, including the fact
that his Vice President adhered to a policy, with 1·egard to the silver
question,

different fr01n his own.

There is no record that the ques-

tions raised during Garfield's illness were a consideration in Cleveland's decision to avoid admitting to disability.

21 Feerick, _Fr~m Failinfi!Iat~ds_, p.
2

~bid., p. 149.
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McKinley is Shot and T.

R. Succeeds

On the afternoon of September 6, 1901, Willi.arn McKinley
attended a public reception at the Pan-Arnerican Exhibition. in
Buffalo.

Hundreds waited in line to shake hands with the President.

Among thern was Leon Czologosz.

Although McKinley was well guard-

ed, Czologosz was able to approach the Chief Executive and fire two
shots before being subdued.

23

Vice President Roosevelt and all but one m.ember of the Cabinet
hurriedly assembled in Buffalo.

By Tuesday, the lOth, McKinley 1 s

condition was improved to such a degree that tl~e Vice President and
Cabinet were inforrned that there was no longer any need to remain. 24
Roosevelt returned to his vacation in the Adirondacks.

He believed

25
the :President was out oE danger, . and perhaps, by his action, sought

to reassure the nation. 26
On Friday, September 13,

Roosevelt received a messa.ge that

McKinley was dying and he promptly set out a second tirne to reach
his stricken C)lief.
death.

He was notified on his way of the President's

Upon his arrival in Buffalo, Roosevelt was requested by Elihu

Root, senior Cabinet member present, to take the oath of the Presi.dency in accordance vvith the precedent established by Tyler and confinned by Arthur.
I

23

Young,

~L cit.,

p. 120.

2 ":lTeerick, From Failing Hands, p. 157.
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In making his reqnest, Root may have wanted to avoid any questi6n or m.isunderstandi.ng regarding RoOsevelt's succession during the
critical period following McKinley's death. 2 7 McKinley had lived
only eight days after bei.ng shot, perhaps too short a period for the
question of inability to have arisen seriously.

The principal concern

of both the Cabinet and the Vice President appears to have been the
President's recovery.

The question of who, if anyone, should govern

see1ns not to have been raised.

Both national and international affairs

seem to have been quiet enough that even though the President was disabled, the Vice President did not hesitate to return to his interrupted
vacation in a remote area where few knew his whereabouts.

Wilson:

A Refusal_to_}\.dmit Inability Result~_2.~. Go\rernment by

Household Junta
It was at the P<l1'is Conference following World War I that the

pressures and responsibilities of hi.s office first overwhelmed President Wilson.

Regarded by some as a "messiah of peace, " Wilson

suffered in Paris a complete collapse and was confined to bed with
what was, at the time, described as influenza.

There was son1e talk

of a slight shoke, which may not have been the first, and of impaired
judgrnent.

28

MernbeJ:s of the official entourage noted marked and

peculia1· changes in the Presi.dent's personality.

27silva, Presidential Succession, p. 28.
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Wilson was still recupe1·ating from the effects of his illness when
he reached Washington in July 1919, to face opposition to his country's
participation in the League of Nations.
clition for the battle to come.

The President was in no con-

Against the advice of his doctor, his

personal secretary, and his wife, he decided to meet s.enatorial opposition with popular support, and set out on a speaking tour of the
western states, a tour that proved too much for a frail and aging
man. 30
The President had stated at a Cabinet meeting that he would be
willing to give up his life for the League.

He very nearly did so. At

Pueblo, Colorado, on September 25, almost blinded by pain in his forehead, Wilson delivered his last, and perhaps his finest, speech.
next rnorning, the President's personal physician, Dr.

The

Gary T. Gray-

i.
I

son, noted that Wilson's left side was paralyzed. 31 Wilson's tour was

I

abruptly canceled and the Presidential train speeded the 1, 500 miles

r

to Washington, whereupon the President disappeared into the White
House.

32

On the return trip he had regained the use of his left arm and
leg, but on October 2, 1919, Wilson's l.eft side was again partially
3~

paralyzed by a cerebral thrornbosis.
dent's life hung in the balance.

J

.
For nearly a week the Presi-

Then began a recovery that was to

---------'
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prove both agonizingly slow and incornplete.
Tbc exact point at which Wilson 1 s disability as a President began
might be open to question, but it clearly did not end until he left the
I!::xecutive Mansion at the end of his term in 1921.

During the interim.,

two groups sought to fulfill the executive responsibilities.
which has been termed a

11

household junta,

wife, his personal secretary,
Grayson.

11

The first,

consisted of the President 1 s

Joseph Tumulty, and his physician, Dr.

The second group was composed of the rne1nbers of the

Cabinet, led by Secretary of State Lansing until the President re. restgna
.
t'ton. 34
ques t e d h ts

lVIrs. Wilson recorded in her mernoirs that, before undertaking
\vhat she termed her
.

11

stewardshin,
L

11

she had proposed to Dr.

Decurn,

I

who \vas consulting on her husband 1 s case, that the President resign
in order to obtain the rest he so needed, and that the Vice President
be permitted to succeed.
11

advised,

Mrs. Wilson further stated that the doctor

H he resigns, the greatest incentive to recovery is gone.

and suggested the course she was to take in screening the President
from all but the most im.portant matters and decisions. 35 She pointed
out in defense of her actions,

II

decision regarding public affairs.

. I myself never rnade a single
The only decision that was mine

was what was irnportant and what was not, and the very irnportant
decision of vvhen to present m.atters to rny husband.

34
Feerick,
3
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31

seems obvious that this false modesty of Mrs.

Wilson was responsible

for charges that the President was out of touch with reality, if not for
graver national questions.

Mrs. Wilson evidently considered only a

Vice Presidential success-ion of a perrnanent nature, and she put this
thought aside upon Dr.

Decum's advice. She reveal'3 in her memoirs,

"Woodrow Wilson was first my beloved husband whose life I was trying
to save,

. after that he was President of the United States. 1137

On October 3, Secretary Lansing called on Tumulty to suggest
that Vice President Marshall be requested to act in Wilson's place.
The President's secretary raised the question of who should ce:rtify
Wilson's inability.
Dr.

Grayson.

Lansing indicated it should be either Tumulty or

The President's secretary assured Lansing that he

WOL!ld take no part in "ousting" Wilson.

It thus appears that Tumulty,

and by implication, Wilson, believed that the Tyler-Garfield precedents would result in an ostensibly ternporary assumption of power by
the Vice President rernaining in effect to the end of Wilson 1 s tenn.
Grayson joined the discus sian and agreed that he also would refuse to
take any part in declaring the President disabled.

The incident closed

with Tumulty inform.ing Lansing that if Wilson "were in a condition to
know of this episode,

11

he would take decisive steps,

38

a remark plainly

indicating how truly disabled the President was. 3 9
On Monday, October 5, Lansing called a meeting of the Cabinet

37Hansen, op. cit~_, p. 35.
3

8y-oung,
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apparently hoping that this body n:1ight agree on a course of action to
be followed during Wilson's recovery.

Perhaps the Secretary of State

was really seeking their help to declare Wilson disabled.
this was not the result.

Dr. Grayson and Mr.

In any event,

Tumulty appeared at the

tneeti.ng, and Grayson reported the President's condition irnproved.
He also indicated that Wilson had shown irritation that a Cabinet meeting was being held without his call.

40

This statement seetns to have

placed Lansing and the already reluctant Cabinet in an ernbarrassingly
defensive posture and ended hope of Cabinet consideration of Presidential disability.

41

The Cabinet met without the President twenty-one titnes in all
between October 6, 1919, .and February 10, 1920, to transact such
business as they were able.

On February 11, Wilson requested

Lansing's resignation on the grounds that he had assumed Presidential
authority by ccnducting Cabinet meetings without the President's
order.

Wilson considered that he thus "spiked" Lansing's disloyalty.
During the early days of Wilson's disability,

42

Congress refused

to pave the way for a Vice Presidential succession by suggesting to
Marshall that,

since the powers of the Presidency devolved upon him,

it was his duty to establish the President's disability.

He might do

13
this "indirectly'' by acting as Chief Executive. '
The Republican
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leaders who controlled Congress had refused to consider Wilson's
disability, partially out of fear of being critici<ced for taking advantage
of the illness of a Democratic President. 44 It is suggested that they
hoped s01ne drarnatic disclosure might take care of the rnatter for
them.

The Congressional De1nocrats naturally wanted to avoid pub-

licizing their Chief's incapacity; it might prove detrimental to the
passage of the Treaty of Versailles and it would not help at election
time.
During this critical period, the Vice President stood on the side
lines, cornplained of being kept in the dark, and refused to take any
i.nitiative. 45 The only executive function he fulfilled for the President
was that of entertaining the visiting Belgian 1nonarchs.

This was a

duty he was "unofficially requested" to perform by the White House. 46
.Nbrshall feared that if he acted on the President's behalf,
Wilson rnight accuse him of usurpation.

He is reported to have said,

"I a1n not going to seize the place and then have Wilson-·-recovered-come around and say 'get off,

you usurper. ' 1147 The Vice President's

fear was not without basis, for Wilson viewed Lansing's actions as
usurpation; actions that had helped to keep the government functioning
and thus perhaps forestalled a possible Congressional m.ove to declare
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the President disabled. 48 While the Vice President could hardly be
forced to resign by a Chief Executive who considered hirn disloyal,
Marshall m.ay have been serious when he reportedly told his wife that
his :=:ttternpt to assume the executive functions "could throw this country
into civil war. 114 9 Such an atternpt would almost certainly have dan1aged both parties politically and shaken hopes for Wilson's beloved
League of Nations.
The Vice President said he '!\'Ould assun1e the Presidency only
in the event of a resolution by Congress, and only with approval, i.n
writing, of both Mrs.

Wilson, with whom Marshall otherwise feared

entanglement, and Dr. Grayson. 50 Neither of these conditions was
e\rer rnet and so the government continued to limp along,

barely func-

tioning for a year and a half. 5l
Mnch has been written about the nature of Wilson's illness and
the degree to which he was disabled by it.

From this considerable body

of writing it is possible to draw two conclusions .. First, the President
during IT?-uch of the time after his speech at Pueblo, Colorado, was
seriously ill. Second, he may or may not have been rnentally as well
as physically ill, but his judgment was inipaired.
During the Special Session of the Sixty-Sixth Congress, sorne
twenty-eight acts becarne law without the President's signature and,

4
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although he vetoed the Prohibition Enforcen"lent Act of October 2 7,

1919, the President failed to pass on fifteen of the sixteen acts sent to
the White House between October 28 and Novem.ber 18. He did not meet
with the Cabinet for eight months after his collapse.
did meet with the Cabinet, Mrs.

When he finally

Wilson stood by to call a halt when

the President tired. 52 He failed to answer the repeated requests
from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for information on the
Shantung Settlement. 53 These failures to act form clear evidence
that Wilson was, beyond doubt, unable to sustain Presidential responsibility and that governrnental business suffered as a result of his
disability.

On August 2, 1923, President Warren Harding, who had been on
a western speaking tour and fallen ill in San Francisco, died suddenly
while his wife was reading to him.

Death was probably due to

a

cere-

bral thrombosis but, since Mrs. Harding would not permit an autopsy,
the exact cause ren1.ained undeterrnined.

In the absence of autopsy

evidence, and of any evidence that Har_ding ha·d eaten crab meat, although the Surgeon General originally diagnosed the illness as acute

~oseph Daniels, The Wilson Era (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press 1946) p. 54s,-cite-d by Hansen, op. ·cit., p. 41.
5

-·----·-

53Silva, 11 Pre.sidential Inability, 11 p. 142, and Presidehtial
Succession, p. 58.
-··--·----------,Tile!act that the Senate Committee on FOJ~eign Relations was
unable to get action or in£onnatior1 from the President on the Shantung
Settlement caused Senator Albert B. !<,all to suggest that, if the Presi-dent was too ill to discharge his duties, lhe Senate ought to recess until he was able to do so .. However, nothing came of this suggestion.
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indigestion caused by crab rneat, rurnors of poisoning arose. 54
When Congress recessed in the surnm.er of 1923, Vice President
Coolidge had gone on vacation to his father's home in Plyrnouth, Vermont.

Coolidge was awakened after rnidnight,

August 3,

by his father,

informed of Harding's death, and advised by the Attorney General to
take the Presidential oath. 55 The oath was administered by Coolidge's
father, a notary public of the State of Vermont, who was so excited by
these events that he stayed up the rest of the night while his son, the
new President, returned to bed. 56
On August 21, he again received the oath, this time from. a
justice of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.

Coolidge

did so on the advice of the Solicitor General, who feared a contraversy over whether an oath adrninistered by a state official was valid.
The oath was taken secretly to avoid alarming the country,

57

and

because of the wish to preserve the appealing story of the first oath
taken in Vermont. 58 Coolidge was later to say tl;tat it was not clear to
him that he was required to take the oath at all in view of the Vice
Presidential oath which covered the possibility of his succession to
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the Presidency. 5 9
After this it seemed agreed that Coolidge was President.

How-

ever, when there was talk of his running for re-election in 1928,
objection was raised on the grounds that, if he were elected, it would
violate the two--term t1·adition.

On the other hand, it was argued that

during Coolidge's so-called first term, he was only Vice President
acting as President, for no man could become President without be-ing
elected in accordance with the Constitution. 6
·words,

°

Coolidge, in his own

did not choose to run m 1928, and so the question rernained

untested and the Tyler precedent remained intact.
T~·um~_:-~_he Vice Preside~t N~! Prop_:=rly Prepared to Take Ove:

On Thursday, Aprill2, 1945,

Harry Truman received a tele--

phone call while visiting Speaker Sam Rayburn in the latter's office.
The President's Press Secretary told the Vice President to come to
the White House as quickly as possible. Mr. Truman did so and was
inforrn.ed that he had just become the thirty-third President of the
United States.

61

The Presidency had fallen to a man who had' spoken with the
President fewer than ten tin1.es since their n01nination.

Trurnan re-

corded that only a few Cabinet meetings were held because Roosevelt
was either abroad or, after his return, at Warrn Springs a great part

-----·---·-----·
5 9Feerick, From Failing Hands, p. 186.

60suva, Presidential Succession, p. 29.
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of the titne.

Yet Truman would now face the p1·oblems of the war,

the post war period, and over three years and nine months of the Pres1'd ency. 62
Questions regarding Roosevelt's health had been wide spread and
becam.e a rnajor issue during his fourth term campaign.
physician, Dr.

His personal

Mcintire, at that time issued a statement that the Presi-

dent's health was good, but Roosevelt was reported by his son, Jarnes,
to have suffered at least two attacks of severe pain that were concealed
from his doctor. 63 Roosevelt had entered upon his fourth term at the
age of sixty--three.

There is considerable mystery surrounding the

state of his health in those last years of his life, much of it engendered
by wartime secrecy and cornpounded by the President's lack of C8.ndor
with his own physician and hi.s staff's loyal efforts to screen their Chief
from criticism.
Many at the crucial Yalta Conference were shocked by Roosevelt's
appearance but opinions regarding the state of his health, and its effect
on decisions reached, are conflicting.
insists the President's mind was clear,

Secretary of State Stettinius
64

yet it has been suggested

that some of the controversial agreernents reached at the conference
were affected by Roosevelt's ill health. 65 On his return to W::,shington,

----------·---62
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Roscoe-Drummond studied the vast collection of notes, min-utes, position papers, and personal exchanges ar.nong the participants at the Yalta Conference in 1945. Drummond concluded that
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people who saw him were also shocked by his. appearance.
physically exhausted and left on March 29 for Warm

He was

Sprin~s,

Georgia,

where he continued to work until his unexpected death on the afternoon
of April 12.

When death did come, it was with such swiftness that the

problems of disability and of keeping the Vice President informed did
not arise. 66
Harry Truman had over three years as Chief Executive torefleet on the problem of Vice Presidential vacancy before Alben W.
Barkley became famous as the "Veep. " Mr. Truman 1 s approach to
the problems of succession was to propose, not a means for filling the
vacant second office, but rather a change in the succession statute.
Jarnes A.

Farley was the first rnajor public figure behind the

mo\ren:..ent to repeal the Presidential Succession Act of 1886. In a
speech at Hazelton, I'ennsylvania, on May 9, 1945, he pointed out that
President T1·uman was in a position to pick his own successor, which
he, and later Trurnan, believed circum.vented the dernocratic process. 67

without a doubt Roosevelt had not done his homework; he had failed
to master the essential briefing papers, and was .
. at the rnercy
of the .
. negotiators with whom he met . .
. FDR's top advisors
were unable to hold the President's attention while trying to convey
the information he needed to know. He seerned unable to conccnh·ate on the matters before the conference for any length of time.
Adm.iral Ernest King believed that the President had shrunk from
facing controversial issues because he could not stand the physical
strain. Was this an instance of presidential disability?
Corwin, op. cit., pp. 54 and 345, concurs and goes further by
stating 11 F. D.TC'T's] inability was clearly evident to his close
associates even before his last election. 11

6 {,.•t· p. :Jr..7 •
'Hans en, op_:___:_:__:_,
6silva, Presidential Succession , p. 124.
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Criticisrn was also made by Secretary of State Edward R.

Stettinius,

who stood first in line of succession. Many Congressmen felt
that he lacked schooling in politics and sufficient governmert experi-ence to act as President should anything happen to Trmnan. 68
Before departing with Stettinius for the Potsdam Conference,
;'

President Truman sent a special rnessage to Congress requesting a
change in the succession law.

He suggested that the Speaker of the

House and the President pro tempore of the Senate should replace the
members of the Cabinet as heirs apparent. 6 9 Truman's stated rea·sons for such a succession change,

like those of his Co"Q.gressional

supporters, were based on the idea that it was more

11

den'locratic 11 to

have men who were elected rather than appointed at the top of the list
of potential successors.
A rneasure sim.ilar to the President's suggestion passed the
House by a vote of 167 to 32, amid cheers for the able Speaker Sarn
Rayburn. It had received only the most perfunctory consideration. 7 0
The Senate was less enthusiastic because of grave doubts over the
constitutionality of some of the bill's provisions and, further, because
of its natural opposition to placing the Speaker ahead of its own presiding officer.

Not surprisingly, the Senate kept the measure in

com.n'litt:ee until, as a result of the 1946 Congressional elections, the
Republicans won a controlling majority in both Houses. 71
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Republicans who previously had been indifferent to Truman's
plan now becm:ne interested in a change that would place two met:nbers
of their party- -Speaker Joseph W. Martin and Presiden-t Pro Tempore
Arthur Vandenberg--in direct line of succession.

Truman,

unmoved

by the results of the election, insisted that if the plan were sound when
the Democrats controlled the Speakership, it was so when a Republican
occupied the chair. 72 The succession bill was passed by the Republican Congress in short order, over the opposition of Sena-te Democrats.
It was quicldy signed by the President and became law on July 18.

The Presidential Succession Act of 1947 contains all of the provisions of Truman's original proposal except that of calling for a
special election of President and Vice President at the next Congressional election to :replace an acting Chief Executive drawn from the
succession line. 73

The Eisenhower Letter: Precedent and Application
Dwight D. Eisenhower knew som.ething of the problems of in-ability and succession even before his three illnesses as President.
He had lived through Wilson's prolonged disability and, as a result,
came to feel that the nation had a right to know 'the exact status of its
President's health.
ShrJrtly after his nomination in 1952, Eisenhower related to
Nixon how unprepared Truman had been for his succession at F'. D. R. 's

7 2suva, Presidential Succession , p. 128.
73see Appendix F (or the text of the Succession Act of 1947.
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death.

The General expressed his earnest convictions that this should

never happen again and that the Vice President should be trained and
prepared to take over smoothly if necessary. 74 It is to Eisenhower's
credit that he made serious efforts to re-establish the Vice Presidency
as a vital working part of the Executive Branch of governn'lent,

so that

Richard Nixon could become probably the best equipped Vice President
in our history to face the contingencies of succession.
Nixon was the third Vice President to confront the problem of
Presidential disability.

Like his predecessors, Chester Arthur and

Thornas Marshall, he faced an extremely delicate situation.

Unlike

any other Vice President, he was forced to deal with disability on three
different occasions, during which the problem, as he saw it, was to
provide leadership without appearing to lead.

75

Ei.s enhower 's first illness, which r·:'!sulted from a "mild 11 heart
attack, began early in the morning of September 24, 1955.

He com·-

menced daily conferences with his assistant, Shennan AJmns, on
October 1 to deal with official matters.

The President m.et with his

Cabinet on November 22, but did not return to Washington uutil

•
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On the evening of Saturday, September 2.4, Vice President
Nixon, General Persons, and Acting Attorney Cieneral William P.
Rogers 1net at Rogers' home. They discussed the situation and
spoke by telephone with Secretary of State Dulles and Secretary of the
Treasury George M. Hmnphrey. A consensus was reached that the
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During his illness, Eisenhower saw to it that the pu.blic was inform.ed o£ his condition and also, as a result of his knowledge of
Wilson's treatment of SeCl.. etary Lansing, that the Cabinet and National
Security Council should continue to meet under the chairmanship of
the Vice P1·esident. Some thought was given to the delegation of powers to Nixon, but this was dropped in favor of what was called team
leadership.
tant, Mr.

In accordance with this decision, the President's assis-

Adams, wen.t to the hospital in Denver where Eisenhower

was being treated to act as official spokes·man and liaison officer.
I-Ie met with the President every few days beginning with the second
week following the heart attack.
of Mrs.

He performed something of the role

Wilson during the early days of treatment, deciding who and

what should reach the President's attention. 77 Nixon remained in
"~l{ashi:1gton

to conduct Cabinet meetings- -from the Vice President's

chair.
Nixon recorded that,

during the President's three illnesses,

"Although I did not take over the reins of government, I was captain
of the tearn that kept the ship of state on course while the President
was incapacita.ted. 1178 Yet, if Nixon was captain, Sherman Adams
was quarterback and, according to the opinion of political scientist
Louis Koenig, Adams was nothing less than Acting President of
I

adn1inistration of the government should be continued by the Cabinet
and White House staff. This was the course followed until October l
when the P1·esident was able to meet with his assistant, 1\/Ir. Adams.
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the United States. '79 These authorities, disagreeing in detail, do
agree that the tearn-government approach probably worked only because there had been no existing crisis at the time the President
became incapacitated and none had developed during the course of
his recovery.
Eisenhower himself had raised questions about his own ability,
during the early period of his treatrnent, to make any vitally importaut decision such as the use of retaliatory force against an attack.
He also expressed doubts as to who would have had undisputed authority to assume leadership in the absence of an able Chief Executive.
On July 7, 1956, less than nine months after his heart attack,
the President was to suffer a second disabling illness.

He underwent

emergency surgery to relieve an obstruction in the lower intestine.
The ilei.t.is operation wa:3 successful, but Eisenhower was to endure
greater pain over a longer period of time than in the case of his heart
attack. 80
The day following his operation, the President walking and
a few days later began to perform official acts.

But it was not until

late July that he was able to function ori a full time basis, when he
went to Panama to attend the m.eeting of American presidents.

While

in the hospital the second time, Eisenhower told those near hirn that,
if another illness should occur, he would l'esign for he was profoundly
disturbed by the fact that,

7 9rbid., pp.- 265-266.
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during the two hours he was under anesthesia,
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the country was without either a Cornrnander-in-Chief or an officer
who had undisputed authority to act for him.

81

President Eisenhower's third illness occurred late in 1957,
seventeen and one-half months after the ileitis episode.

On Novem-

ber 2 7, he su£fe1·ed what was diagnosed as an occlusion of the srnall
branch of the middle cerebral artery on the left side, probably caused
by a vascular spasm or blood clot.

The doctors stated that the effects

of this stroke, the rnost obvious of which was a speech impairment,
we1·e m.ild and transitory, and that his reading, writing, and reasoning powers were unaffected. 82 On the basis of this infor.mation, the
Attorney General concluded that it would not be necessary to delegate
any power to the Vice President. So, once again the enorrnous problems of a disabled Co:mmander-in-Chief had been side-stepped,

But

this time the decision had been made by the nation's highest legal
officer; in Wilson's tirne, a similar decision had been taken by those
so close to the President that their only consideration had been his
personal we Hare. 83
President Eisenhower's battle to secure a solution to the inability problem bega.n in January, 1956, after his recovery frorn his
first illness.

He ordered Attorney General Brownell to make an in-

depth study of the problem so that a plan might be drafted to protect
the country in case of Presidential di.sa bility at a tim.e when imn1ediate

81
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execL1tive action was essential.

84

Brownell went so far as to enlist

the aid of Ruth Silva, whose work has often been cited in this paper,
but the project was postponed by the 1956 election lest it become an
85
.
. par t'tsan po l't'
tssue
tn
1 tcs.
As a result of the Cabinet meeting on February 8, 1957, i.t was
qecided to push for a Constitutional amendment along the lines favored
by the Attorney General:
Section l.

In case of the removal of the President from office,

~Of-his death or resignation, the Vice-President shall become

President for the unexpired portion of the then current term.
Section 2. If the President shall declare in writing that he is
·una5le to discharge the powers and duties of his office, such
powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as
Acting President.
Section 3. If the Prer~ident does not so declare, the Vice-Presi<renf;Tfsatisfied of the President's inability, and upon approval
in writing of a majority of the heads of executive departments
who are mernbers of the President's Cabinet, shall discharge
the powers a.nd duties of Acting President.
Section 4. Whenever the President declares in writing that his
lllabi.Iityis terminated, the President shall forthwith discharge
the powers and duties of his office. 86
A meeting of C01l.gressional leaders was held on March 29, 1957,
at which opposition to the proposed amendment was first manifest.
Speaker Sam Rayburn stated that the public would be suspicious of any
87
a ttem.pt by Eisenhower to turn the government over to Richard Nixon.
......
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According to Nixon's view, the Democratic Congressional leaders
were not going to approve any plan that might place Mr. Nixon in the
White House before the 1960 election.

88

The Democratic Speaker's opposition, the lack of unanimity as
to the form and details a solution should take, and the absence of
enthusiasm am.ong Republican leaders, all made it apparent that the
proposed amendment would not get far.

It did not.

8

9

Following Eisenhower's speech in1pairment, a second attempt
was made to get Congt·ess to take action on the problem, but it, too,
rnet with failure for the same two reasons as the first attempt: political and personal opposition to Nixon, and the inability of Congress to
unite behind a single proposal.
As a result of the failure of Congress to produce a solution to
the inability

problen~,

Eisenhower worked out a "stopgap" agreement

to take the form of a letter, copies of which would be sent to Nixon,
Attorney General Rogers, and Secretary of State Dulles.

He first

showed the letter to Nixon and Rogers early in February, 1958.
They approved it with minor suggested changes, and it was made
public on March 3, 1958.

90

The President set forth the following pJ:ocedures:
H the President were unable to perforrn his duties, he would
so inform the Vice President, who would become Acting
President. But if the President were unable to comrnunicate

90 rbid.
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with th.;; Vice President, the latter ''after such consultation
as seerns to hirn appropriate, 11 wo~ld decide if a state of
disability existed, and if so, he would take over. In either
event, the President would determine when the disability
had ended, and he would then resume his duties. 9l
What Eisenhower did was to take from Brownell's proposed amendrnent those provisions relating to inability and in1plant them in an
Executive Agreement.

His was the first action of any real signifi-

cance in meeting the inability problem. 9Z
The agreement has been criticized on the grounds that it was
on.ly as good as the will of the two men involved to rnake it so.
was an Executive Agreement and, as such,

It

would have no perrnanence

beyond the adtninistration in which it was written.

It is further charg-

ed that the letter could not prevent a Constitutional crisis,

if there

werr; disagreement over the determination of inability or recovery. 9 3
It rnust be :remernbered that Mr.

Eisenhower had sought a Constitu-

tional amendment first which might have obviated some of the foregoing criticisms.

When that approach failed, he had to rely upon a

stopgap expedient.

Although the im.perfections of the Eisenhower Letter

as a solution are apparent, it was at least an attempt to permit the
Vice President to act for a disabled Chief, where no such clear nJ.andate had heretofore existed, and as such it formed the basis for similar ag1·eements between President John F'. 'Kennedy and Vice President

91
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Lyndon B. Johnson, and later between President Johnson and S1;·eaker
John W. McCormack, and finally between President Johnson and Vice
President Hubert H. Humphrey. 94
The precedent of Eisenhower's Letter was to have its first application when President Johnson entered Bethesda Naval Hospital, in
October, 1965, for the removal of his gall bladder. It was announced,
prior to surgery, that Vice President Humphrey would stand by
while the President was under anesthesia and for an indefinite period
thereafter, to make Presidential decisions should the need arise. 95
The same agreement was again invoked when, on November 16,

1966, the President underwent surgical removal of a non-malignant
polyp from his throat and the repair of a small abdominal hernia. 96
The need for Vice Presidential action did not arise during either
disability, and it is perhaps just as well. Any action Vice President
Humphrey might have taken at such a time could, because of the extra·legal nature of the agreement, have precipitated .a major Constitutional
or political challenge. 97

Lyndon Johnson: Our Eighth Unexpected President
John Kennedy's Presidency was ended abruptly by bullets on
November 22, 1963. Before Air Force One, the Presidential plane,

9 4 rbid., p. 229.

9~ew York Times, October 6, 1965, p. 1.
9 6Tom Wicker, New York Times, November 17, 1966, p. 1.
91bid., p.

46.
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departed for Washington that same day, the Vice President had taken
the President's oath of office. Kennedy had said of Mr. Johnson before their election, "Lyndon Johnson is the only other 1nan (after myself) I can think of with the equipment for the job of president. ,r9S
F'ew besides Leonard C. Jones, a New Mexico attorney,
tioned Mr.

ques-

Johnson's succession to the office of his deceased prede-

cessor. Shortly after L. B. J.

became President, Jones unsuccess-

fully requested Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and the United
States Attorney for the District of Columbia to institute a suit to "try
President Johnson's right to the office.

11

In June, 1964, having failed

in his first attempt, Mr. Jones instituted his own suit in the United
States District Court for the District o€ Columbia, in which he sought
to prove that Lyndon Johnson's

becon~ing

President was unlawful,

illegal, and unauthorized by the Constitution. His suit was dismissed
in September of 1964. 9 9
The death of President Kennedy stirred widespread demand for
a return to the 1886 Succession Law.

The accession of Mr. Johnson

to the Presidency left the usual vacancy in the second office for a
period of fourteen months,
McCormack,

100

and placed Speaker of the House John

71 years olJ at the ti1ne, and Senate President Pro

Tempore Ca,rl Hayden, 86,

next in line.

98F., eeru:
. 1~.
99Feerick, "The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amen.dment to the
Constitution,

11

p. 17 5.
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The possibility that Hayden might be called upon to succeed
seemed remote since elevation of the Speaker to the position of Acting
Vice President required the election of a new Speaker, thus effectively
precluding the succession of the President pro tempore.

101

On the

other hand, it seemed n-:tore than possible that Johnson _might die because of the pressure of the job; he had already suffered one heart
attack. If this happened, it was not irnpossible that leadership of the
Executive Department might first pass rapidly into the hands of one
"old man" and then of another.

102

John McConnack had held positions of leadership in the House
for more than twenty years before he had been elected to the Speaker 1 s
chair i.n 1962.

However, there was the question of his age which he,

hin1.self, conceded was a "legitimate" subject for discussion, although
he had previously lost his temper at the suggestion he resign in favor
of a younger potential Presidential successor.

103

McCorrnack was not

regarded as conspicuously qualified to be President, particularly in
foreign affairs. Perhaps he suffered by comparison with Sam Rayburn.
But, through 1964, in the absence of a call from the White House for
a succession statute change, the Speaker 1 s colleagues chose not to
injure. further McCormack's already bruised feelings.

It was also

I
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suggested that the Democrats did not wish to revive mernol'ies of Pre··
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10 ?wrichael Harwood, In The Shadow of Presidents (Philadelphia:
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sident Johnson 1 s 1955 heart attack, inevitable in any consideration of
such a change before the 1964 election.

104

It was further suggested

that Congress adjom·ned in 1964 without the House taking action on an
inability-succession amendrnent already passed by the Senate because
of resentrrtent in the House over criticism directed at its Speaker.

105

This regard for the Speaker 1 s personal feelings and the natural
desire not to diminish his office in any way, resulted in delay of Congressional action on a proposed 25th Arnendment to the Constitution
until 1965, and delay of reconsideration o£ the 1947 succession statute
indefinitely.
In 1963, following Kennedy 1 s death, President Johnson agreed in
writing with lVIr. McCormack that the latter was to attend such key
decision-making meetings as would not be inconsisten-t with his legis.
c.ff'1ce. 106
l.a t.lve

The Speaker expressed great relief upon his re-

rnoval from the status of heir apparent. by the inauguration of Vice
President Hubert Humphrey.

For all the criticism leveled at

McCorrnack, he is generally conceded to have done a creditable job
in dealing with his strange dilem1na of wearing one and a half hats.

104

Ibid.

105

Feerick, 11 The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution, 11 p. 196.
106

New York Tilnes, Decetnber 4, 1963, p. 1.

CHAPTER III

CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE
THE PROBLSMS PRIOR TO 1965

Attempts to Solve the Inability Problem

-----·-·-------

At the Constitutional Convention, only John Dickinson posed any
question regarding the disability provision.

He asked his colleagues,

on Septem.ber 7, 1787, to tell him what was meant by "inability" and
who should decide that it existed, but no one present found it necessary
or perhaps possible, to answer him.

1

Indeed, no persistent attempt to settle these problems was rnade
even during per.iods when their gravity was proven.
death,

Following Garfield's

Congress turned instead to a question that had not yet occurred

in reality and designated a successor to act in the case of a sirnultaneous inability or vacancy in both Executive offices. 2 And during
President Wilson's long disability, all proposals to deal with the
problems introduced in Congress died in Committee. 3
Not until 1955--shortly before President Eisenhowe1·'s heart
attack in September- -was the problem of Presidential disability seriou.sly
raised again when Emanuel Geller, Chairrnan of the House Judiciary

1clinton Rossiter, The American Presidency (New York: Mentor
Books, Revised Edition, 19b4f,p:--26Z:-Zsuva, Presidential Succession , pp. 83-84.
3rbid:_, p.

84.

53

54
Committee, ordered a study of it.

During the course of this study, the

Comrnittee 1 s staff distributed to various jurists, political scientists,
and public officials a list of fundamental questions relating to Executive inability.

The replies were varied and indicated no consensus. 4

However, six proposals gleaned from the analysis of the replies were
put into legislative drafts, two in the form of statutes, and the rest as
Constitutional an1endr:nents.

At this point, President Eisenhower 1 s

first disability, the heart attack, moved the House Committee on the
Judiciary to set up a special subcommittee to study the matter.

Hear-

i.ngs were held in April, 1956, and still more varied opinions were
heard. 5
In .t'\pril, 1957, Attorney General Herbert Brownell testified before the House Subcornmittee on behalf of a Constitutional amendment
proposed by the Adm.inistration.

His proposal was criticized because

it allowed a President to declare the end of his own disability and thus
would nullify the ability of the Vice President and Cabinet to act i.n those
cases where the President was unwilling to admit his inability and
im.mediately declared his own recovery. 6
After consideration of various other proposals involving either
separately or in combination the Vice President, Cabinet, Congress,

4:Presidential Inability, Cornr:nittee on the Judiciary, House of
R.epresentatl.ves, 84th Cong]:ess, 2nd Session, January 31, 1956.
5Feerick, "The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendmen·t to the
Constitution, " p. 181.

~Iearings before the Special Subcommittee on Study of Presidential Inability of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 85th Congress, 1st Session, Serial 3, April l., 1957, pp. 4-32.
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Supreme Court, and a Special Inability Commission, the Subcomrnittee
found itself unable to reach agreem.ent on a single approach.

This lack

of consensus was communicated to the full Committee on May 16, 1957
and, as a result, no recon1.mendations v;ere made to the House. 7

In January and February of 1958, the Senate Subc91nrnittee on
Constitutional Arnendments, under the Chainnanship of Estes I<efauver,
began its own hearings on the subject.

Attorney General William P.

Rogers testified on behalf of the same Brownell Proposal previously
studied by the House Subcommittee but Rogers had added to the original a provision by which a Vice President and Cabinet had a chance of
making effective their disagreement with the President's declaration of
ability.

In such a case, the Vice President, with the approval of the

majority of the Cabinet, could bring the disagreement before Congress
and, if a rn.ajority of the House voted that the President was disabled
and the Senate concurred by a two-thirds vote, the Vice President
would continue to exercise the Chief Executive's powers until the President's term expired or a majority of both Houses decided the inability was ended.

8

The Brownell Proposal with the Rogers 1 modifi-

cation was approved by the Senate Subcomn1.ittee on Constitutional
Amendrnents on March 12, 1958.

But Congress adjourned without con-

si.dering it and took no action in 1959 or 1960, although the proposal was
reintroduced by Senator Kefauver in January 1959 and was still on the
parent comrnittee 1 s agenda when Congress adjourned in the smnmer
of 1960.

----------7 Feel'ick, "The Propos cd Twenty-Fifth Am.endrnent to the

Constitution,

~bid.,

11

p. 181.

p. 182.
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Congressional failure to solve the problem after the rnost concerted effort up to that time was the result of several factors.

Al-

though there was general agree1nent on the need for a Constitutional
arnendment, there was considerable disagreernent on a procedure for
deterrnining the existence and termination of a disability.

Each of the

numerous proposed solutions had its supporters and critics and none
proved able to conunand the support necessary for pas sage .. 9 Action
"

was further inhibited by a reluctance to pass any measure that might
have placed Richard Nixon in the Vthite House, as Acting President,
b-e-Eore-th-e--l9 60-election-ancl-thus--uncle ubte dly-have-in G-l~('}aS@d-his-GhanG to:.;,, _ _ _----;;
of being nom.inated and elected as President.

10

Although Congress as a whole had still not decided upon a solution
to the inability problem, its discussions had brought about a consensus
on certain aspects of the problem: a Vice President who succeeded in
cases of death, resignation, or removal would becorne President for
the remainder of the tenn; and in cases of Presidential disability, the
Vice President would act as President only for the duration of that disa b 1'l't
1 y.

11

With the election of John Kennedy to the Presidency, the problen1
of executive disability seemed to recede from both Congres~ional and
public consciousness, and the new administration itself showed little
concern to find a lasting solution to this recurring dilemma.

12

9rbid . .
10

Young, op. cit. , p. 331.

ll F eerlc;<,
. ,
12 Feerick,
Constitution,

11

The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendm.en.t to the
p. 183.
11
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However, in 1963 Senators Kefauver and Keating, who realized that
previous attempts to legislate had failed because of disagreement on
detail, put aside their own pet proposals and jointly sponsored Senate
Joint Resolution 35 which, by Constitutional an.1.endment, would clarify
the status of the Vice President in cases of disability and empower
Congress to legislate later a solution to the problem of the cornmencem.ent and termination of inability. 13 At hearings which began on June
11, 1963, testirnony was taken from seven witnesses, one of whom,
Deputy Attorney General Nicholas
-

deB Katzenbach, indicated adminis-

---- tration-support o£S.J. Res; 35: Shortlythereafter, the Subcommitteefavorably reported S. J. Res. 35 to the full Committee.

The sudden

death of Senator Kefauver in August 1963 brought progress to a stop.

14

The death of President Kennedy drmnatically revived interest in the
disability problern once again for, as Senator Keating put it,

II

a

n1atter of inches spelled the difference between the painless death of
John F.

Kennedy and the possibility of his permanent incapacity to

exercise the duties of the highest office of the land.

1115

There descended, in the aftern1ath of John Kennedy 1s ass as sination, such a flurry of proposals dealing with Presidential inability

16

13 nearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendrnents of the Cornmittee on the Judiciary, Senate, 88th Congress, 1st
Session, June 11-June 18, 1963, pp. 5-6.
14

Feerick, !:.?rn.

Fai~ing_!:-!_ands, p. 243.

1

~eerick, "The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution, " p. 183.
16The idea~ embodied in these bills can conveniently be divided
into four major categories, perm.ii:ting the matter of Presidential in·-.
ability to be resolved by: (a) the Congress, (b) the Executive, (c) a
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and Vice Presidential vacancy that Senator

Birc~1

Bayh, Kefauver's

successor as Chairman of the Senate Subcomrn.ittee on Constitutional
Amendments, announced in December 1963 that hearings on the subject would be held early in 1964.

The new Chairman himself, along

with several other senators, introduced Senate Joint Resolution 139,
·which contained provisions relating to inability, Vice Presidential
vacancy,

and the line of succession beyond the Vice Presidency.

Senator

Bayh' s inability provisions were essentially those of the BrownellRogers Proposal.

17

Meanwhile, the American Bar Association came to the assistance of Congress. It sponsored a conference on the subject of Presidential inability and succession in Washington on January 20 and 21,
1964. 18 Frorn that conference e1nerged a proposed amendment to the
1
Constitution inade up of the following parts. 9
(1) In the event of the inability of the Presid~nt, the powers
and duties, but not the office shall devolve upon the Vice President or person next in line of succession for the duration of the

special commission, or (d) a combination of government entities.
Examples of each are to be found in the Congressional Digest, XLIII,
#5, (May, 1964), p. 143, along with the Vi.ewsOITormer"""""Pre""Z-;idents
Hoover, Truman, Eisenhower and fonner Vice President Nixon.
17F ee:nc
' d Twenty- F'1. f t h A rnen d ment w
' tl· 1e
. J_,, II Th•".. p. ropose
11
Constitution, p. 184.
18 A1nong those present were John D. Feerick, author of Fr01n
Failing Hands , and Richard H. Hansen, Nebraska attorney andauffior
or-r:rne-Yea1·--we Had No President. Bayh, op. cit., p. 46.

·--------------·----

------

19In 1960 the American Bar Association, after an ''elaborate"
study of the entire problem of inability and succession, had "·
recornmended t1wt such an arnendment grant to Congress the power to
establish, by law, the necessary machinery which would be needed in
the event the President beca1ne ill. 11 Bayh, op. __<:!-_!:_, p. 27.
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inability of the President or until the expiration of his term.
of office;
(2) in the event of the death, resignation or removal of
the President, the Vice President or the person next in line
of succession shall succeed to the office for the unexpired
terrn;

(3) the inability of the President may be established by
declaration in writing by the President. In the event that the
President does not make known his inability, it may be established by action of the Vice President or person next in line
of succession with the concurrence of a majority of the
Cabinet or by action of such other body as the Congress may
by law provide; 20
(4) the ability of the President to resume the powers and
duties of his office shall be established by his declaration in
writing. In the event that the Vice President and a majority
of the Cabinet or such other body as Congress may by law
provide shall not concur in the declaration of the President,
the continuing disability of the President may then be determined by the vote of two-thirds of the members of each House
of the Congress; and
(5) when a vacar:..cy occurs in the office of the Vice President the President shall nominate a person who, upon approval
by<.!. majority of the m.ernbers of Congress meeting in joint
session, shall then become Vice President for the unexpired
term.
The Conference also considered the related question of Presidential
succession and concluded that:

(1) The Constitution should be amended to provide that in
the event of the death, resignation or removal of the President,
the Vice President or the person next in line of succession shall
succeed to the oHice for the unexpired ter·m.;
(2) It is highly desirable that the office of Vice President be
filled at all times. An amendrn.ent to the Constitution should be
adopted providing that when a vacancy occurs in the office of
Vice President, the President shall norninate a person who,

2

~enator Bayh states that this

11

•••
addition had been made in
order to broaden the base of support .
. . Thl.1s those favoring . .
[ the disability comrnis sian] approach could be brought into the fold
in support of S. J. Res. 139. 11 Bayh, .c.?_:P_·.:_~:_-' p. 50.
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upon approval by a majority of the elected. 1nembers of Con-gress rneeting in joint session, shc.ll then becom.e Vice
President for the unexpired term. 21
All these proposals were released to the press immediately
following the conference, endorsed by the American Bar Association
on February 17, 1964, and presented to the Senate Subcomm.ittee on
Constitutional Amendment on February 24 by the president and president-elect of the A1nerican Bar Association. 22
The hearings of the Subcommittee were concluded on March 5,
1964, and by May 27 the Subcommittee had favorably reported to the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary a revised S. J, Res.

139, which

embodied the recommendations found in the A1nerican Bar Association
consensus and deleted those original provisions dealing with succession
.,
b eyon d t.1e

v·lCe r=> reSlC
· 1ency. 23

Tl1e J U d.lClary
·
c~,omml·t+vee, 1n
· t.urn,

unani.rnously approved it on August 4, 1964, and on September 28

2 \-Iearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Comrnittee on the Judiciary, Senate, 89th Congress, J.st
Session, January 29, 1965, pp. 59-62.
Bayh, op. cit. , p. 49, states: 11 The final draft [of the ABA consensus] was almost identical to the language of Sections 1 and 2 of S. J.
Res. 139; for most part they [Walter Craig, Herbert Brownell, Ed
Wright, Lewis Powell, and Ross Malone J had simply changed a word
here and a word there, sharpened the language and clarified the intent.
The controversial Section 3, however, had been dropped c:ornpletely.
They had felt as I had, that no a1nend1nent v1ith such a provision, dealing with the line of succession beyond the Vice Presidency, capable of
being interpreted as offensive to the Speaker of the House, could pass
11
through the House.

2~eerick, 11 The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution, 11 p. 185.
2 i\mong those who testified at these hearings in favor of S. J.
Res. 139 were John D. Feerick, of the ABA, and Professor Ruth C.
Silva of Pennsylvania State University. Bayh, op. cit., p. 66.
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S. J.

Res. 139 was passed by a voice vote of the senators on the floor

at the time.

There were fewer than twelve senators in attendance, and

it was suggested that such a procedure would set a dangerous precedent for the passage of Constitutional

Ame1~dments;

therefore, the

following day, a roll call vote was taken and the sixty senators present
unanimously voted in favor of Bayh 1 s revised S. J. Res. 139. 24
These actions by the Senate represent the first time either House
had passed a measure to deal with the problems of Presidential inability or Vice Presidential vacancy.

25

Even then, the complete Con-

gressional approval needed to send the Amendment to the States for
ratification was delayed because Congress adjourned before the House
of Representatives took action.

26

Attempts to Solve the Vice Presidential Vacancy Problem
---··--.--~O"OW~N-·-----·-
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F'or .more than thirty--seven years, or over twenty percent of our
history, the United States has been without a Vice President. 27 Yet it

2

1teerick, 11 The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution, 11 p. 185.
2 1:3ayh had worked hard to convince Senate Majority Leader lVIike
JV[ansfield to bring S. J. Res. 139 to the floor for a vote before adjournm.ent even though both recognized that there was 11 • • • no chance whatsoever of its passing the House. 11 Bayh reasoned that if his resolution
was passed once by the Senate, it n1ight be n1ore easily passed a second
time, during the next session, by that body. The result could be that
attention might then be focused 11 on getting action in the House. 11 Bayh,
op. cit., p. 138.

2 9.<'eerick,
Constitution,

11

The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the
p. 186.
11

2711 The Office of the Vice-Presidency, 11 Congressional Digest,
XLIII, # 1j, {May, 1964), p. 134. See Appendixe·s;i\-8."iic!B,-Vice -Presidents Who Succeeded and Vice Presidential Vacancies.
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was not until the assassination of President I<:ennedy that any serious
effort. was 1nade to devise a 1neans whereby the Vice Presidency might
be filled prior to the next regular election.
When Lyndon Johnson entered the White House, the Vice Presidency was left vacant for alrnost fourteen months.
with the age of the potential

President~al

Thi~

fact, com.bined

successor and the increasing

importance given to the Vice President's office, forced politicians and
scholars alike to recognize that the Vice Presidency must be kept filled
at all times.

The Vice President was, after all, the person best able

to prepare himself to succeed either to the Presidential office itself 1n
an emergency or to exercise temporarily its powers and duties.

28

The record of previous Congressional contetnplation of the problem of Vice Presidential vacancy enforces other evidence of the low
esteern in which the office was long held, and indicates that Legislative
thinking continually turned to deciding the line of succession by statute
as a .means of assuring continuity of the executive functions.

Three

times Congresses have changed the statutory line of succession beyond
the Vice Presidency but until recently no Congress seriously thought
of avoiding the use of that line by assm'ing that the Vice Presidency
would always be occupied.

Suddenly, during the 1964 Senate hearings,

there was almost con1plete agreernent on the need for a Vice President
Senator Bayh noted it in every measure on the subject of

at all times.

Presidential inability placed before his Committee, and many witnesses
were 'Lo point out that the Vice President is the official best prepared to

2

~eerick,

Constitution,

11

The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the
p. 181.
11
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succeed because of his knowledge of and· experience with the Executive

m~chinery.

2 9 President Johnson publicly added his influence when, at

a press conference on March 15, 1964, he stated it was "important''
that something should be done to keep the office filled, but he doubted
Congress would rnake any progress in 1964. 30
One of the many suggestions made for assuring succession was
that a special election be held whenever a vacancy existed.· This was
criticized on the ground that such an election would con1.e at a time,
most likely, when a President had died and the great need for unity
could be disrupted by a political campaign.

Furthermore, a special

election could conceivably bring to the office a Vice President of a party
different from the late President's.
Forrner President Truman and former Vice President Nixon had
both recon:nnended the reconvening of the last Electoral College to
choose a new Vice President, stressing the elective rather than appointive
process.

Criticism of the Electoral College proposal pointed out that

such a process was a step away fr01n dernocratic control because the
Electors would have no mandate hom the voters.

It was also men-

tioned that this approach was unwise be'cause Congress had for many
years been studying the possibility of abolishing the College altogether. 31
Former Senator KennethB. Keating suggested the creation of a

2
3

9Feerick,

!.~.:_o~ Faili~:_~-~Iancls, pp. 258-259.

~ew York Tim.es , .March 16, 1964, p. 18.

31 Feerick,. Fro:? Failil:.t5__ Hc:nds, p. 259.
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plural Vice Presidency.

One Vice President would be an Executive Vice

President first in the line of succession and would, under normal circumstances, be available to undertake Presidential assignments.

The

second would be a Legislative Vice President acting as President of the
Senate and second in the line of succession.
this proposal,

The great advantage of

according to I"<:eating, was that both Vice Presidents

would be of the President's party and would have been popularly elected. 32
---s

Richard Nixon criticized Keating's suggestion when he pointed out that
by dividing the already limited functions of the Vice Presidency, it
would be downgraded at a time when the Vice Presidency became most
important. 33 Keating's proposal also received criticism on the grounds
that one or both Vice Presidents might be chosen to balance a ticket with
the result that neither n1an would be of the desired caliber, and neither
would be adequately prepared to succeed.
Another suggestion for filling a Vice Presidential vacancy was to
give Congress the power to r.nake the selection. Senator Jacob K.
Javits, one of the leading advocates of this proposal,

changed his bill

to allow the President an absolute veto when it was pointed out that
otherwise a Vice President from a different party than the President's
could succeed.

34
I'

r

------··--------

32"From an address given on the Senate floor on December 19,
1963, introducing S. J. Res. 140.
. 11 by Kenneth B. Keating,
Congressional Digest, XLIII, #5, (May, 1964), p. 152.
3311 From testimony given bef.ore the Senate Subcomn'littee on
Constitutional Amendments on March 5, 1964 11 by Richard Nl. Nixon,
Congressiona_~Digest, XLIII, #5,
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Many, including Sen8.tor Birch Bayh whose S. J.

Res. 139 con-

tained such a provision, felt the best way to fill a vacancy in the second
office was to give the .President the power to n01ninate a person, whose
name would then be subrnitted to Congress for that body's approval. 35
This method would assure the President of a compatible Vice President,
just as does the current practice of the Presidential candidate in an
election year selecting his running mate.
Critics of the foregoing method saw it as giving Congress the
role of rubber-starnping the President's nominee and suggested, instead,
that the President submit to Congress a list of names frorn which one
could be chosen.

There is precedent for such a proposal in the way

Dwight D. Eisenhowe:c· allowed the convention to select his Vice Pre sidential running n1ate, just as there is precedent for Senator Bayh's
m.ethod in the 1nanner Lyndon B.
name his choice for a nominee.

Johnson went to his convention to
Further objection to the last proposal

is that the President might not get the person with whom he could best
work or that Congress might become deadlocked on the choice.

36

Supporters of the Presidential nomination approach were not agreed on
whether the name or names should be submitted to one or both Houses
of Congress and arnong the adherents of joint participation there was a
difference of opinion. as to whether the Houses should meet separately
or jointly.

3511 From a state1nent of January 22, 1964, opening hearings before
the Senate Subcom1nittee on Constitutional Amendments, 11 by Birch

Bayh, C~:m.gressio_na~ Diges.!_, XLIII, #5, (May, 1964), pp. 148, 150.
3

~eel'ick, _!i'r~_:n Failit:[_!-~~nds,

p. 261.
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Most of the proposals thus far had been embodied in Constitutional amendments.

Governor Nelson A.

Rockefeller suggested the creation

of a statutory office of first secretary.

This office would be filled by

appointment of the Chief Executive, with the approval of the Senate.
The first secretary would be a member of the Cabinet and National
Security Council, and would assist the
security and internal affairs.

Pre~ident

in areas of national

The Governor felt that a person with such

knowledge and experience as would be gained from this office would be
well prepared to succeed. 37
Senator Eugene J. McCarthy backed the creation, by statute, of
an office of deputy president.

This office would be filled within thirty

days of a vacancy in the Vice Presidency.

The President would choose

a norninee fron1 arnong the following: mernbers of Congress, the justices of the Suprerne Court, and State governors.
then be subject to confirtnation by the Senate.

The nominee would

According to the Senator,

the choice of a deputy president would be r:nade under conditions more
politically realistic than those of the past, for the possibility of a deputy's
38
.
succec d 1ng
wou ld b e th e paramoun_ t cons1. d era t'10n.
It had even been suggested that Congress could abolish the "need-

less n office of Vice President and provide,

in the event of the President's

death, the procedure for choosing a successor for the unexpired term. 39

3

7 ~::__~- YC?._rk Tirne ~· February 2 7, 1964, p. 16.

38Feerick, Frorn
3

Fa~ling !--1an~ls, pp. 262--263.

~enry Hazlitt, "To Reduce Uncertainty,

(December 9, 1963), p. 63.

11
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For, it was argued, the institution of the Vice Presidency. forces the
voters to choose a m.an they may not like in order to elect a man they
do.

A successor chosen by the House and Senate to fill a Chief Execu-·

tive's unexpired term would, presur:n.ably, be a person chosen ohly for

h is Pr esi d ential potential and f or no other reason. 40
After studying the foregoing proposals and their rnany va1·iations,
Senator Bayh's Committee decided that: "Whenever there is a vacancy
in the office of Vice-President, the President shall nominate a VicePresident who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of
both Houses of Congress," each House to meet separately.

This was

designed to deal with two sets of contingencies: when the Vice President
succeeds to the Prcsiden'cy upon the President's death, resignation, or
removal; and when the Vi.ce President dies, resigns, or is removed. 41
This proposal was embodied inS. J.

Res. 139 and suffered the fate of

the resolution when the House adjourned without taking action in 1964.
Attempts to Solve the Problern of Succession Beyond the Vice Presidency
The Constituti01i. provides fo1· the contingency of succession beyond
the Vice Presidency by granting Congress the power to declare, by law,
what officer should act as President when both a President and Vice President die, resign, or are removed from office.

Congress has passed

three la·ws u'nder that grant of power made in the succession clause,
the original in 1792, a second in 1886, and the still current one passed
in 1947. 42

4

<l-Jenry Hazlitt., "The Vice-Presidency,
(Dece1nber 2, 1963), p. 62.

11

Newsweek, LXXXVI
------·-·

263.
4 2suva, Presidential Succession, p. ll2. See Appendixes· D, E,
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The Second Congress passed the first succession act on March 1,
1792, with rather scant discussion of either the possible Constitutional
objections or the practical problems of its application. 43 During the
debates, the only Constitutional question raised concerned the definition
of an "officer" of the United States Government, and thus those eligible
for designation as a successor.

44

The act provided that the Senate

President pro tem.pore and the Speaker would follow the Vice President,
in that order, in the line of succession.

It is believed that this order

resulted from. Alexander Hamilton's determination that the successor
should not be the Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson. 45 Madison
\vas one of those who,

in criticism, pointed out that there was no re-

quirem.ent in the act that 1.£ any one of those named went to the White
House, he would give up his original duties to avoid a conflict with the
principle of separation of powers. 46 It was also later noted that since
the President pro tempore was not "held over" from one Congress to
the next the office was frequently without an occupant, as was that of
the Speaker shi.p.

The Second Congress had overlooked the fact that a

new Congress, elected in Novem.ber, would norn1ally not assemble for
thirteen nJ.onths, which left the House without a Speaker from March 3,

43Lindsay Rogers, "The Line of Succession,
XXIX (Decerhber 19, 1963), p. 21.
4 'Suva, Presidential Succession, p. 113.

4 s.1 "d
In . ' p. 114.
4

6:Rogers, loe. cit.
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the end of the old "lame duck" session, until D2cernber. 47
The foregoing two defects were, for the most part, corrected by
a change in Senatorial procedure, allowing the

11

hold over 11 of the

President pro tempore and by the Twentieth Amendrnent which, in 1933,
abolished the "lanJ.e duck 11 session.

Apparently unanticipated, however,

by both the Constitutional Convention and the Second Congress, was thedevelopment of political parties. It becarne quite possible that the
President pro tempore and Speaker might not be of the same political
philosophy and hence not the same party as that of the President and
Vice President.

It does not seem altogether democratic for the voters

to choose one party to occupy the executive by election and be given

. t•10n. 4 8
a no·.
th er b y 1'll. ness, acc1. d en t , or assass1na
With the passage of the Act of 1792, Congress did not seriously
concern itself with the line of succession again until 1820, at v:ihich
time Senator James J. Wilson introduced a resolution requesting the
Senate Judiciary Comn1ittee to make a study to detennine whether or
not the law should be amended. On February 1, 1821, the Committee
reported that it was inexpedient to attem.pt to legislate further on the
matter of the line of succession. 4 9 In 1856, the Judiciary Comtnittee
rendered the opinion that the Act of 1792 was in all i'ts pa1.'ts Constitutional, and rccomtnended that if no President pro ternpore or Speaker
we1·e available, the sucq::ssion should pass to the Chief Justice of the
1.
li

4'L

Kogers, ol?_·_:it. , p. 21.

4

~bid.

49
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Supre1ne Court and then to Associate Justices in order of seniority.
The bill was read twice and discussed in the· committee of the whole,
but no action v;,ras taken then or for the next twenty-five years. 50 In

1864, another bill to extend the line of succession was introduced; it
rI'

passed the House but was

ki~led

in the Senate.

I

i

The im.peachment of Andrew Johnson made clear the danger of
designating the President pro tempore or the Chief Justice as successors, both of whom sit as m.embers of the tribunal by whose verdict a
Presidential vacancy might be created.

Following his acquittal, Presi-

~
1:

"

dent Johnson requested that Congress pass a Constitutional amendment

1:
I

i

~

,.

which would place Cabinet officers immediately after the Vice President
in line of. succession. Although Congress took no action on Johnson's
proposal, it eventually became the basis for the Presidential Succession
Act of 1886.

51

On September 19, 1881, President James A. Garfield died and
Chester Arthur succeeded to his office. If anything had happened to
Arthur there would, because of a flaw in the Act of 1792, have been no
immediate successor for there was no President pro tempore until
October, and no Speaker until Decembe·r.

A silnilar situation occurred

following the death of Grover Cleveland's Vice President,· Thornas A.
Hendricks, in November 1885, when Congress was not in session. 52

50Rogers,

_OP.:_ ci~,

p. 21.

51 suva, Presidential Succession
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The situation was so precarious that President Clevela-nd was advised
not to attend the Vice President 1 s funeral in Indianapolis for fear that
he n::tight suffer son1e accident during the journey. 53 The President
telegraphed his condolenses and remained in Washington.
These two incidents inspired the Succession Act of 1886. It
stated that, after the Vice Presidency, succession to the Presidency
would be \rested in the Secretary of State, and other Cabinet rnembers
in the order of their department 1 s seniority.

The Act further declared

that when the powers and duties of the Presidency devolve upon any
such successor, Congress, if not in session, should be convened within
twenty days. 54
This Act differed from its predecessor in two fundamental respects: Cabinet members were substituted for the presiding legislative
officers, and an Acting President was to complete the term to which he
had succeeded.

Prior to the Act 1 s passage by the Senate, its author,

Senator George F. Hoar, had explained the reasons for the changes.
He pointed out that there was often, as had recently been demonstrated,
neither a President pro tempore nor a Speaker, and also argued that
nearly all of the past Secretaries of State had been greater leaders
than the legislative officers who were not chosen with their succession
potential in mind.

In the House, Representative Andrew Cald\vell spoke

for the Hoar bill because he considered it, in contrast to the Act of

1792, to be clearly Constitutional in retaining the principle of separa.tion

------·-----53""'.1
;:-.il va, Presidential Succession, p. 120.

?2
of powers. Although the Hoa:t.· bill was originated in a Republican Senate, and Hoar hixnself was a Republican, Representative Jonathan H.
Powell thought it was motivated by a desire of the Democrats, who
controlled both the Presidency and the House, to take the line of succession away from. the Senate and vest it in a Dernocratic Cabinet. 55
For the next sixty years,

the order of Presidential succession

spelled out in the Act of 1886 was considered sati~factory and no seri-ous effort was made to change it.

Even bills introduced to add the

more recently created Cabinet posts failed to become law, because of
their seerning unimportance.-5 6
However, when Franklin Roosevelt died and Harry S. Truman
became President, the Secretary of State was the able but unknown
Edward R.

Stettinius.

Almost immediately, some public officials who

believed that Stettinius in the White House might not inspire the nation's
confidence,

attacked the Act of 1886 as "undemocratic 11 on the ground

that a President, in appointing a Secretary of State, was in effect naming
his own successor. 57 On June 19, 1945, President Truman sent Congress a rnessage urging a new Presidential succession law. He argued
that the r:nan next in the line of succession after the Vice President
should have been elected to sorne office and, further, that the Speaker
was the official whose selection, after the President and Vice President,
I

could be said to stem frorn the people themselves.

5

~ilva, Pr·esiclential Succession , p. 122.

5

~bid.,

5

p. 123.

kogers, op. cit. , p. 21.
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now appear somewhat faulty.

It is not considered undemocratic for a

Presidential candidate to natne his imrnediate successor in the f.onn of
his Vice Presidential running mate, and as for the Speaker, he tnust
come frotn a "safe" district in order to gain the seniority necessary to
be elected by the Representatives of the people. 58
Nevertheless, the Presidential Succession Act of 1947 was to
embody all of Truman's original suggestions except the one that called
for a special election.

According to its provisions, if for any reason

there is a vacancy in both Presidency and Vice Presidency, the Speaker
of the House will resign that position and act as President. If there is
no Speaker able to succeed, the President pro tempore of the Senate,
following his resignation, is to act as Chief Executive.

Should there be

no presiding legislati\'e officers, or if neither qualifies to act as Presi·dent, the Secretary of State is to succeed to the Executive Office, and
the Cabinet members are placed in the line of succession in an order
similar to the Act of 1886, with the addition of the Secretarie·s of
Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor. 5 9
President Kennedy's death generated a great deal of retiewed discussion and criticism of the 1947 Succession Law but, as in the case of
the first two succession acts,

much of the discussion was moore con·-

cerned with the individuals who stood in the line of succession than with
the question. of what officers should, in principle, be placed in the

58
Ibid.
59-.
•::n'1 va, Presidential Succession , p. 130 .
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succession line after the Vice President.

60

The abilities of both

Speaker lVIcCorrnack and President Pro Te1npore Carl Hayden were seriously questioned, and it was even suggested that they resign their respective positions so that persons better qualified as potential successors might replace them. 61 It has been argued that the 1947 law is
not practical even without considering the relative merits of the two
incumbent presiding legislative officers.

Neither the Speaker nor the

President pro te1npore is chosen on the basis of his qualifications for
the Presidency.

The Act of 1947 also allows for a person of a political

party different from the President's to succeed to the White House
without election. It has further been suggested that the legislative
leaders are not officers within the meaning of the Constitution's suecession provision and, even if they were, Congress would have no
power to authorize the1n to act as President. 62
Following John Kennedy's death, the lines were drawn for and
against the 1947 law.

Former President Truman .stated that he still

supported the law he had recomrnended, as did President .Johnson, who
had voted for it in Congress.

Fonner President Eisenhower, perhaps

the foremost exponent of the return to the Cabinet line of succession,
pointed out the need for continuity in the Executive branch of government, which he felt could be jeopardized by the possibility of a Speaker

6 °Feerick, From Failing Hands, p. 264.
6

~ogers,

01::_ cit., p. 22.

6 ?~,
· 1<, ..F
-1• eer1c

rorn F~ a1·1·1ng r~T-:~an d s, pp. 264·- 265 .
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of the opposition party succeeding to the White House. 63
The 1947 succession law still stands.

Reconsideration of it will

be hampered by the fact that criticism of particular Speakers and
Presidents pro tempore have made it virtually impossible to act on the
matter without insulting the presiding officers of both !:louses.

Those

who wish to avoid casting such insults will most likely argue that the
problen1 has been solved by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment which, as
described in the next chapter, provides almost certain assurance that
there will always be a Vice President- -a primary successor.

The

Amendment thus has made the reconsideration of the line of succession
beyond the Vice Presidency less urgent.

Nevertheless, it remains

entirely possible that both the President and Vice President could be
killed in a natural disaster, nuclear conflict, or by assassination.
It the.refo:re remai.n.s irnportant that a line of succession be found to

provide potential successors who are agreed to be the best qualified
to accept an emergency elevation to the executive.

·I
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CHAPTER IV
CONGRESSIONAL PASSAGE OF THE AM.ENDIVIENT

The Course of the Debate
Senate Joint Resolution 139 was reintroduced in early January,

1965, as S. J. Res. 1 by Birch Bayh and over 70 other senators.
Not all the senators were active supporters. Senator Bayh relates
that:
We had arranged for the Bar Association people to bombard
the n10re reluctant Senators with requests to co-sponsor; and,
as usual, the ABA was extrernely efficient in this enterprise.
Thus, Conrad 1 s last-minute call to the office of .
. Senator
. . . Harry Byrd, produced surprising results. His bGwildered legislative assistant told Conrad, "I don't know what it is,
but the lawye1·s are all over us. Put us down as co-sponsor. 11 1
A simi.lar proposal 'Nas almost simultaneously introduced in -the
House by Representative Emanuel Geller as House of Representatives
Joint Resolution 1. 2
These resolutions both p1·ovided that upon removal, death, or
resignation of the President, the Vice President would become Prcsident.

The President would be required to nominate a per son who n1et

the Constitutional qualifications for the Presidency, to be Vice Presi-

-- ..-------·-·-;-.-1

Bayh, op._ cit., p. 170.

211 Constitutional Arnendxnent on the Preside~cy, 11 Congressional
Quarterly Almanac, XXI (1965), p. 575.
----1"3-a:yh. enTiSTeo the aid of Herbert Brownell to persuade House
Judiciary Chairman Emanuel Geller to introduce an identical bill into
the House. Senator Bayh felt that· if Chairman Geller backed his proposEd, "the odds were 1nore strongly in its favo1· than they had ever
been before, 11 Bayh, op. cit., pp. 1.62-163.
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dent whenever a vacancy occurred in that office.

The nominee would

take office as Vice President upon confirmation by a majority vote of
both Houses of Congress. 3
Provisions for determining the commence1nent and tennination
of Presidential inability made it clear that the President could declare
his own inability in w:riting.

If the President did not declare his in-

ability, the Vice President, with the written approval of a majority of
the Cabinet, would assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting
President upon the trans1nission of such declaration to Congress.

4

Both resolutions would have permitted the President to resume
the powers and duties of his office upon transmission to Congress of
his written declaration. that inability no longer existed.

If the Vice

President, with a 1najority of the Cabinet, felt that the President was
still disabled, they could prevent him from resum.ing his powers and
duties by transm.itting their written declaration to the Congress and
Congress supporting their contention by a two-thirds majority of both
Houses.

The Vice President would then continue as Acting President.

Should Congress fail in any manner to cast a vote of at least two-thirds
in both Houses, the President would then resume the powers and duties
0

.
f h lS

0

£f'lCC. 5

----·---~--'---

3Raymond J. Celada, Presidential Continuity and Vice Presidential Vacancy Amendment (Washington; n.c-:-=-Legis1afl"ve-ReTel.:en:ce-·
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S. J. Res. 1 and H. R. J.
issue ''immediately.
Richard H.

11

Res. 1 required Congress to decide the

Proposals introduced by Representatives

Poff and William .McCulloch were similar but their bills

would have lin1ited Congress to ten days in deciding a disputed Presidential recovery.

H Congress failed to do so within the specified

period, the President would autoxnatically resmne his powers and
duties. 6
With Senator Bayh's prompting, President Johnson lent his support in a special passage to Congress on January 28 when he urged
Congress to "approve [the resolutions

J

forthwith for submission to

ratification by the States. 117
The following day, the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendrn.ents of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary held hearings at which
Attorney

G·~neral

Katzenbach, among others, were heard.

.Mr.

Katzen-

bach, who presented for the record his interpretation of several areas
of the proposed amendxnent, concluded by stating that "Senate Joint
Resolution 1 represents as formidable a consensus of considered
opinion on any proposed amendment to the Constitution as one is likely
to find. 118

6 Feerick, "The Proposed Twenty-l<.... ifth Amendment to the
Constitution, " p. 186.
7Presidential .Messages, Complete text of President Johnson's
January 28th 1nessage to Congress
, C ~? g ~ e s s i o n~.!._..S.~~-:_t e_r 1~
:0-lma_~':~-' XXI (1965), p. 1407.

B:Presidential Inabi.lity and Vacancies in the OHice of Vice President, :Aearl.ng oe·fO"re-flie Suocommtttee on c.TonstifirtTonalA.mendinents
ortKe Comm.ittee on the Judi.ciary, United States Senate, :Eighty- Ninth
Congress, First Session, January 29, 1965, pp. 7-30.
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On February 1, 1965, the Subcomrnittee .unanimously approved
S. J. Res. 1 and reported it to the full Judiciary Committee, which
approved it on February 10, with several changes.

The Cornrnittee 1 s

amendments specifically designated the Senate President pro ternpore
and House Speaker to receive a President's written declaration of inability and recovery, and provided that if the President and Vice President disagreed on termination of inability, Congress "would immediately
proceed to decide,

11

rather than the original "immediately decide 11 the

i.s sue. It was specified that such written declarations be 1nade to the
presiding legislative officers in order that Congress, if not in session;
could be convened. 9
On February 19, the Senate passed S. J.

Res. 1 by a vote of 72

to 0, and sent to the House a modified version of the Bayh Resolution.
During debate on the 1neasure, the Senate adopted certain clarifications
of wording proposed by Senator Bayh: the wording was changed to require that the "Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet" transmit
their written challenge (rather than "the Vice President, with the concurrenceof a majority of the Cabinet") to "the President pro tempore
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House. . . " (rather than "to
Congress").

10

The Senate also adopted changes proposed by Senator

Hruska that would permit the Vice President and Cabinet seven days,
rather than two, to challenge the termination of the President's disability.

9"Constitutional Amendrnent on the Presidency,
lO Ibid.

11

op..:_.~i.t._, p. 577.
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Three other aspects of the Resolution were debated by the Senate
on February 19 but did not lead to changes.

These were: contingencies

not covered by S. J. Res. 1, ·such as what might happen should both the
President and Vice President be disabled; whether the language of S. J.
Res. 1 was specific enough to avoid delay in

implement~ng

dures; and whether a Constitutional Amendment

Ol'

its proce-

a statute was the

best rnethod Eor prescribing procedures to deterrrline Presidential inability and its termination.
On the third aspect, Senator Everett Dirksen offered an amendrnent providing:

11

The connnencement and terrnination of any inability

shall be determined by such method as Congress may by law provide. 1111
The Senator stated that

11

it has been pretty much a rule in our Consti-

tutional histo:ry that we do not legislate in the Constitution.
offer some latitude for statutory implementation thereafter,

We .
depending

upon the events and circumstances that tni.ght arise. 1112
Opponents of the Dirksen amendment argued that latitude was
not required and could, indeed, be dangerous. Senator Bayh, floor
leader for S. J.

Res. 1, pointed out that the Constitution was quite

specific in its provisions regarding the Presidency, citing Article II
and the Twelfth Arnendn"lent as example.

He also stated his view that

the principle of separation of powers would be violated if specific
methods of establishing and terminating Presidential inability em.bodied

11 c·
·
1..R ecor a-- s ena·t e
ongress1ona
19 65, ·p ::·:Tf7"5-:::-·----·-·-·---.-

1lrbid., p. 3183.

(Daily Edition), February 19,
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in his bill were not retained.

The Senator also noted that the state

legislature would rather deal with an amendment containing specific
proposals, 13 and that further, unless the amendment were specific,
Congress might never agree on procedures, since interest would wane
once the amendment had been ratified. 14
Senator Sarn J. Ervin opposed the Dirksen amendment on the
grounds that it ignored the Vice
that a

11

Presidenti~l

vacancy issue and argued

power-hungry 11 Congress, in providing for Presidential in-

ability by statute, might

11

take charge· of the Presidency.

11

He offered

Andrew Johnson 1 s impeachment as proof that his fear was 11.0t hypothetical.

Only by setting out specifics in the Constitution, argued the

Senator, would the President be suff.iciently protected. 15 At the conelusion of this debate, the Dirksen Amendment was defeated by a vote
of 60 to 12. 16
Three other amendments were rejected: one by Stro1n Thurmond
called for filling a· Vice Presidential vacancy by vote of the electoral
college; another, by John 0.

Pastore, stipulated that whenever Con-

gress considered the confirmation of a Vice Presidential nominee or
the issue of Presidential inability,

11

no other business shall be trans-

13:rbid.,, p. 3189. Bayh 1 s committee had sent copies of S. J.
Res. 3S~n enabling amendment such as Dirksen proposed, along
with S. J. Res. 139 to the state legislatures. Only three states
seemed to favor the enabling approach.

14

Ibid., pp. 3170-3171.

.1 5congressional Recoxd- -:$en<J.tE!

1965, p:3Tf{7.

1~bid.,
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p. 3190.

(D<3.ily

E~_iticm), February 19,
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acted 11 until such issues were decided; and the third,

made by Ross

Bass who, because he feared deliberate Congressional delay, moved
to require Congress to consider 11 imrnediately 11 the confirmation of a
.
,_. 1 nom1nee.
17
.
P res1·a e1Ye1a
V 1ce

Following

~he

Senate 1 s approval of S. J. Res. l, w.ithout a dis-

senting vote, Senator Magnuson was recognized and said,

11

I believe

. after all the discussion today, that the Senate should wish the
President and Vice President good luck and good health.

11

18

Meanwhile, the House Committee on the Judiciary held its own
hearings on February 9, 10, 16, and 17 at which time support was expressed for the ten-day limitation suggested by Representatives
NlcCulloch and Poff with regard to Congressional action on disagreernent concerning the termination of disability.

Such a limitation was

considered essential because of the possibility that Congress might
delay an unreasonable time in deciding the issue, or might reach no
decision at all.

It was feared that the consequences of such inaction

might prove disastrous for the nation. l9
Former Attorney General Herbert Brownell testified to the
opposite.

He felt that a disagreement between the President and Vice

President over disability was remote.

If. such a disagL·eement did

occur, however, Congress would act with all due speed,

II

. I

think public opinion would force them to do it or destroy their useful-

"1711 Constitutiona1 Amendment on the Presidency,

II

~E_:__::it., p. 578.

18

Bayh, op: cit., p. 274.

19Feerick, 11 The Proposed Twenty--Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution, 11 pp. 189-190.
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ness as public officials thereafter. 1120
Senator Bayh, after answering questions regarding his S. J.

Res.

The 1nain barrier . . . to our ability to find a solution has
been the fact that so far we have had so many different opinions
that we have never been able to co1ne close to a consensus.
Now we have, it seems to me, arrived at a situation where the
Chairn1an of this Committee in the Senate, 76 of my colleagues
in the Senate, the American Bar Association, and others are
joining in this consensus. . . I would ask you to consider once
again the impossibility of finding perf~ction and the gravity of
the situation which now exists.
21
On March 24, 1965, the House Committee on the Judiciary favorRes. 1.

The main change

would have permitted the President, if he had voluntarily declared his
own inability, to recover· his powers and duties immediately upon his
declaration of the termination of such an inability, without possible
challe-nge by the Vice President and Cabinet.
assumed but not explicitly stated inS. J.

This point had been

Res. 1. It was reasoned that

to permit the President to be challenged under such circumstances
m.ight work to discourage him from voluntarily relinquishing his
powers.

The right to challenge the tern1ination of a disability should

therefore be Teserved for cases under which the President had been
declared disabled.

i:

~

l, made the following statement in sununary: .

ably reported an amended version of H. R. J.

I

22

2 <i?residential Inability, Hearings before the Committee on the
Judiciar-y-;- Hotise ()-C'R.epre-sentatives, Eighty-Ninth Congress, F'irst
Session, February 9, 10, 16, and 17, 1965, Serial No. l, p. 243.
21

Ibid., p. 95.

2 1:>residential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of the Vice
Pres i d e11t,-"FI o use OT-R:ep res euta ti v es:K"epo rf-:No:-z.-cr3--;---89t11'C::-o ng res-s ,
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The ten-day limitation for the settlement of a dispute, when such
a disagreement arose from a disability declared by the Vice President
and Cabinet, was adopted and Congress was required to assemble
immediately, if not in session, to decide the issue within the prescribed period.

H. R. J.

Res. 1, as amended,

would have further

speeded up the process by allowing the Vice President and Cabinet only
two days, rather than the seven granted by S. J. Res. 1, in which to
challenge the recovery of the President.

23

The House Resolution, as amended, was cleared by the House
Rules Committee on March 31, and was debated before the House of
Representatives on April 13.

24

Prior to its pas;..>age, the House accepted an amendment 25 by
Richard H.

.Poff which stipulated that if Congress were not in session,

i.t V·lOuld convene ''within forty-eight hours 11 to decide a case of disputed

inability. 26 Other amendments to H. R. J.

Res. 1 were offered from

the floor but were rejected by vote:
--Roman C.

Pucinski moved to delete Section 2, which allowed

the President, in case of vacancy in the second office, to nominate a
new Vice President. 27

23
2

Ibid.

41Constitutional

Amendrnent on the Presidency,

11

op.

-~!:_, p. 579.

2

5rhis proposal originally had been suggested by Speaker McCormack who, during the debate, had moved about the chamber urging
members of the House to support it: Bayh, ~r.:__
_:it., p. 278.
2
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··--Charles M.

Mathias, Jr. moved to substitute for Section 2

language perrnitting Congress to provide

11

by law'' for the case of re-

rnoval, death, resignation or inability of both the President and Vice
President. 28
--Arch A. Moore sought to amend that part of H. R. J. Res. 1
under which the Vice President would continue to act as President pending resolution by Congress of a disagreement involving inability, in
order to ensure that a President rnay always resume his powers immediately upon declaring

l~is inability terminated. 2 9

--H. R. Gross proposed to amend the resolution to require a

roll call vote whenever Congress voted on a President's Vice Presi.
30
. 1 nomu1ee.
d en t Hl

Although, as Representative Clarence J.
A1nendn'1.ent would

tab~

away

11

Brown pointed out, the

from the House a Constitutional right it

now has to select a Presj_dent'' by selecting the Speaker, who is the
successor to the President when there is no Vice President. 31
Speaker John W. McCormack gave his fullest support to the measure
when he stated:

I have lived for 14 months in the position of the man who,
in the event of an unfortunate event happening to the occupant

2 8rbid,
2

I

tbid.

30Ibid., pp. 7696-7697. Representative Gross stated that he
would rna~ the same proposal regarding a vote on a disagreement
involving inability, but the defeat of his first amendrnent seen1s to
have precluded such action.
31
Ib'1. d ., p. 7673.
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of the White House, under the law then would have assun'led
.the office of Chief Executive of our country. l can assure
you . . . that a matter of great concern to me was the
vacuum. which existed in the subject of determining inability
of the occupant of the White House, if and when it should
arise. : . . We h32e made a marked contribution by this
resolutlon. . . .
Representative Emanuel Geller gave perhaps the .best smnmary
of H. R. J.

Res. 1 when he stated:

This is by no m.eans, ladies and gentlemen, a perfect bill.
No bill can be perfect . . . . But none the less, this bill has
a minimum of 'draw backs. It is [ a] well-rounded, sensible,
and efficient approach toward a solution of a perplexing problem that has baffled us for over 100 years. 33
In closing, Mr. Geller quoted Walter Lippmann's thoughts on
the proposed Constitutional Amendment:
It is a great den.l better than an endless search for the
absolutely perfect !30lution, which rnay never be found and,
indeed, is not necessary. 3 4

H. R. J.

Res. l, as arnended by Mr.

Poff, was approved by a

vote of 368 to 29 after the debate of April 13. 35
In order to resolve the differences between the House and Senate versions of the Amendment, a Conference Committee was appointed.
The conferees from the Senate were: Senators Birch E. Bayh, James

0. Eastland, Sam J. Ervin, Everett M. · Dirksen, and Roman L.
Hruska; and frorn the House: Representatives Emanuel Geller, Byron
G. Rogers, James C. Corman, William M. McCulloch, and Richard H.
Poff.

32Ibid., p.
3

7698.

Ibid, p. 7667.

1bid., p. 7668. Cited by Geller from the New York Harold
1964, p. 20.

Tribune~June 9,
3

33

~:bid.,

p. 7698.
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The chief difficulty the conferees had to settle was whether to set
a time limit for decision by Congress, in the event a Vice President and
rnajority of the Cabinet challenged the assertion by the President that
hi.s inability had ended.
ate none.

The House had set a limit of ten days, the Sen-

The House conferees, who feared that a Senate filibuster

might hold up action in a critical period and thus place the nation in
jeopardy, insisted on a time limit. After a two-month deadlock, the
conferees agreed on a 21-day limitation. 36
The conferees settled three other matters o£ timing.

They com-

promised on four days as the period during which a Vice. President and
a majority o£ the Cabinet could challenge the contention of a disabled
President that his inability was tenninated; the House had wanted two
days, the :!lenate seven.

The conferees agreed with the House that, in

the event of a challenge to the termination o£ a Presidential inability,

Congress, if not in session, would assemble within 48 hours.

And the

conferees settled on 21 days as the period in which Congress should
decide the issue of a challenge. The Senate version provided only that
Congress would

11

immediately proceed to decide" such an issue and

placed no limit on either the time within which Congress must assemble
or by which a decision had to be reached.

37

Thus, a crisis arising f.rom

a disputed termination of Presidential disability could not be permitted

to continue indefinitely because of the difficulty o£ obtaining a cloture on
Senate debate.

3

£:i.Jresidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of the Vice
Preside-nt ,House o£ Representatives Report No-:-?.n:>-4-;-·s-9tfl. Congress,
1st Session, p. 2.
3 1bid., p. 4.
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The conferees also reached agreement on two n1atte:r s of language.
They accepted the House language in Section 3, which specified that a
President who voluntarily decla1·ed his own inability would resume his
powers and duties irnmediately. upon transmitting his declaration of
recovery to the President pro ternpore and the Speaker.

38

And they

changed the expression "the Vice President and a rnajority of the principal officers of the executive departments, or such other body as
Congress rnay by law provide,

11

to read "the Vice President and a

rnajority of either the principal officers of the executive departments
or of such other body as Congress may by law provide.

11

This change

was 1nade at the suggestion of Senator Hruska in order to make it clear
that, if and when Congress should create a comrnission to replace the
Cabinet, the Vice President would remain in a position to establish the
Presiden.t 1s dis2.bility or challenge his recovery. 3 9
The unanirnous Conference Report 40 was adopted with little debate in the Bouse by voice vote on June 30, 1965.

41

It was considered

later the same day in the Senate, where Senators Robert F. Kennedy
and Eugene J. McCarthy expressed reservations regarding the method

3

~Ibid., p. 3.

3~eerick, 11 The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution,'" p. 194.
40Bayh, op. cit., p. 304, states:
Both Charrman Geller and I were glad that the report was unanhnous. Even though the Democrats were in the majority on both
sides, and that majority alone could have reached an agreeinent,
neither Chairman wanted to see his delegation vote break down
along party li-q.es.
4111 Constitutional Amendment on the Presidency, 11 op_._cit.,

p.

580.

89
of detennining inability.

Senator Kennedy feared that a President

might discharge his Cabinet, and a conflict could then arise as to:
. whether the President had, in fact, fired the Cabinet
at the time they had met and decided to put in a new President. What we could end up with, in effect, would be the
spectacle of having two Presidents both claiming the right
to exercise the powers and duties of the Presidency,. and
perhaps two sets of Cabinet officers both claiming the
right to act. 4 2
The concern of Senators Kennedy and McCarthy was somewhat lessen-·
ed when it was pointed out that Congress could establish a body to replace the Cabinet in acting with the Vice President to determine Presidential inability. 43 A body thus created by Congress could, most
likely, not be dismissed by a President.
Senator Albert Gore, referring to the "other body'' provision,
raised the last substantive objection to the Arnendment.

The Senator

argued that the use of the expression ''either/or'' placed the Cabinet
and the "other body" on a par, 44 and would allow a Vice President to
choose between thern. 45 Senator Bayh pointed out that there was an
abundance of legislative history

46

offering proof that the "either/or"

42
congressional Record---Senate,· (Daily Edition),
p. 14668:--·---

June 30,

1965~

4i:<'eerick, "The Proposed Twenty--Fifth Amend 1nent to the
Constitution, '' p. 194.
p.

4 'Congressional Record- -Senate , (Daily Edition), July 6, 1965,
1483il-.~-----------·---------4!ibid.:_, p. 15023.
---- 4 b---- ---------------------------- --------------------------. Bayh, ~P· ci_!_:_, p. 145, states:
The co1irts· have stated that where the language of a proposal
does not clearly state its intent, they will look to congressional
debates, co1nmittee reports, and particularly the statements of
the sponsors of the legislation, to surmise what that intent must
have been.

I

I!

I
'i
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language was intended to vest exclusively in one or the other of the
bodies.

He stated that, if Congress created another body,

"the Cabi-

net loses the responsibility and it :r.ests solely in the other body. 1147
Senator Gore requested, and was granted, a postponenJ.ent of further
discussion in order, as he said, to study this point. 48
On July 6, 1965, when the Conference Report was again con·sidered, Senator Gore renewed what appeared to be a fight to return
the whole n1atter to conference.

He continued to contend that,

by

allowing Congress to name a second body, the Amendm.ent W011ld, in
effect, permit the Vice President to 11 shop around 11 between the Cabinet
and the other body for support of his view that the President was disabled: 49 Senator Bayh again stated that he felt the language of the
Arnend1nent was sufficiently clear.

Senator Dirksen agreed, and added

that he could not imagine a Vice President acting in such a manner, but
that if he did, his political future would be ruined; 50 the Senator noted
that:
Fashioning language to do what we have in mind, particularly
when we are subject to the requirem.ent of compression for
ConstitutionaJ Amendment purposes, is certainly not an easy
undertaking. 1
Senator Sam J. Ervin, one of the conferees, added his com.ment:

'±tongressional Record---Senate,
·-------

p. 14835:""·-

(Daily Edition),

June 30, 1965,

4~bid., pp. 14838-14839.
~------ --- -- ---- <4J:~0ngressiona1-Record~--Senate_, --(-Daily_Edition), __3_uLy_6,_L9_65_, _______ ------•------P· 15025.
5 0rbid., p. 15027 ..

51

Ibi.d,, p. 15026.
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\Ve have more cooks with rn.ore zeal concerned with preparing this broth than any piece of proposed legislation I have
ever seen . . . . I am of the opinion that the Conference Report
. . . would submit to the States the very best possible r esolution on the Sll;bject obtainable in the Congress . . . as it is now
constituted. 52
Following the conclusion of the July 6 debate, the Senate approved the Conference Report without change by a vote of 68 to 5. 53 The
Joint Resolution was then formally transmitted to the General Services
Adrninistration on July 7, 1965, for certification and transmittal to the
state legislatures for their action on ratification. 54
Opposition and Compromise
Senator Birch Bayh, with his staff, 55 not only drafted the proposed
Arnenchnent and worked effectively at developing the necessary support
for its Congressional passage, they also prevented the Amendment from
becorning a partisan issue and recomr.nended compromise where it seerned both necessary and possible without allowing the proposal to be

5 trbid., p. 15030.
5 :tongressional Record- -Senate , (Daily Edition), July 6, 1965,
pp. 15o:rr:rso32.-Senato-r-Irayh recaiTs his thoughts at that moment:
The final outcom.e, of course, was in the hands of the state legislators, but for the moment I could relax and enjoy the exhilaration
of victory. It had not always been that way.
Bayh, ~."¥:· cit._, p. 333.
5 4'Constitutional Amendment on the Presidency,

11

op. cit.,

p. 581.

5 5:fhe Senator would be the first to admit the value of his staff
which consisted o£: Larry Conrad, the Senate Constitutional A1.nendments
Subcormnittee Chief Counsel, and Stephen Lesher, a young newspaper
man who was-on the_sta£Las_th© 1:_esult of a fellowship fro1n the American
Political Science Association. Also, Cio-sefy associat'ed wi.th the Sena-~
tor 1 .s efforts to amend the Constitution was Bernard P. Fensterwald,
former Counsel of the Senate Constitutional Amendments Subcornmitte.
Bayh, _?P· cit., p. 33.
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emasculated.
The ABA contributed to the passage of the Amenchnent by supplying a consensus outside of Congress that could rally support and by
lobbying to gain co-sponsors and votes for the pJ:oposal.
The support given by President Johnson, first in

~1is

State of the

Union 1nessage and later in his specific endorsement of S. J. Res. 1,
was a significant factor in aiding Senator Ba yh to convince. his fellow
Senators that the President wanted a solution, and that the President
supported his particular solution.
The opposition to the Amendment, like the support for it, was bipartisan.

It was directed against possible ambiguities in the langl.tage

of the original Bayh proposal, and possible disadvantages in writing of
detailed procedures into the Constitution and, most important, possible
disadvantages in specifying, or not specifying, time lirnitations in the
Amendment.

The greatest single point of contention,

and the reason

for the two-month deadlock in Conference Com:mittee, was the questio'n
of whether or not. to place a limit on the time Congress could take in
deciding a disputed disability.

Disagreement on this point came close

to killing the proposal at that stage.

The greatest threat, however, was

not this question but rather the stand taken by Senator Albert Gore on
the

11

l

either/or 11 language relating to the Cabinet or other body that

Congress might establish to determine disability and that might allow
I

the Vice President to

11

shop around 11 for support in his efforts to declare

I

the President disabled or challenge his recovery.

It is not clear whether

Gore was trying .to perfect the language of the proposal or kill the Amend1nent.

But had he succeeded in his attempt to return the Amendment

!

l
t

I

I
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to the Conference Cornm.ittee the results, whether intentional or not,
rnight well. have been tantamount to killing the Amendment,
He did not succeed, and the A1nendrnent went to the states fo1~
ratification.

CHAPTER V
RATIFICATION BY THE STATES
Progress in 1966
The last step necessary to incorporate the Joint Resolution into
the Constitution as the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was the approval of
three-fourths of the states (Appendix H gives details of the Ratification
Procedure).

Senator Bayh records that he felt:

. the process of State ratification would be the most long
and drawn out, if not the 'most difficult, stage of the ·journey .
. . . Moreover, we were not merely uncertain how long it .
would take to pass; the q1estion o£ whether it would pass at
all was a very real one.
Once Congressional passage was cornpleted, a n1ember of each
.state bar association was assigned the responsibility of mobilizing
support within his state.
speaker 1 s bureaus.

Many of the junior ba.r associations forrned

Senator Bayh and his staff did what they could to

hasten the process of ratification.

Letters were addressed to each of

the state governors requesting their assistance and "masses" of
detailed correspondence were sent to state legislative leaders.

The

state bar associations supplied comprehensive critiques of the Amendment. 2
Less than 24 hours after Congressional passage, New Hampshire 1 s
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Senator Tom. Mcintyre m.ade a valiant effort to obtain the

t~ecessary

docmnents so that his state might become the first to rati.fy.

Many

long distance telephone calls on July 7 were to prove of no avail, when
the General Services Administration (hereafter referred to as G. S. A.)
finally indicated that it would not be able to prepare the proper documents in time, and so the New Hampshire Legislature adjourned without being able to consider the proposed Amend1nent. 3
Within a week of New Hampshire's failure, both Nebraska and
Wisconsin were eager contenders for first place in rati.fica tion.
Nebraska notified the National Archives and Records Service, G. S. A.,
that its unicameral legislature had ratified the Amendment on July 12.
The following day, the

Ca'pi~al

Ti.n_:es reported that "Wisconsin today

became the first state . . . to ratify the proposed am.enclment. rr4
Yet it was not and still is not certain which of the two states actually
ratified first. 5

The proposed Amendment was introduced in the Nebras-

ka State Legislature as Resolution 72 and was passed the san1e day by
a vote of 47 to 0.

6

However, a dispute arose over whether a resolution

ratifying a Constitutional An1endment must be signed by the Governor.

4capital [ 1\IIadi.son, Wisconsin] Tin1es, July 13, 1965, (Zerox
clippi.ng).--.fil"e New York Times, July T4,T965, p. 21, proclaimed
that "WisconsitllJeat o-u.tNebraska by just four minutes.
. to become
the first State to ratify . . . "
.

5Tb,e New York Times of July 15, 1965, _reported that on July 14
Ne 5raska Legt-Sla ture vofea-fc)notiTy-Wasliingtonofficially -tli.a t--------------'-Nebraska claimed the status of the first State to ratify. The G. S. A.
would seem to ag-ree, for it records Nebraska as the first.

,-------t1ie

6

Letter received from Hugo F. Srb, the Clerk of the Nebraska
State Legislature, dated August .21, 1967.
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He was away frorn the State Capital and it was not until 10:.19 a. 1n. on
July 13 that it could be ar·ranged for the Lieutenant Governor to sign
as acting chief executive for hi.s State. 7

That same 1norning, the

Wisconsin State Assembly ratified by a vote of 84 to 11, and the House
by 28 to 0.

8

The next state to complete the ratification process was Oklahorna,
on .July 16, 1965; Massachusetts granted approval on August 9 without
. 1e ·d.1ssen t'tng vo t e. 9 ' 10
a s1.ng

S01ne two weeks later, Senator Bayh

was told that the Amendment had passed the State Sena.te of Pennsylvania, but that the Chairman of the House Committee to which it had
been referred intended to "sit on it. ''

The Senator notes that, after

''many telephone calls'' between Washington and Har·risburg, the
Pennsylvania Legislature corr1pleted ratification on August 18.

11 12
·'

Kentucky m.ade its elf the sixth state to ratify, acting on Septe1n-

ber 15 pursuant to the call of a Special Session of the State Legislature
by the Gove1:nor of that State.

7

8

13

Arizona approved on September 22,

Bayh, ~}?_:__::.it:_, p. 337.
Ibid.

10

I.... etter received fron1. Daniel M. O'Sullivan, the Director of the
Legislative Research Bureau of the State of Massachusetts, dated
August 1'7, 1967.
11

Bayh, op.:__.~_~!:_., p. 337.
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and Michigan brought the nun-:tber to eight in favor on October 5. 14
Passage was as smooth in Senator Bayh's horne state of Indiana.

The

Governor, who had called a Special Session to consider legislative
reapportionrnent, placed the Amendment on the State Legislature's
agenda and invited the Junior Senator of Indiana to
session.

15

ad~ress

a joint

The Amendment was ratified that same day, October 20,

by an "overwhelming" vote.

16

The next day California became the

tenth state to approve the Amendment.

17

.
Then a snag occurred.

As the Arkansas State Legislature was preparing to consider
the Amendment, Representative Paul Van Dalsen distributed to each
member a copy of an article printed in the South Carolina Law Re~iew

--

------

that was extrern.ely critical of certain aspects of the Amendment.
Representative Vc.r.nDalsen also convinced the Speaker of his Legislature that the Amendment should not be brought to the floor for a vote.
However, as a result of argun1ents presented by members of the
Arkansas State Bar Association and the ABA's request that Governor
Orval Faubus use his "good ·offices,

II

the Speaker was moved to re-

consider his position and, on November 4, ratification was accon1plished. 18

op.

1411 Presidential Disability Amendment Ratified by States, 11
cit., p. 301.
15
Ibid.

1j

l6Letter received frorn Sa1nuel T. Lesh, Law Division Director,
-~~----c!nE1i-.:t-na-be g-i-sl-a-ti-ve-Bur-eau-,-da-ted-Augus-t-_:_:_10-,-1-96-7-,-i-ndi-cates-:-the-vote~-----~~-·- - - - in his state's legislature was 50 to 0 in the Senate and 88 to 1 in the
House.
~
op.

1711 PJ.·esidential Disability Amendm.ent Ratified by States,
cit., p. 301.

--18

Bayh,

"P· ._::_i:_t,_,

p. 338.

11

~

I
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New Jersey followed with its approval on November 29,
major opposition,

1119

11

without

and Delaware ratified on December 7--the day

that was, by something more than coincidence, the I 78th anniversai·y
of its ratification of the original Federal Constitution.

20

Utah granted

its approval on. January 17, 1966.
West Virginia became the fifteenth to verify, on January 20,
but not without a problem.

21

A few days before, a member of Senator

Bayh 1 s staff received a phone call from the Floor Leader of the West
Virginia Senate who said his Legislature was very much concerned by
the Arnendment 1 s disability provision.

The Floor Leader wanted to

know if it were possible to ratify one part of the Arnendment and not
another.

He was told it was not and, after Senator Bayh had a long

phone conversation with the Floor Leader and the Chairman of the
State Senate Judiciary Committee--the value of which Senator Bayh
admits is uncertain- -the Legislature finally granted its approval.
Four days later, on January 24, Maine ratified,

23

22

closely

19

Letter received from Donald E. Wardle, Assistant Couusel
to the Governor of New Jersey, dated Decernber 5, 1967.

21 11

Presidential Disability Amendment Ratified by States, "
Ol?":_~cit. , p. 301.
22

Bayh, op. cit., pp. 338-339.

..•... ·· ·.. · ............... · .... · .. .
-Letter received from Edith L. Hary, Law Librarian, Maine
State Library, dated August 15, 1967. The letter is cited because it
speaks not only for Maine, but for rnany other states for whioh little
more than the date of ratification is noted:

===~~==~23

. . . here we were deciding on approval or rejection of an

I'

!

. ~
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24
followed by Rhode Island, on January :'.8.
~
Colo1·ado was to prove quite a p.t·obleln.

In July, 1965, the

Governor of that State had called a special session of the State Legislature to deal with recent floor problems.

The A1nendment was intra-

duced, although it was not on the agenda presented by the Governor and
the session was to be limited to just three days.

The Denver Post

attacked such action as inappropriate during a special session. 25 How-

ever, the Am.endment was brought to a vote and adopted almost unanimously in the Colorado House but was "deemed" to have died in the
Senate where it received four votes short of the necessary two-thirds. 26
Ratification by a two-thirds vote of each house of a state legislature is
not req1.tired by the constitution of any other state,
Code.

28

27

or by the U.S.

Therefore, it appears that Colorado's failure to ratify on its

first atte1npt m.ay have been at least partially due to a misunderstanding

amendn1en.t to the U.S. Constitution and yet no attention was called
to the significance of the occasion, no hearings were held, no debate or com.ment was offered. The Joint Resolution was simply
read by the clerks in either house and declared adopted by the presiding officers simply by a tap of the gavel. It bothered me then
and does now in thinking about it. .·Possibly national attitudes
were already well conditioned as to its desirability and the final
action less perfunctory here than it seerns.
2411

Presidential Disability Amendment Ratified by States,
op. ~~!:_• p. 301.

25

11

Ba.yh, _?p.___:it:., p. 339.

26Leonard Larsen, "Vote Delayed on Succel3sion A1nendment,"
.Denver Post, January 20, 1966, p. 3 .
.-.-.____

~...

. .------~

-

27Bayh, op. cit., p. 339.
28

U.S. Code, Title I, Section 106b.
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on the part of the State Legislature of its own Constitution. 2 9
Senator Bayh records that efforts in Colorado were
abandoned 11 for the time, since it was hoped that the
an outright defeat by a legislature might be avoided.

11

11

hastily

black rnark 11 of
The Senator

mentions that early in the ratification process, great care had been
taken to avoid such

11

blen1ishes on our record of ratification.

11

30

The Amendment was again brought before the Colorado Legislature during its 1966 regular session.

This tirne the Denver Post

criticized not the timing but the wisdom of the Amendment:

11

•••

if

enough states refuse to accept it, an itnproved atnendment will come
out of Congress in a form which will be generally acceptable.

11

31

29

La1·s en, loc. cit. In 1966, a theory was propounded by Ty
J?atteTson, a .Dep"uTyi>-ttorney General of the State of Colorado, and
advanced by House Speake1· Allen Dines, along with other legislative
leaders, that the Legislature may actually have approved the Amendment in the Special Session of July, 1965. The line of reasoning was
that, while the Colorado Constitution requii·es that amendments to i.t be
adopted by two-thirds majorities, there is actually no such requirement
concerning ratification of amendments to the National Const.il;uti.on. The
possibility of submitting this matter to the Colorado Supreme Court was
considered, but proved unnecessary when both houses voted approval by
two-thirds majorities in 1966.
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Bayh, op. cit., p. 339.
The Senator states:
In Alabama:·-·:--:-we had discussed with the State Bar Association the advisability of trying for ratification . . . . My own feeling was that no one could be certain what would happen in Alabama.
I could imagine Governor George Wallace seizing on the criticism
contained in the South Carolina Law Review, and making opposition
of the Amendmel11-intoa statesrrightSissue. This could hurt us
not only in Alabama, but elsewhere as well. We delayed our efforts
there, and the Alaba1na State Legislature never got around to con~sidering the Twenty-Fi£th-Amend1nent [untH aftel' the 1·equisite ] "
nmnber of states had already approved, thus n1aking it a part of the
--Gonstitution~ -:---- -------- -- -- - ---- --- - - - ---
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31Editorial in The Denver Post, January 14, 1966, p. 26.
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On the floor of the Colorado House, opposition to the Amendment was
led by Representative John Carroll who suggested that it was
drawn and potentially dangerous.

1132

11

vaguely

In the upper house, Senator L.

T.

Skiffington had led the opposition during the 1965 Special Sessio~,
stating that the United States had done without the Amendment for more
than 175 years and still could.

33

He again led the forces opposed to
. i

~

ratification.

f

Senator Skiffington 1 s principle objection was that the Amendment
set no standards for filling a Vice Presidential vacancy.

11

could put some political hack, or a personal friend in,

he said, and

11

The President

added:
I think it 1 s a dangerous thing to have an office as important
as that of Vice President filled by one man, instead of being
elected by the people . . . . If there were a requirement for
p:i:ior Congr.essionG.l sel'•rice the man would at least have been
elected by some o£ the people.

Skiffington admitted that h!O! favored a Constitutional Amendment on the
subject

11

but not this one. 1134

As a result of a. one-hour Senate Judiciary Cornmittee hearing,
at which proponents of the Amendment, including representatives of
the Colorado and American Bar Associations, were in the majority,
the Amendment was cleared for floor debate on January 11.

The

Arnenchnent 1 13 supporters, led at the hearing by Dale Tooley, a Denve1·

3

J

tarsen, loc. cit.

~~-_a~~ew~York'·'Tiffie·s,--·J\ll)i·~ls-;--'19 65';-p';'-.::5-3--.-~----~~~--~--------"--~--~_:_::__::_::_;c::: .- --
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attorney,

agreed that there were many hypothetical situations that the

Am.endm.ent did not meet, but that it was "the best alternative available" to what he referred to as the "present dangerous void in Presidential succession. 113 5
Senator Bayh records that he and his staff spent t]:le weekend of
January 30 working desperately to prepare a careful analysis of the
Amendment, along with a rebuttal to the arguments raised- in Colorado
against it.

Early Monday morning, they mimeographed these in

quantity planning to send a copy by air to each member of the Colorado
Legislature.

But all planes were grounded by a blizzard. Since a vote

was scheduled for the next day, the entire critique was dictated by
phone to bar representatives in Denver, who mimeographed it there
and distributed a copy to each mernber of the Legislature as originally
planned.

Senator Bayh concludes that this effort 1nust have won sorne

support for, on February 3, Colorado became the eighteenth state to

~atify. 36
Twenty more states were needed. 37 New Mexico ratified on
February 3, 38 and Kansas on February 8

duri~g

and with the encouragement of the Governor.

its 1966 budget session

Vermont gave its approv·al_

on February 10, and Alaska on February 18.

----------3 5The Denver Post,
3

~ayh,

January 12, 1966, p. 18.

op. cit., p. 340.

\-·-~·-·'-.----~~---3..:~ 1 Pre~si..:d-entta-I-_:_I'>i-sa~bi-li:ty-Am:e·ndm-ent..:Rattfi-ea.:__oy~gta:te-s-;-'''
op. cit., p. 301.

38 :Pl1ilip T." Manly, Attorney for the New Mexico Legislative
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Steady progress continued throughout the first half of 1966.
Idaho 3 9 ratified on March 2, and Hawaii on the following day. 40
11

Virginia, reacting to the strong leadership of its native son,

President Lewis Powell,

11

ABA

on March 8 unanimously approved the

Council, in a letter dated August 8, 1967, stated:
As is true in most of the states, New Mexico keeps no
records of committee hearings or floor debates. This was,
however, a cornpletely non-controversial measure without
expressed opposition other than the negative votes. There
was no evidence of activity either for or against by any
organized group, and the press gave no coverage except
for brief notice of its passage.
3 91Presidential Disability Amendment Ratified by States, 11
op. cit. , p. 301. Judith Austin, Historical Librarian for the Idaho
HGto"i:-·lC:al Society, wrote of the Am.endrnent 1 s passage in her state in
a letter da.ted March 29, 1967:
I am afraid that the story of Idaho's ratification of the 25th
Amendrn.ent to the Constitution is not going to add much color
to your paper.
The arnendment was ratified in the course of a special
session called by Governor Ro6ert F.. Smylie to redistrict the
state. As a result, the attention of everybody--legislature,
newspapers, etc. --seems to have been focused prirnarily on
this issue, and rnost of the other twenty-one specified items
of business (of which the amendinent was number 13) were
acted upon in fairly routine fashion.
4 CLetter from State Archivist Agnes C. Conrad, dated August
4,. 1967, explaining the process of ratification in her state:
If the Twenty-Fifth Amendment passed through all State
Legislatures as readily as it did through Hawaii 1 s you will
not have much rnaterial. . . . It was adopted by both houses
by a voice vote and there was no debate or opposition. It was
offered in the House and adopted on February 16 without any
referral to cmnmittee. It was then offered in the Senate and,
upon being reported out of corn.mittee, was adopted ilnrnediately
on March 3. As far as I can ascertain, there was no opposition
to this amendment.
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43 and Missouri
Arnendment. 41 Mississippi, 42 New Yo:rk, Maryland,
also ratified during March, bringing the total to twenty-nine,
states away frorn the necessary three-fourths.

or nine

44

By the end of March, Ba yh and his staff realized that few of the
remaining states would be convened in regular sessions during 1966.
They therefore began to concentrate on the handful of states that were
holding special sessions in response to the Supreme Court decision on
reapportionment. 45 Among these was New Hampshire,

which had tried

to be the first state to ratify; it beca1ne the thirtieth on June 13 by a
voice vote in both houses. 46 Louisiana was the last state to ratify in

1966 approving the Amendment on July 5.

41

Bayh, op. cit., p. 340.
Letter fro-m G.---M. Lapsley, Director of the Virginia Legislative Advisory Council, dated August 17, 1967, indicating the vote was
36-0 in the Senate, and 86--0 in the House of Delegates.
4 4'Presidential Di.sabili.ty Amendment Ratified by States,
op. cit. , p. 301.
4

11

1

letter from the Director of the Maryland State Department
of Legislative Reference, dated August 24, 1967, indicates the vote
was unanimous in both houses.

4 1\. letter from William R.

Nelson, Director of Research for
the Cornmittee on Legislative Research, State of Missouri, indicates
that the vote was unanimous in the Senate, 24-0, and the Amend1nent
was passed by the House with 93 ayes, 42 noes, 27 absent, and one
p1·esent but not voting. Mr. Nelson further notes that "no party line
vote was present on the vote in the House as both Republicans and
. Democrats are listed as voting on each side of the question. "

4

13ayh, .op. cit., p. 341.

~ letterfrOin John W. King, Governor of the Stateof New
Harnpshire, dated August 21, 1967, reports the voice voting.
4

.

\
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The Year Changes

------------The Bayh forces resigned themselves to await the opening of
regular legislative sessions the following year.

The Amendment was

only seven states away from the thirty-eight required.

Early in

January 1967, Bayh wrote to the governors of all the xemaining states
and uxged them to use their influence to help complete the process of
ratification.

"We were coming into the home stretch. 1147 Tennessee

xatified at the end of the second week in January, followed by Wyoming
on January 25,

and both Washington and Iowa on the 26th; Oxegon's

ratification was on February 2.

48

Thexe were only two more states

required.
North Dakota's two houses passed a resolution of ratification on
February 9, with the understanding that they were the thirty-eighth
;3tate to ratify.

To their great disappointment, they were informed by

the G. S, A. that "someone" had miscounted and that North Dakota was
only the thirty-seventh.

The State Legislature, still hoping to gain for

North Dakota the honor of being the state responsible for incorporat ..
ing the Amendment into_ the Constitution, declared their ratification
vote illegal on the technicality that it had been. a voice vote in one
house.

Their intent was to pass the measuxe again after one more

state had ratified and thus achieve their goal. 4 9 However, before the
Amendm.ent could be re-ratified, Minnesota and Nevada granted

~

-- ----~

~--~-__ -·----~- 4 &•E.r.esidenti.aLDisahilit-y_Amendment_Raiifi:e_d_hy_States_,__,,_________~~
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op. cit. , p. 301.
49Bayh, loc.

cit.
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approval on February 10, 1967, thus m.aking the Amendment a part of
the Constitution. 50
Ceremonial Approvals
Although there is no requiren1.ent that the President add his
signature to a Constitutional Amendment ratified by the requisite number of states, President Lyndon Johnson, "desi.Ting to give recognition
to the irnportance of our accomplishment, held a formal ceremony in
the East Room of the White House.

lr

After G. S. A. Administrator

Lawson Knott had signed the proclamation, Mr. Johnson affixed his

l

signature, not as an official part of the amending process but merely

!

as a witness to the G. S. A. proclamation.

:

i
1:

i

51

I
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I
I

Bayh concludes his account of the ratification process by stating:

I

l

f

1

I

SQ Presidentia1 Disability Amendment Ratified by States,
op. cit. , p. 301.
------:rn the race to be last, Nevada had ratified the Amendment
on February 8, but nullified that action when it learned it was
only 37th. . . . Ohio, North Dakota and Montana . . . also
were vying for the distinction of being 38th. The Minnesota
Legislature acted ai ll:31 A.M. (GST) on Feb. 10, becoming
the 37th state, and Nevada, in a time zone two hours earlier
than that in Minnesota, made its decisive move 'one hour and
13 1niuutes later.
The G. S. A. lists Minnesota as the 37th and Nevada as the 38th
in order of ratification.
Letters from Fred Krohn, Research Assistant in the Office of
the Governor of Minnesota, dated August 14, 1967, and Russell W.
Donald, Legislative Counsel of the State of Nevada Legislative Counsel
Bureau, also dated August 14, 1967, indicates that the chief concern
of both legislatures was the attaining of the distinction of being the
11
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Vice Presider1CBumplirey, Senate President Pro Tempore Carl Hayden,
Speakerof the House John McCormack, Congressmen Geller and
McCulloch, arid th-e Jtm.i6r Senatot frorh Indiana, Birch Bayh;
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In 1787, John Dickenson of Delaware, a delegate to the
Constitutional Convention meeting in Philadelphia, had
asked, "What is rneant by the term disability and who shall
be the judge of it'? 11 On February 23, 196 [ 7] at 1:18 P.M.
179 years later, in the East Room of the White House, John
Dickenson received his answer. :>2
There is a denouetnent to the story of state ratification.

Nine

states completed their ratification process after it was no longer
necessary, leaving only Georgia,

North Dakota and South Carolina

as states which failed to grant approval. 53 All three states appeared to
experience the same human weaknesses in their legislators that, while
of little consequence in this instance, had delayed federal legislators
in settling the basic questions of leadership succession for six 'generations.
About Georgia, Senator Bayh notes:
On February 18, [ 1966 ] . . . Georgia was on the verge
of becoming the hventy-third state to ratify, but they never
quite rnade it. It was late in the evening of the session's
final day; both houses had gone through the procedure required for ratification, but somewhere along the line a

5 tBayh, op. cit.; p. 342. An interesting side light on Senator
Bayh 1 s sense o£ tir.ning is given in an article which appeared on June
25, 1965, in the New York Times just after the Conference Committee
had reached a com.pi:-omise on the Joint Resolution: Senator Bayh predicted then that ratification would occur in "earlv 1967 11 because some
state legislature would not be in session [in 196,6 ] . E. W. Kenworthy,
"Conferees Back Succession Plan, 11 New York Tirnes , June 25, 1965,
p. 8.
5311 Presidential Disability Amendment Ratified by States, 11

op. ci.t., p. 302. The G. S. A. lists the following states as ratifying:
"COnnecticut on February 14, 1967, South Dakota on March 6, Ohio
on March 7, Alabama on March 14, North Carolina on March 22,
·--,--------Ill~n9tsc QB:_JYl1!;t:~~h:C:~!h~-Sf~~~~~~Q_t!~4p.:r-=-il~4:S~~.Jid=c_~LQ;J;"-j.::Q~~2.n~=1'4~-Y~~.:_:-l~~I~.•
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relatively insignificant procedural step necessary for
.finalizing the process never was taken. We never discovered what actually took place, but it appeared that,
in the rush which surrounds adjournment . . . the
necessary papers had been lost or mislaid. 5 4
North Dakota, as previously noted, had hoped to become the significant--thirty-eighth--state to ratify; however, it was lec;trned that
North Dakota had delayed too long and the Amendment had gone into
effect. It was then the consensus of that State 1 s House that-any action
by North Dakota would have no legal effect, so no vote was taken. 5 5
Senator Walter J. Bristow, Jr. of South Carolina, who introduced a
ratification resolution in 1967, indicates that, although a bill for
ratification was introduced during both the 1966 and 1967 legislative
sessions, it did not pass on either occasion:
. the1·e was no great interest in the passage of this
Ar:nendrnent. . . . After the Amendment had been ratified
by a .sufficient nurnber of States to become a part of the
Constitution there was no longer a need for the South
Carolina Legislature to take any _(lc;tign . . _. . Th~re'lv'as _
no organized opposition to the Bill insofar as I am aware: 56 ·-

-

--=-c::----

CHAPTER VI
AN EVALUATION OF. THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT
The Four Sections
Sections 1 and 2 of the Amendment remain unchanged since they
were first introduced in Congress as joint resolutions in January 1965.
SECTION l. In case of the removal of the President from
office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall
becorne President.
The first section confirms the Tyler precedent by which Vice
Presidents have assumed the Presidency when their Chief Executives
have died.

The precedent has proven .satisfactory in practice but is

contrary to the intentions of the authors of the Constitution. It therefore seerns wise that the custorn has been incorporated in a Constitutional amendment.
The section extends the occasions upon which a Vice President
would succeed to the Presidency. Although no President has been ren~oved

or has resigned from office, the political chaos that could be

precipitated if a President did so leave 'his office and there were uncertainty about his successor justifies the inclusion of these contingencies in the Amendrnent.
In any of these three cases, the Vice President would serve as
President for the ren:1ainder of the unexpired term.

1

f

l

i

1John Feerick, 11 The Proposed Twenty-FHth Amendment to the
Constitution, 11 Fordham Law Review, XXXIV (December, 1965), p. 196.
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SECTION 2. Whenever there i.s a vacancy in the office
.of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice
President who shall take office upon confirmation by a
majority vote of both Houses of Congress.
A vacancy could occur in the Vice Presidency either when a Vice
President has become President or when he hirnself has been removed
from office or has resigned or died.

In any case, the President would

submit his nornination to Congress and, upon confinnation, the new
Vice President would serve for the unexpired portion of the Presidential term.
By assuring that Congress participates in the appointment of a
Vice President when the office falls vacant, the

An~endment

does t:ot

assure that the office would be filled immediately. If Congress is not
in session, the Vice Presidency could remain vacant at least until the
next regular session or a special session was called. 2 During this
tir.ne, the Speaker of the House would be heir apparent.

The present

succession law WOLtld also apply in the case of simultaneous vacancy
in the Presidency and Vice Presidency.

3

The nominee for the Vice Presidency must be a citizen born in
the United States, at least 35 years of age, and a resident within the
United States for no less than 14 years. 4 He would therefore have the

Z:Feerick, "The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution," p. 196. Presidential Inability, Hearings before the
Comrnittee on the .Judic.lal;-y;-1-Jouse oT Representatives, Eighty-Ninth
Congress, First Session, February 9, 10, 16 and 17, 1965, Serial
No. 1, pp. 45, 49.
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Statements orSenators-Bayli ana-Hollana~ongressional·
!<-~~o:_d- -Senat~,. (Daily Edition), February 19, J.9t)5-;--p:-52lHJ:'\Jearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 1965,
op.~~-· p. 48.
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proper Constitutional qualifications to succeed to the Presidency if
the need arose.
On January 29, at hearings held by the Senate Subcommittee on
Constitutional Amendrnents, Senator Dirksen had brought up the question of lirniting the President's possible choice of a new Vice President to n1em.bers of Congress and heads of the departrnents of government.
Attorney General Katzenbach replied that he did not believe the
choice should be limited at all.
The Presidential candidate customarily has a free hand
in choosing his running mate. . . . I [ Senator Bayh
stepped in n<omentarily to point out that Senator Dirksen's
limitations would excll!-de state governors; with some understater:nent, the Attorney General replied that "it would be in
the interest of ratification not to eliminate the Governors"-a contention with which I was in complete agreement. 5

J

There is in theory no limit to the number of nominees the Presi-

r
Il

I
il
f

i

dent could offer and Congress reject, and any nominee might be re-

I

quested to undergo hearings in either or both the House and Senate.

I

Nevertheless,. the Twenty-Fifth Amendment appears to be as politically
practical and Constitutionally sound as any proposal f()r keeping the
Vice Presidency filled.

While retaining the initiative in selecting his

Vice President, just as a Presidential candidate does at a convention,
the Presiden,t could seek out the views of Congressional leaders before
submitting his nomination and thus reduce the risk of rejection; unlike
the Presidential candidate, however, he would want to consider the

~

I
~

~=:-c~=c_::c=_~a.=cc=enfal:)i-lif)'=-oF:J?_Qterit@:l==-o:oix1.ft1ee=s::to~th~~Qpposition==p_~)-•ty--ascwe1-Facs=-=-c-'="'-'CO"-=c"··-~~---5 Birch Bayh, One Heartbeat Away {Indianapolis and New York:
The Bobbs-Merrill Com~pa11.y~--1nc. ,-l!)oH), p. 186.
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to his own, particularly if the opposition were a majority or large
rninority in either House. 6 Congress, for its part, would feel the
pressure of public opinion if it rejected or failed to act on a President's nor.nination, or at least on his second or third try.
Yet Congress has an active part to play. Accordi:ng to the
Constitution, only the Senate need approve Presidential appointments. 7 .
By giving the House of Representatives a vote on the Presidential
appointment of a Vice President, Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment gives the people, through their Representatives, a greater participation in this uniquely important appointment than if the power of
confirmation were limited to the Senate. 8
Although Section 2 does not guarantee that the Vice Presidency
will always be filled 1 and leaves to the present untested law the matter

i

of succession beyond the Vice Presidency,

~

its solution to the problem

1

of Vice Presidential vacancy appears to be workable. Only under
conditions of extraordinary partisan disagree1nent between the President and Congress, or of extraordinary national e1nergency when other
questions would take priority, would the nation be likely to remain for
long without a Vice President.

~
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the House Committee on the Judiciary, 1965,

o:~...:_ cit., p. 50.
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u. S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2.
. . and he shall nominate, . . . with the advice and consent
of the Senate.
. all other officers of the United States, whose
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Sections 3 and 4 of the Amendment are the attem.pts ·to solve the
rnuch n1ore difficult problems of establishing Presidential disability
and assuring that Presidential responsibilities always and clearly rest
with one person.
SECTION 3. Whenever the President transmits to the
President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives his written declaration that he is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and
until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the
Vice President as Acting President.
Under this section, a President is authorized, and indeed encom·aged, to take the initiative in declaring Presidential disability,
and would know that his Vice President would not assume the office of
the Presidency but only act as President, and only for so long---except
as provided under Section 4- -as the President wished to be free of his
povvers and duties. 9
The section is intended to cover any type of Presidential-inability or disability.

As Senator Ba.yh put it:

The intention of. this Legislation i.s to deal with any type
of inability, whether it is from traveling from one nation to
another, a breakdown in cornmunications, capture by the
enemy or anything that is imaginable. The inability to perform the powers and duties of the office, for any reason is
inability under the terrns that we are discus sing.10

9congr'essi.onal Record--House, (Daily Edition), Aprill3, 1965,
p. 7669-,- citingl.:-ernar"lcsof-Repl:esentati.ve Geller. See also Congres··
sional Record--Senate, (Daily Edition), June 30, 1965, p. 14830~1ting
tneremarks of S'enator Bayh; Senate Report No. 66, 89th Congress,
.. ··-·1st Session, 1965, p. 3; and House of Representatives Report No. 203,
'--"-'

.
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Twenty-Fifth .Amendrnent to the Constitution, 11 p. 198, suggests that
although, i.n the case where a President has himself declared his inability, there could be no challenge to his restoration, the Vice President and Cabinet would not thereafter be precluded from declaring
the President disabled under Section 4 of the Arnendment.
10
congressional Rec:ord---Senate, (Daily Edition), F'ebrmiry 19,

19 6 s, P .5zcru:---------·--·-----·---------·--

1
J

114

Again, Section 4 provides for the exceptional case, in which a President was not able to co1nrnunicate with the Congressional leaders.
The President could declare his disability for either an indefinite or specific period of tilne, and even set the hour when the Vice
President is to assurn.e the role of Acting President. ll Such a
tion could be conditionaL As Mr.
might write,

declara-

Katzenbach suggested, the President

"if in the event I am under anesthesia or sim.ilarly unable,

I wish you to assume those duties.

. . " Mr. Katzenbach concluded

that Section 3 is broad enough to include a prospective as well as an
actual inability. 12 This Section obviously has some precedence in
the letters President Eisenhower wrote before his potential and actual
illnesses to Vice President Nixon.

In formulating the Amendment,

Congress intended that written declaration of inability, recovery, or
challenge would be rnade public.
Cormnittee Report on S. J.

As stated in the Senate Judiciary

Res. 1:

. notice by all parties should be public notice. The
Committee feels that notice by transmittal to' the President
[ pro tempore] of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
. guarantees notice to the entire country. . . . It is
further understood by the Committee that should the President [pro tempore ] . . . and the Speaker . . . not be found
in their offices at the time the declaration was transmitted
that transmittal to the office of such presiding officers would
[ serve] for sufficient notice under the terms of the Amendment.l3

11 Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th
Congress, 1st Session, Serial No. 1, 1965, pp. 98, 99, 240.

13senate Report No. 66, 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1965,

p.

2.
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Whenever a Vice President bec01nes Acting President, it would
appear that he temporaTily loses his position as President of the
Senate.

Less clear is the question of whether he would take the

Presidential oath upon assuming the role of Acting President. 14
By clarifying the status of the Vice President who substitutes
for his President, Section 3 removes the historic fear prevailing in
tilnes of .Presidential disability that the Vice President will usurp the
Presidency, or will be accused of doing so. Section 3 also confirm.s,
without grammatical confusion, the apparent intentions of the authors
of the Constitution--that the Vice President would carry out the powers
and duties of a disabled President but would not assume the office itself.
Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, by its very length,
indicates that it grapples with the rnost difficult. of the three questions
-<

which have frequently disrupted the continuity of executive power:
how to deal with Presidential inability when there is uncertainty or
conflict of opinion.
SECTION 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority
of either the principal officers of the executive departments or
of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmits
to the Presid·ent pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the Vice President shall imn~ediately assume the powers
and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transrnits to the President
pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of

14Feerick, 11 Proposed Twenty-Fifth Am.endment to the
Constitution,-11 p~ 198, concludes that it would seem that he- should not,since the duty of acting as President would be 11 encompass ed 11 in his
Vice Presidential oath. The legislative history on this point appears
to be inconclusive. See also Hearings before the House Cornmittee on
the Judiciary, 89th Congress, 1st Session, Serial No. 1, 1965, p. 87.
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Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists,
he shall resurne the powers and duties of his office unless the
Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers
of the executive department or of such other body as Congress
may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President
pro tempo1•e of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the President {s
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within fortyeight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress,
within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declara-.
tion, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days
after Congress is required to assemble, determine by twothirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President
shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resun1e the powers and duties of his
office.
An impo:dant aspect of Section 4 is that, while either the Vice
President or n1em.bers o.f the Cabinet (or "other body") could raise the
question of Presidential inability, the written challenge would be signed
by both.

Attorney General Brownell stated:

Undoubtedly the Justice Departrnent would prepare papers
[ for the inability declaration ], and the action would be
taken at a joint meeting of the Vice President and the Cabinet
men'lbers. It might not even be a matter of public knowledge
. . . who signed first. That particular point would fade into
insignificance in getting . . . group action. 15
There are several reasons for placing partial responsibility for
inability determination upon the Cabinet.

They are Presidential

appointees and therefore unlikely to declare a President disabled unless
he were truly unable to perform the duties of his office.

The members

of the Cabinet work closely with the President and meet with him often.
They would therefore be better able to judge his condition than some
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1.5pr esidential Inability, Hearings before the House Committee
on the Jud1c1ary, "139111-c-ongress, 1st Session, Serial No. l, 1965, p. 247.
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other body.

However, should future usage prove that the Cabinet

is not a viable body to participate in judging whether the President is
disabled or recovered, Congress has the power under the Amendment
to create another body that would share with the Vice President the
responsibility of Presidential inability.

I'

.Another responsibility that would be shared is the assernbling

I

of Congress within the specified 48 hours if the Vice President and

J:
I!

Cabinet challenged the President's declaration of fitness.

It would be

"incumbent" upon the Acting President to fix a time within 48 hours at

I

which Congress must assemble. 16 If he did not do so, it would be up

f:
f!

to the President pro tempore and Speaker to call their respective
houses into session within the prescribed time. 17
The Vice President would retain his position as Acting President
until either Congress reached a decision supporting the President's
statement of recovery

Ol'

the 21...:day limit expired. 18 Congress would

16 F.eerick, "The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendrnent to the
Constitution, " p. 201.
17

Congressional Record--House , (Daily Edition), Aprill3, 1965,
pp. 769171098--;- Fee-rTcTS:tatestliat 1f11either of these officers issued
a call, "Congress would have to come into session within forty-eight
hours on its own initiative, 11 but he does not explain how Congress
would do so. Feerick, "The Proposed Twenty-Fifth A1nendm.ent to the
Constitution, " p. 201.
18

Senate Report No. 66, 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1965, p. 3;
Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Congress,
lst Session, SeTial No. 1, 1965, p. 58. Senator Bayh stated before· the
House Comxnittee:
The Vice President continues to act as Pres1dent until
Congress decides the issue. We have given this a considerable amount of study and we have tried to arrive at a situation
where there is a minirn.um arnount of change back and forth.
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have three cou:rses of action open to it within the 21-day limit: it
could decide in favor of the President, or in favor of the Vice President, or reach no decision at all.

Representative Poff explained:

Circmnstances may be such that Congress by tacit agreement rnay want to uphold the President in some rnanner which
will not amount to a public rebuke of the Vice President who
is the Acting President.
[This
option furnishes
the graceful vehicle. 19

J

.

All the procedures under Section 4, in fact, weigh heavily on
the side of the President in the case of a challenge.

It was again

Representative Poff who remarked:
If one House voted but failed to get the necessary two -thirds
majority, the other House would be precluded from using the
21 days and the President would immediately resume the powers
and duties of his office. 20

And Senator Ervin observed:
The only thing that saved Andrew Johnson fr01n impeachment,
and saves us from behaving as a "banana republic" . . . was
the provision of the Constitution that required a two -tr1irds vote
before the President could be removed from office. 2
Nevertheless, in deciding the issue of a disputed Presidential recovery, Congress could conduct snch proceedings as it feels are
warranted. It could request the President to undergo medical or
psychiatric tests and exarninations or be questioned at hearings. 22

l9Feerick, "The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution, 11 p. 201, citing the remarks of Representative Pof£ in
Congressional Record- -House , (Daily .Edition) April 13, 1965,
p .~7tJ'i3·:-·--·
-2Cbongressional Record- -House, (Daily Edition), June 30,

19 6 5'

p:l4~r31.

-----

21congressiona1 Record- -Senate, (Daily Edition), April 13,
1965, p. 76'73.
.
2

~earing before the Subcornmittee on Constitutional Amend-
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Section 4 of the Twenty·-Fifth Am.endment drew the greatest
criticism during passage of the resolution through Congress and
frorn outside scholars.

For example, the participation of the Vice

President in declaring a President's disability or challenging his
state1nent of recovery has seemed to some a political impropriety
and to others a very real danger to the nation.

Richard H. Hansen

felt that:
As a lawyer, I cannot subscribe to putting the Vice President, a party in interest, in the embarrassing position of
passing (even indirectly) on his own advancement. He.
should come to the job free of avoidable public criticism. 23
Senato:c Albert Gore, one of the Arnendrnent's severest critics, insisted that a coup was not only technically but legally possible now:
"The Amend1nent, in fact, is almost a bluepriut for ii. 1124

In answer to such an argumen-t, it can be pointed out that i.n any
attempt to seize the President's job, a Vice President would first have
to satisfy the Cabinet and then win a. two-thirds approval of Congress.
The possibility of a Vice President seizing the Presidency existed
before the Amendm.ent, and during Presi.denLial disability crisis,

ments of the Senate Judiciary Con:u::nittee, Janua:ry 2.9, 1965, pp.
21-23, 29, 35. The remarks on the floor of Senators Ervi.n and
Hrusk~l appe.3.r to confirn1 that hearings were contemplated.
Congressional Record--Senate, (Daily Edition), February 19, 1965,
- - - .----······-··r---------------·--pp. 3195 -319o.

2

~

itichard H. Hansen,

"The Continuing Presidency,

. . [ Ne~~~::]tuJ~::l~d,:a;e:~~;::·.(:~:x{:::,~
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Vice Presidents have gone to extremes in avoiding even a .suggestion
of a coup.
One of the points frequently made during both hearings and floor
debates was that the President could discharge his Cabinet
was able to declare him disabled.

befo1~e

it

While this is certainly possible,

Congress could deal with the situation under Section 4 of the Amendment by exercising its power to establish another body.

Such a body

would be c:reated by statute, which could be subject to the President's
veto.

However, a determined Congress could override a President's

veto by a two-thirds vote.
A Vice President serving as Acting President would also appear
to have the powe:r to appoint or remove members of the Cabinet.
he

u::H:~d

If

this power to appoint a Cabinet that would back him against

the President, Congress would not be likely to look with favor upon
hin.1. and, again, could eliminate the Cabinet as the body to participate
. in inability determination. 2 5
It seems that the advantages of having the Cabinet participate in

disability determination outweigh the disadvantages.

The hi story of
.l

Presiden.tial inabilities points toward the conclusion that the Cabinet
would not decli·.1e to exerdse its pO"\ver if an occasion arose requiring
it to do so.

The Cabinet of President Garfield unanimously agreed
I

that the P1·esident was disabled but felt it did not have the power to
declare hh:n so and hesitated to take such action for fear that the

2

~'eerick, . "The Proposed Twenty--Fifth Amendment to the

Constitution,

11

p. 203.
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Vice President would remain President for the rest of his terrn.

In

the case of Wilson's disability, the Cabinet sought to ascertain the
President's condition and it appears that, if they had had the power to
declare hirn disabled, they would have exercised it in a responsible
way. 26 It seems likely that a future Cabinet would use ~ts power only
if the President could not be persuaded to make a voluntary declara-

tion, or if the President were unable to make such a declaration.
Senator Gore's principal criticism of Section 4 dealt with the
"spectacle of competing claims [ for J the power of the Presidency. 1127
Such a spectacle could last for 21 days, the time within which Congress
must decide or make no decision and thus return the President to the
full duties and po,vers of his office.

During those 21 days, the Vice

President \VOuld be Constitutionally recognized as Acting President.
Ad1nittedly, a 21-day controversy could be damaging both at home and
abroad.

However, the 21-day limitation was a comp1·omise and the

best obtainable, as indicated by the two months the conference committee was deadlocked on this point.
No legislation can protect against all sources of controversy or
unethical behavior in the future.

The nation is forced, to sorne degree,

to place reliance upon elected officials to act with a sense of constitu·tional morality, particu'larly when they are exposed to the glare of

2

~_'::_1._~:.·

i

i

pp. 202-203.

2 tabe11 Phillips, "Disability Plan for Presidency Sent to
States, 11 -~!!_:_: Y~rk_!im_es_, July 7, 1965, p. 1.
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publicity that would inevitably be turned on any situation ?.pproaching
an inability or succession crisis.

Successful i1nplernentation of the

Amend1nent appears to be conditional upon two aspects of the relationship between the President and Vice President: Vice Presidential can··
didates must be selected with the knowledge that they have a very real
chance of succeeding to the Presidency either ternporarily or for the
unexpired portion of the tenn; and Presidential candidates must be
allowed to continue the practice of making the final choice arnong
potential running mates, so long as this practice provides Vice

Presi~

dential candidates that are qualified to succeed, in order to assure
con1patibility and close cooperation between the President and Vice
President.
Although the Amendment contains no ironclad guarantee that it
will cover all future succession situations, its workability is strongly
suggested by several factors.
First,

both the support and opposition

gene~ated

Amendment during the debates on it were bipartisan.

by the proposed
The opposition

in Congress and in the state legislatures appeared to coxne horn the
conservative elements in both parties as well as from those sincerely
disturbed by the imperfe.:tions they discerned in the Amendment.

In

the absence of organized opposition, or, indeed, of very much interest.,
I

ratification by the states required 19 months, only about half the
average arnount of time required for ratification of previous amendrnents. 28 Nevertheless, interest was great enough and survived long

2 8senator Keating noted, at hearings held before the House
Special Subcom.rnittee in 1957, that counsel for the Com1rlittee had
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enough to provide the nation with legislation aimed at solving the
difficult problems of Presidential inability and succession that had so
often been left unsolved in the past.
Second, the Amendn1ent found widespread support among influential groups outside Congress and the state legislature.s, most
notably among members of the American Bar Association and state
bar associations.
Another factor indicating the likely success of the Amendment
when· the time co1ne s for its application is the long and careful study
given to the multiplicity of questions involved by the legislators who
drafted and voted on the Amendment.

The documentation of their

debates should allow future Congresses to understand the weaknesses
of the Amendtnent and to deal ·with them should the need arise.

In spite of its imperfections, the Amendment appears to be the
best solution that was possible.

Early in the debate, Attorney

General Brownell stated that:
An analogy that has crossed my mind is this . . . . I
visualize people trying to determine the cause of airplane
accidents at an airport where they have had some terrible
accidents and a lot of near-misses. They have called in
all the engineers and knowledgeable people and are trying
to decide what to do, and they find out that most of the
near-rnisses have corne frotn one set of circumstances,

'jo-oo--_ ----==-=--

called to his attention that the first twenty-one amendments became
effective in from one to four years. The 22nd Am.endment took four
years [ 47 rnonths ] . The average time for ratification then is
somewhat less thati three years. Presidential Inability, Hearing
-bi:Hore-tlie SpeciaT Stibcbinmittee_o_n_'Studyof "PresidentialHiabilifyof the Committee of the Judiciary, House of Representatives,
Eighty-Fifth Congress, First Session, April 1, 1957, Serial No.
3, p. 23. For the dates on which an1endments were proposed to the
state.s and dates of final ratification see: The World Almanac and
Book of Facts--1968, pp. 252-255, ·publishecTl.Jy-New-spape-rEU·ferprl.se-·Asso·cTaHon~-ror Doubleday.
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and that they could cure 90 percent . . . b>; changing . . . .
one procedure. . . . [Someone would sa yj "'Nell, let's
not do it piece meal, let's have a long term program that
will cover every conceivable kind of accident that can
occur . . . . "
. . . so I say [the Amendment] doesn't cover every
conceivable situation, but I believe it covers, in consonance
with . . . basic Constitutional principles, at least 90 percent of the cases we could reasonably foresee. 2 9
After passage of the Amendtnent, authorities on Presidential succession
agreed on this point.

Ruch C. Silva suggest_ed that although "·

. cer-

tain features of the . . . Amendment do not conform to rny criteria
... ·~-~,, .-.-.-lt~was-the~best~that~could~be--got~thl·ough~the~House. •• 30 Richa-1'-d
H. Hansen has stated: "I think the .

. Amendment is the only one

that could be passed at this time. 1131 And John D. Fee rick answered
"yes and no, respectively" when asked whether he thought the Amendmen.t was the best obtainable and whether he could offer any c:dticisnts
on constitutional or political grounds. 32
The Amendment eliminates the greatest single difficulty in
assuring that the Presidential duties and powers will at all tirnes be
exercised: a President is encouraged to admit disability knowing that
he can almost certainly reclaim his duties and powers when he wants
to, and at the same tin1.e, his Vice President can assume those duties

2 1?restdential inability, Hearings before the House Conlmittee
on the r~ialcTary, 89th Congress, 1st Session, February 9, 10, 16 and
17, 1965, Serial No. 1, p. 242.
3 'Letter hom Ruch C. Silva dated August 17, 1967.

·- 31Letter from Richard H; Hansen dated-August 19,--1967.?1..,..E;!_tter from John J). :fi'eeri.ck dated August 17, 196?. _
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and powers with little fear of being accused of usurping them.
Senator Bayh and his colleagues worked hard to ensure that their
Amendment would be consistant with the principle of "separation of
powers 11 'lv'hich, in practice, has allowed limited application of one
power over another.

Senator Bayh, in testifying before the House

Judiciary Committee hearings, stated:
. our forefathers have found it expedient and wise to include in the body of the Constitution itself, as have subsequent
arnendments, certain co1nn"lingling of the various branches.
I cited the veto power of the executive over the legislative
branch, the confirmation power of the Senate, the role of the
House in deciding a Presidentia~ election if no candidate received a majority of electoral votes, and i1npeachment provisions, which involved the House, the Senate, and the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court. 33
The Amendment gives the Chief Executive the initiative to
propose a Vice Presidential non1inee, and places Congress in the
role of granting or withholding approval.

It also allows the execu-

tive branch the initiative in determining and resolving disability,
with Congress intruding only if the executive branch can not resolve
the problem. of disability by itself.

The Amendment thus appears to

be fully compatible with historic application of the principle of
irseparation of powers.

11
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APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

Vice Presidents Who Succeeded to the Presidency *

Term for Which
Elected
Date of Death

President

........

Length of
Unexpired
Term :}:>:~~::::
Yrs. M6s. Days

Vice President
Who Succeeded

Date
Presidential
Oath Taken

John Tyler

Apr. 6, 1841

3

ll

0

------

Willia:nJ. H. Harrison

Mar. 4, 1841-45

Apr. 4, 1841

Zachary Taylor

Mar. 4, 1849-53

July 9, 1850

Millard Fillmore

July 10, 1850

2

7

23

Mar. 4, 1865-69

Apr. 15, 1865

Andrew Johnson

Apr. 15, 1865

3

10

17

James A. Garfield ~:•~:•

Mar. 4, 1881-85

Sept. 19, 1881

Chester A. Arthur

Sepct. 20 & 22,
1881

3

5

13

William McKinley>~>!<

lVIa r. 4, 19 0 1- 0 5

Sept. 14, 1901

Theodore Roosevelt

Sept. 14, 1901

3

5

18

Warren G. Harding

Mar. 4,. 1921-25

Aug. 2, 1923

Calvin Coolidge

Aug. 3 & 21,
1923

l

7

2

F'ranklin D. Roosevelt Jan. 20, 1945-49

Apr. 12, 1945

Harry S. Truman

Apr. 15, 1945

3

9

8

John F. Kennedy >!<>:<

Nov. 22, 1963

Lyndon B. Johnson

Nov. 22, 1963

l

1

29

10

20

Abraham Lincoln

~:·~:·

V>

..P:..

Jan. 20, 1961-65

Total:

-

23

~·

John D. Feerick, From Failing Hands (New York: Fordham Universi~y Press, 1965), p. 315.

*•!•

Presidents whose deaths were by assassination.

>!<>!<>!<

The computation is based on the dates of the presidents' deaths.
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APPENDIX B
Vice Presidential

Vice President

Vacancies~:(

Termination
of Office

George Clinton

Died Apr. 20, 1812

Elbridge Gerry

Died Nov. 23, 1814

John C. Calhoun

Resigned Dec. 28,
1832 to take seat
in Senate
Took oath of office
a,s President,
Apr. 6, 1841
Took oath of office
as President,
July 10, 1850
Died Apr. 18, 1853

John Tyler
Millard F'illmore
William. R. King
Andrew Johnson
Henry Wilson
Cheste.r A. Arl:hm·

Thomas A. Hendricks
Garret A. Hobart
Theodore Roosevelt
James S. Sherman
Calvin Coolidge
Harry S. Truman

Lyndon B.

>:<

Johnson

Took oath of office
as President,
Apr. 15, 1865
Died Nov. 22, 1875
Took oath of office
as President,
Sept. 20, 1881
Died Nov. 25, 1885
Died Nov. 21, 1899
Took oath of office
as President,
Sept. 14, 1901
Died Oct. 30, 1912
Took oath of office
as President,
Aug. 3, 1923
Took oath of office
as President,
Apr. 12, 1945
Took oath of office
as President,
Nov. 22, 1963

Tenn for which
Elected
Mar.
Ma:r.
Mar.
Mar.
Mar.
Mar.

4,
3,
4,
3,
4,
3,

18121813
18131817
18291833

Dates Office
Vacant
Apr. 20, 1812Mar. 3, 1813
Nov. 23, 1814Mar. 3, 1817
Dec. 28, 1832Mar. 3, 183.3

Ma1·. 4, 1841Mar. 3, 1845

Apr. 6, 1841Mar. 3, 1845

Mar. 5, 1849 ·Mar. 3, 1853

July 10, 1850Mar. 3, 1853

Mar.
Mar.
Mar.
Mar.

4,
3,
4,
3,

18531857
18651869

Apr.
Mar.
Apr.
Mar.

Mar.
Mar.
Mar.
Mar.

4,
3,
4,
3,

1873-1877
18811885

22, 18 7 s-:
Mar. 3, 1877
Sept. 20, 1881Mar. 3, 1885

Mar.
Mar.
Mar.
Mar.
Mar.
Mar.

4,
3,
4,
3,
4,
3,

18851889
18971901
19011905

Nov. 25, 1885-

Mar. 3,
Nov. 21,
Mar. 3,
Sept. 14,
Mar. 3,

Mar.
Mar.
Mar.
Mar.

4,
":1
-'•
4,
3,

19091913
19211935

Oct. 30, 1912"2
I\/.(a r. J
, 1913
Aug. 3, 1923'2
Ma:r. J,
1935

Jan. 20, 1945Jan. 20, 1949

Apr. 12, 1945Jan. 20, 1949

Jan. 20, 1961Jan. 20, 1965

Nov. 22, 1963-

18,
3,
15,
3,

18531857
18651869

Nov.

1889
18991901
19011905

Jan. 20, 1965

The Research and Policy Comrnittee of the Committee for Economic
Deve1oprnent, Presidential Succession and Inability (New York:
Committee Eor-Econ6nuc-De ve1opment;-191i"'5), pp. ·- 3 6- 3 7.
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APPI!~NDIX

Vice
Presidency
Vacated

B (continued)
Length of Tirne
Office Vacant
Yrs-.-1\7Io s :-ua y s

President

--

---

---

Clinton

0

10

12

James Madison

Gerry

2

3

9

Jam.es Madison

Calhoun

0

2

4

Andrew Johnson

Tyler

3

11

0

William H. Harrison 1 died
Apr. 4, 1841

Fillmore

2

7

23

Zachary Taylor, died
July 9, 1850

King

3

10

14

Franklin Pierce

Johnson, A.

3

10

17

Abraham Lincoln, died
Apr. 15, 1865

Wilson

1

3

10

Ulysses S.

Arthur

3

5

13

James A. Garfield, died
Sept. 19, 1881

Hendricks

3

3

7

Hobart

1

3

11

William McKinley

Roosevelt

3

5

18

William McKinley, died
Sept. 14, 1901

Sherrr1an

0

4

5

William H. Taft

Coolidge

1

7

2

Warren G. Harding, died
Aug. 2; 1923

Trurnan

3

9

8

Franklin D. Roosevelt, died
Apr. 12, 1945

Johnson, L.

1

1

29

John F'. Kennedy, died
Nov. 22, 196.3

37

3

12

Total Pe:dod of Vacancy

Grant

Grover Cleveland

APPENDIX C
Occasions on which the President and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives or the President pro tempore
of the Senate were of opposite parties, 1864-1964 ):<
President
and Party

Gong. Date

---·- - -

Speaker
and Party

-------

President pro
tempore and party

44

1875-77 U.S. Grant-R

Michael C. Ken·-D
Samuel J. Randall-D

Thornas

w.

Ferry-R

45

1877-79 R. B. Hayes-R

Samuel J. Randall-D

Thomas

w.

Ferry-R

46

1879-81 R. B. Hayes-R

Samuel J. Randall-D

Allen G. Thurman-D

48

1883-85 C. A. Arthur-R

John G. Carlisle-D

George F. Edmunds -R

49
50

1885-87 G. Cleve1and-D John G. Carlisle- D

52

1891-93 B. Harrison-R

54

1895-97 G. Cleveland-D Thomas B. Reed-R

62

1911-13 W. H. Taft-R

Champ Clark-D

William P. Frye--R
Charles Curtis -R
Augustus 0. Bacon-R
Jacob H. Gallinger -R
Henry Cabot Lodge-R
Frank B. Brandegee-R

66

1919-21 W. Wilson-D

Frederick Gillett-R

Albert B. Cum.mins-R

72

1931-33 H. C. Hoover-R John N. Garner-D

80

1947-49 H. S. Truman-D Joseph Martin, Jr. -R Arthur

84

.1955-57 D.D.Eisenhower-R

Sam Rayburn-D

Walter F . George-D

85

195 7 -·59

D.D.Eisenhower-R

Sam Rayburn-D

Carl .Hayden-D

86

1959-61 D. D. Ei.senhower·-R

Sam Rayburn- D

Carl Hayden- D

):~

1887-89

G~

C1eve1and-D John G. Car1isle-D
Charles F. Crisp-D

John Sherman-R
John J. Ingalls -R
Charles Monderson-R
William P. Frye-R

George H. Moses-R
Vandenb~rg-R

The Research and Policy Com.mittee of the Committee for Economic
Development, , op. .., cit. , p. 38.

___ __
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APPENDIX D
An act relative to the election of a President
and Vice President . . . etc.
March 1, 1792
1 U.S. Stat. 240; Revised Stat.,

"Sec. 9.

~§ 146, 147, 148, 149, 150.

And be it further enacted, That in case of removal, death,

resignation or inability both of the President and Vice President of
the United States, the President of the Senate [pro tempore?

J

then the Speaker of the House of Representatives, for the time being,
shall act as President of the United States until the disability be ren1oved or a President shall be elected.
"Sec. 10.

And be it further enacted, That whenever the offices of

President and Vice President shall both becon1e vacant, the Secretary
of State shall forthwith cause a noti.fica tion thereof to be made to the
executive of every state, and shall al3o cause the same to be published in at least one of the newspapers printed in each state, specifying that electors of the President of the United States shall be appointed or chosen in the several states within thirty-four days preceding

I,
1:

the first Wednesday in December then next ensuing:

Pro_vided, There

shall be the space of two months between the date of such notification

~

i
f,

r
I'

and the said first Wednesday in December, but if there shall not be

I'

the space of two months between the date of such noti.fica tion and the

I'
II,

I

first Wednesday in December; and if the term for which the President

!:

j;

and Vice .President last in office were elected shall not expire on the
third day of March next ensuing, then the Secretary of State shall
specify in the notification that the electors shall be appointed or
chosen within thirty-four clays preceding the first Wednesday in
138

!
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APPENDIX D (continued}
Dece1nber in the year next ensuing, within which time the electors
shall accordingly be appointed or chosen, and the electors shall
meet and give their votes on the first Wednesday in December, and
the proceedings and duties· of the said electors and others shall be
pursuant to the directions prescribed in this act.

11

*

l

*

Ruth C. Silva; Presidential Succession (Ann Arbor:
of Mi chi ga n Pres s-;-TcrsTr-1:)-:--r·rs.-----

University

l
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APPENDIX E
An act to provide for the performa nee of the duties
of the office of President in case of the removal,
death, resignation, or inability both of
the President and Vice-President
January 19, 1886
24 U.S. Stat. 1; U.S. C.

A:

(1940 ed. ), Title 3,

§§

21-22.

"Be it enacted, etc., That in case of removal, death, resignation,
or inability of both the President and Vice-President of the. United
States, the Secretary of State, or if there be none, or in case of his
removal, death, resignation, or inability, then the Secretary of the
Treasury, or if there be

nor~e,

or in case of his removal,

death,

J:esignation, or inability, then the Secretary of War, or if: there be
none, or in case of his removal, death, resignation, or inability,
then the Attorney-General, or if there be none, or in case of his
removal, death, resignation, or inability, then the PostmasterGeneral, or i.f there be none, or in case of his removal, death, resignation, or inability, then the Secretary of the Navy, or if there be
none, or in case of his removal, death, resignation, or inability, then
the Secretary of the Interior, shall act as President until the disability of. the President or Vice-President is removed or a President
shall be elected:

Provided, That whenever the power .s and duties of

the office of President of the United States shall devolve upon any of
the persons nam.ed herein, if Congress be not then in session, or if
it would not meet in accordance with law within twenty days thereafter,
it shall be the duty of the person upon whom said powers and duties

shall devolve to issue a proclamation convening Congress in extraordinary session, giving twenty days' notice of the time of meeting.
140

APPENDIX E (continued)
"Sec. 2.

That the preceding section shall only be held to describe

and apply to such officers as shall have been appointed by the advice
and consent of the Senate to the offices therein narned,

and such as

are eligible to the office of President under the Constitution, and
not under impeachrnent by tbe House of Representatives of the United
States at the time the powers and duties of the office shall devolve
upon them respectively.
"Sec. 3.

That sections one hundred and forty-six, one hunch·ed and

forty-seven, one hundred and forty-eight, one hundred and forty-nine,
and one hundred and fifty of the Revised Statutes are hereby repealed.

~c

Silva, Presidential Succession, p. 179.

--------------

"*

APPENDIX F

An act to p1·ovide for the performance of the duties
of the office of President in case of the removal,
resignation, death, or inability both of
the President and Vice President
July 18, 1947

61 U.S. Stat. 380.
"Be it enacted, etc., That (a) {1) if, by reason of death, resignation,
ren1oval from office, inability, or failure to ·qualify, there is neither
a President nor Vice President to discharge the powers and duties of
the office of President, then the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall, upon his resignation as Speaker and as Representative in
Congress, act as President.
11

(2.) The same rule shall apply in case of the death, resignation,

rernoval frorn office, or inability of an individual acting as President
uuder this subsection.
"(b) If, at the time when under subsection (a) a Speaker is to
begin the dis charge of the powers and duties of the office of President, there is no Speaker, or the Speaker fails to qualify as Acting
President, then the President pro tempore of the Senate shall, upon
his resignation as President pro ten1pore and as Senator, act as
President.
"(c) An individual acting as President under subsection (a) or
subsection {b) shall continue to act until the expiration of the then
current Presidential term, except that--

{1) if his discharge of the powers and duties of the office
is founded .in whole or in part on the failure of both the President-·elect and the Vice-President-elect to qualify, then he shall
142
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APPENDIX F (continued)
act only until a President or Vice President qualifies; and
{2)

if his discharge of the powers and duties of the

office is founded in whole or in part on the inability of the
President or Vice President, then he shall act only until the
removal of the disability of one of such individuals.
"(d) ( 1} If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office,
inability, or failure to qualify, there is no President pro ten1pore to
act as President under. subsection (b), then the officer of the United
States who is highest on the following list, and who is not under disability to discharge the powers and duties of the office of President
shall act as President:
Sec:retary of vVar,

!1:~

Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury,

Attorney General, Poshnaster General, Secre-

tary of the Navy,>~ Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Agriculture,
Secretary of Comrnerce, Secretary of Labor.
"(2) An individual acting as President under this subsection
shall continue so to do until the expiration of the then current Presidential term, but not after a qualified and prior- entitled individual is
able to act, except that the removal of the disability of an individual
higher on the list contab.ed in paragraph (1) or the ability to qualify
on the part of an individual higher on such list shall not terminate his

'
service.

:>',c

Under the National Security Act of 194 7, the Secretary of Defense
is given the place in the line of succession formerly held by the
Secretary of War, who along with the Secretary of the Navy is
dropped from. the list. 61 U.S. Stat. 495 at 509, ~ 311 (194 7).

I

"
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APPENDIX F (continued)
"(3)

The taking of the oath of office by an individual specified

in the list in paragraph ( 1) shall be held to constitute his resignation
from the office by virtue of the holding of which he qualifies to act as
P:resident.
"(e) Subsections (a)

(b) and (c) shall apply only to such officers

as are eligible to the office of President under the

Constitut~on.

Sub-

section (d) shall apply only to officers appointed, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, prior to the time of the death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or failure to qualify, of the
President pro tempore, and only to officers not under impeacbmen't
by the House of Representatives at the time the powers and duties of
the offi.ce of President devolve upon them.

::(f) .During the period that any individual acts as President
unde1: this Act, his cornpensation shall be at the rate then provided
by law in the case of the President.
"(g) Sections 1 and 2 of the Act entitled 'An Act to Provide for
the performance of the duties of the office of P1·esident in case of the
removal, death, resignation, or inability both of the President and
Vice President, ' approved January 19, 1886 (24 Stat. l; U. S.C. ,

1940 edition, title 3, sees. 21 and 22), a1·e repealed.

>!c

Silva, Presidential Succession, pp. 180-181.
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APPENDIX G
Part 1
(S. J. Res. 1 & H. R. J. Res. 1 as introduced in
January, 1965 (same as S. J. Res. 139 o.s
passed Senate in September, 1964)
Section 1.

In case of the removal of the President from office or

his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.
Sec. 2.

Whenever there is a vacancy 1n the office of the Vice

President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take
office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.
Sec.

3.

If the President declares in writing that he is unable to

discharge the powers and duties of his office, such powers and duties
shall be discharged hy the Vice President as Acting President.
Sec.

4.

If the President does not so declare, and the Vice Pre-

sident with the written concurrence of a n1ajority of the heads of the
executive depa1·trnents or such other body as Congress may by law
provide, transmits to the Congress his written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the
office as Acting President.
Sec. 5.

Whenever the President transmits to the Congress his

written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers
and duties of his office unless the Vice President, with the written concurrence of a majority of the heads of the executive departlnents or Buch
other body as Congress may by law provide, trausm.its within two days
to the Congress }:lis written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office.
·shall

[

11

will 11 inS. J. Res. 1 ]
145

Thereupon Congress

imrnediately decide the issue.

If the
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APPENDIX G (continued}
Congress determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office, the
Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise the President shall

resun~e

the powers and duties of

his office.
Part 2

>:c

{S. J. Res. 1 as passed Senate on February 19, 1965)
Section 1.

Same as above.

Sec. 2.

San1e as above.

Sec. 3.

Whenever the President transmits to the President of

the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
~--------------·------~··---

~~-~_?ra~~~!2.._0la!_h=._~~~ unab~~o-~is~h_':lrge the powers_ and_ dut~~--?.!_his
?.~£ic~,

such powers and duties shall b1-:! discharged by the Vice President
i.

I

as Acting President.
Sec. 4.

lj

Whenever the Vice President, and a majority of the

if'

l

r

p:_~r_:cip~l ~-fficers

of the executive departments_ or such other body as

Congress may by law provide, transmit to the

.€_:esidel~-~

of the Senate

I
•,'t

,P,,,

,,~

!

,Fj

and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declara----··.....
tion that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office, the Vice President shall ilrJ.mediately assun1.e the powers and

!
I,

I

li

ll,,
I'

~

duties of the office as Acting President.
Sec. 5.

Whenever the President transmits to the President of

------·--

the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written

>!<

The underlined words represent the changes made in the basic
proposal (Part 1} in the Senate (Part 2}, and in the House of
Representatives (Part 3}.

1
I
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APPENDIX G (continued)
declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and
duties of his office unless the Vice President, with the written con-

n1ents or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transrnits
within seven_ days to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
!louse _of

Re:ere_~entative~

their written declaration that the president

is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
Congress shall immediately proceed to decide the issue.

Thereupon

If the Con-

gress determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office, the Vice
President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President,
otherwise the President shall 1·esume the powers and duties of his
office.
Part 3
(H. R. J. Res. 1 as passed House of
Representatives on April 13, 1965)
Section 1.

Same as above.

Sec. 2.

Sa1ne as above.

Sec. 3.

Vlhenever the President transmits to the President pro

terr:1-pore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives

duties of his office, and until he transmits a written declaration to the
:ontrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice Presi.dent. as Acting President.
Sec. 4.

Whenever the Vice President and a majority of the

principal officers of the executive deparhnents, or such other body as

;

.ii
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APPENDIX G (continued}
Congress may by law provide, transrnit to the President pro tetnpore
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their
written de.claration that the President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assurne
the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
There':_~te~·,

when the President transmits to the President pro

tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
his written declaration that no inability exists, he. shall resume the
powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a majority
of the principal officers of the executive departments, or such other
body as Congress m.ay by law provide, transmit within two days to the

Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
shall decide the issue, assembling
purpose if not in session.

---·---

Thereupon Congress

with~~ forty-e~ght

hours for that

If the Congress, within ten days after the

receipt of the written declaration of the Vice President and a majority
of the principal officers of the executive departments, or such. other
body as Congress may by law provide, determ.ines by two-thirds vote
of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of the office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the
same as Acting President; otherwise the President shall resume the
powers and duties of his office.*

>:c

.John D. l?eerick, "The Proposed Twenty--Fifth Amendm.ent to the
Constitution, 11 Fordham Law Review, XXXIV (December, 1965),
111). 2 0 4- 0 6.
·--------~--------
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APPENDIX H

Ratification Procedure
The Constitution and federal statutes prescribe a rigid procedure for ratifying proposed constitutional am.endments.
Under· Article 5 of the Constitution, an1endments may be
proposed either by Congress by a two-thirds vote of both
cha1nbers or by a national convention called by Congress. Under
the latter rnethod, a convention is convened upon application of
two-thirds of the state legislatures. No national convention has
ever been called.
Arnendments proposed, either by Congress or by a convention, becom.e part of the Constitution only after they have been
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the states, or by
conventions in three-fourths o£ the states. Congress is elnpowered to determine whether the states shall ratify through their
legislatures or through state conventions. Congress also is empowered to deterrnine the length of time during which states may
deliberate on ratification. By precedent, Congress has required
ratification by amendments by the states within at least seven
years.
The procedu:ee for submitting proposed constitutional amendments to the states for ratification is set forth in 1 U.S. C. 106(b).
The procedure provides that upon approval by Congress a pl·oposed arr,endrncnt rnust be transmitted to the General Services
Administration (GSA), where it is certified, signed by the GSA
Adn."linistrat.or and transmitted to each governor with a letter requesting that the state act. As each state acts on the amen·dment,
the action mL1.st be certified and notification returned to the GSA.
When the necessary three-fourths of the states have notified the
GSA Adm.inist.ra tor of ratification, the amendment is published in
the :Federal Register along with the Administrator's certification
of adoption and a list of the ratifying states.*

~~

"Constitutional Amendm.ent on the Presidency,
ua :d~ l'ly Alma na c , XXI ( l 9 6 5), p. 58 1.

9

11

Congressional
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APPENDIX I
Ratification of the 25th Amendment by the States
State and Date
of Ratification

)~

*~<

Sum.mary of Action Taken by the State

l.

Nebraska
7/12/65

The final •1ote on Legislative Resolution 72):o:o:r.
in the state's Unicameral Legislature was 47
ayes, 0 nays, with 2 not voting. No hearings
were held. The ernphasis was on becoming
the first state to ratify.

2.

Wisconsin
7/13/65

The final vote on Assembly Joint Resolution
103 was 28 ayes to 11 noes in the Senate. In
the Assembly the vote was 84 ayes to 11 noes.
No hearings were held. The Wisconsin Legislature made great efforts to becoine the first
to ratify but failed.

3.

Oklahoma
7/16/65

The final vote in the Oklahoma House of Representatives on House Concun·ent Resolution
568 was 75 for, 17 opposed and 7 excused.
The vote in the Senate was by voice. No hearings were held. The vote did not break along
party lines.

4.

lV[ass•lchusetts
8/9/65

The final vote on Senate Resolution No. 1116
and House Resolution No. 4135 was unanimous
with rules suspended. The Amendment received the support of the Governor, legislative leadership, and local press.

*

This table was composed from information supplied to the author
by: (1) state governors, (2) state libraries, (3) state legislative
reference services, (4) state legislators and clerks, and (5) state
newspapers. The information is in the fonn o£: (a) personal
correspondence, {b) newspaper clippings, and (c) legislative
:records.
Dates of ratification are those given by the General Services
Administration. "Presidential Disability Amendment Ratified
by States, 11 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, XXIII (1967), 30 L

,.

num~ers

ref~r

[~tate-

Resolution
in this table
-to
legislative
tions granting ratification to the proposed Amendment.
150

:,

~

i,

r~-;~lu=-~--~
·

·~
r

:I

I
,I

~

~
I

i

li

151
APPENDIX I (continued)
5.

Pennsylvania
8/18/65

The final vote on Bill No. 1001 was 48 to 0 in
the Senate and 15 7 to 32 in the House. No
hearings were held. The An1endment received the support of the State Bar Association
and 219 state chapters of the Junior Cbarnber
of Co1nmerce.

6.

Kentucky
9/15/65

The final vote on Senate Resolution 4 was
4 in the Senate and 71 to 1 in the House.
negative votes were cast by Republicans,
though 1nany members of that party voted
the affirmative. No hearings were held.

7.

Arizona
9/22/65

The final vote in the Senate was 25 ayes (24
Democrats, 1 Republican), 0 nayes, and 3 not
voting (2 Dem. , 1 Rep.). In the House the
vote was 47 ayes {31 Dem., 11 Rep.), and 22
not voting (13 Dem., 9 Rep.). No hearings
were held and there was no floor debate. ·

8.

Michigan
10/5/65

The final vote in the Senate on Senate Joint
Resolution 0 was 30 yeas ( 17 Dem. , 13 Rep.),
0 nays, and 8 r:nembers absent.
The House
vote was 81 yeas (60 Dern., 21 Rep.), and 15
nays (12 Rep., 3 Dem. ). The Republican
votes in opposition did not represent a party
caucus position. The House conducted hearings
at which support for the Amendment was expressed by political scienth-;;ts from state
universities and colleges.

9.

Indiana
10/20/65

The final vote on Senate Joint Resolution 8 in
the Senate was 50 yeas (35 Dem., 15 Rep.),
and 0 nays. All members voted. The vote in
the House was· 88 yeas, and 1 nay. The fact
that Senator Bayh of Indiana was the chief
sponsor of the Amendment aided the rapid
action by his home state.

31 to
All
al'in

The final vote on Assembly Joint Resolution 1
was 66 in favor (27 Rep. , 39 Dem. ), and 1
against.
The vote in the Senate was 32 in
.
favor ( 10 Rep. , 22 Dem. ), and 5 against
·!
·
(3 Rep., 2 Dem. ). Ratification was proposed
j
.~~-----~---------------------------------b_y:_Sp_eak.e_:r_of_ih.e~A_,s_s__e_nlbly__Uil.:r__uh,~_g_loug_y;.riih _______---;i
9 Dem. and 3 Rep.
10.

California
10/21/65

1

j

11.

Arkansas
11/4/65

The final vote in the Senate was 29 affirmative,
4 negative, and 1 absent or not voting. The
House voted approval by voice vote. There
were no hearings or floor debate.

I
'I

i'

I

I
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12.

New Jersey
11/29/65

The final vote on Assembly Concur1·ent Resolution 55 in the Assernbly was 55 affirmative,
0 negative, and 0 abstaining. The vote in the
Senate was 20 affirmative, 0 negative, and 0
abstaining. The vote was taken the same day
the Resolution was introduced. Both houses
were controlled by the Republican party.

13.

Delaware
12/7/65

The final vote is not available. The principle
concern appears to have been ratifying on the
date of the state's !78th anniversary of being
the first state to ratify the original Constitution.

14.

Utah
1/17/66

The final vote in the House on Senate Joint
Resolution 1 was 67 yeas, 0 nays, and 2 absent
(1 Dem., 1 Rep.). The vote in the Senate was
26 yeas, 0 nays, and 1 absent (a Dem. ). No
hearings were held. The young lawyers actively
worked in support of the Amend1nent.
·

15.

West Virginia
1/20/66

In the House of Delegates, House Joint Resolution 1 was declared adopted hy unanimous vote
by the Speaker. It had been stated that if any
me1nber wished to vote against adoption, the
yeas and nays would be counted. The Resolution was adopted on a 1notion in the Senate.

16.

Maine
1/24/66

The Joint Resolution was read by the clerks in
both the House and Senate and declared adopted
by the presiding officers.

17.

Rhode Island
1/28/66

The final vote in the House on Hl004 was 65
ayes, 0 noes, and 33 absent or not voting.
The vote in the Senate was 36 ayes, 0 nays
and 10 absent ..

18.

Colo:rado
2/3/66

The final vote in the Senate on Senate Con-current Resolution 1 was 28 ayes (14 Dem.,
1'-1 Rep.), and 4 noes (Rep.). The vote in the
House was 49 ayes (32 Dem. , 17 Rep.), and
14 noes (8 Dem. , 6 Rep.). The Amendm.ent had
been considered during the 1965 Special Session,
at which time it was deemed to have died in the
Senate where it received less than a two-thirds
vote. Both hearings at1d floor debate took place
before final approval in 1966.

19.

New Mexico
2/3/66

The final vote on House Joint Resolution 1 in
the House was 59 to 2 (Rep.). In the Senate the
vote was 28 to 3 ( l Rep., 2 Dem. ).

-(>'
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20.

Kansas

2/8/66

21.

Vermont

2/10/66

22.

Alaska

The final vote on House Concurrent Resolution 512 in the House was 111 yeas, 0 nays,
and 14 absent or not voting. The final vote
in the Senate was 36 yeas, 0 nays, and 4 ·
absent or not voting.
The final vote on the proposed Amend1nent
was hy Joint Resolution. No vote was recorded. No hearings were held and there
was no floor debate.
No final vote is available.

2/18/66
23.

Idaho

3/2/66

24.

Hawaii

3/3/66
25.

Virginia

3/8/66 .
26.

Mississippi

3/10/66

The final vote on House Joint Resolution No. 1
in the House was 68 ayes, 1 nay, and 10 absent and excused. In the Senate the vote was·
39 ayes, 0 nays, and 5 absent and excused.
House Concurrent Resolution 2 was adopted by
·both Houses by voice vote without de bate or
opposition.
The final vote on Senate Joint Resolution 7 was
36 yeas, and 0 nays. The vote in the House
was 86 yeas and 0 nays.
The fi.nal vote on Senate Concurrent Resolution
12 in the Senate was 36 yeas, 6 nays, and 7
absent and not voting.
The House vote was
123 yeas, 4 nays, and 4 absent and not voting.

27.

28.

New York
3/14/66

The Senate unanimously approved the Amendment. No vote is available but it is known that
the House did grant approval.

Maryland

The final vote on Senate Joint Resolution 5 in
the Senate was 29 affirmative, and 0 negative
(the composition of the Senate was 22 Dem.,
17 Rep.). The vote in the House o£ Delegates
was 99 affirrnative, and 0 negative.

3/23/66

29.

Missouri

3/30/66

The final vote in the Senate v.;as 24 ayes, and
0 noes. The vote in the house was 93 ayes,
42 noes, 27 absent, and 1 present but not
voting. No party line vote was present on the
House vote. Both Republicans and Dem.ocrats
voted in favor and opposed. Comrni:ttee hearings were held in both Houses and debate was
allowed on the Tloor.
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30.

New Hampshire

6/13/66
31.

Louisiana

7/5/66

32.

Tennessee

1/12/67

The final vote was by Concurrent Resolution of·
ratification. It was adopted in both House and
Senate by voice vote, presumably unanir:oously.
The final vote on Senate Concurrent Resolution
1 in the Senate was 21 yeas, and 16 nays.
The
vote in the House was 89 yeas, and 4 nays.
There appears to have been no hearings or
floor debate.
The final vote on Senate Joint Resolution 8 i.n
the Senate was 28 affirmative, 0 negative, 5
abstentions (1 Rep., 4 Dem. ). There were 8
Republicans in the 33 member Senate. In the
House the vote was 84 affirmative, 0 negative,
and 15 abstentions (5 Rep., 10 Dem. ). There
were 40 Republicans in the 99 me1nber House.
No hearings were held. The only discussion
on the floor was an explanation of the Amendment by sponsors of the ratifying resolutions.
'.Both the Tennessee Bar Association and the
American Bar Association adopted positions
calling for ratification.

33.

Wym:nirtg
1/25/67

The final vote on Senate Joint Resolution No.
2 in the Senate was 22 ayes, and 8 noes (5
Rep. , 3 Dem. ). The vote in the House was
60 ayes, and 1 no (Dem. ).
The vote did not
see1n to go along party lines. No hearings
were held and there was little debate.

34.

Washington

The final vote on Senate Joint Resolution 7 in
the Senate was 4.5 yeas, 0 nays, 4 absent. The
vote in the House was 99 yeas, 0 nays, and 0
absent.
The measure received bipartisan sponsorship. No hearings were held, and it was
passed -the sam.e day it was introduced.

1/26/67

35. Iowa

1/26/67'

36. Oregon

2/2/67

The final vote on Joint Resolution 13 in the
Senate \vas 54,affirmative, and 0 negative.
The vote in the House was 121 affirmative, and
0 negative.
The A1nendment was not considered a political issue by the Legislature.
The final vote on House Joint Resolution 2 in the
House was 55 affirmative, 0 negative, and 5 not
present. In the Senate the vote was 29 affirma-·
ti.v·e, 0 negative, and l not present. The House
held only a brief hearing and the Senate none.
There appeared to be no controversy on the
issue of ratification.
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37..

Minnesota
2/10/67

The final vote on H. F. 21 in the House was
124 yeas, and 7 nays (the negative votes
were cast by conservatives. 1\IIi.nnesota 's
Legislature is officially nonpartisan, but
1nost conservatives have ties with the Republicans). The vote in the Senate was 64 yeas,
and 0 nays. Short hearings were held, but the
chief concern appeared to be making Minnesota
the 38th or decisive state to ratify.

38.

Nevada
2/10/67

The final vote on Assem.bly Joint Resolution 6
in the Assembly was 33 yeas, 0 nays, and 7
absent. In the Senate the vote was 19 yeas,
0 nays, and 1 absent. The resolution was
treated as an emergency measure in both
houses and adopted in 2 days, with the intention
of securing for Nevada the distinction of being
the 38th and therefore decisive state to grant
ratification. The General Services Administration confirms that Nevada was the last state
necessary to complete the ratification process.

3<).

Connecticut
2/14/67

The final vote on Senate Joint Resolution 12
was by voice.
The House vote was 159 yeas, 0
nays, and 18 absent and not voting. A brief
public hearing was held. It appears that the
Connecticut Legislature was not aware that the
Amendment had been 1nade a part of the Constitution by Nevada's ratification.

40.

Montana
2/15/67

The final vote on Senate Joint Resolution No. 7
was unanimous in both Houses.
The Senate was
controlled by the Democrats 30 to 25, and the
House of Representatives was controlled by the
Republicans 64 to 40. The1·e was little, if any,
debate on the .Resolution.

41.

South Dakota
3/6/67

The final vote on Senate Joint Resolution 9 was
32 affiemative, and 2 negative (Rep.). The
House vote was 71 affirmative, and 0 negative.
The Amendment had pass,~d the House in 1966
by a vote of 53 affinnativc, and 21 negative,
but it was killed i.n the Senate State Affairs
C01nm.i.tte e.

42.

Ohio
3/7/67

The final vote on House .Joint Resolution No. 1
i.n the House was 88 yeas (52 Rep. , 36 Dern. ),
and 7 nays (5 Rep., 2 Dern. ). The vote in the
Senate was 31 yeas (22 Rep., 9 Dem. ), and 0
nays. :Hearings were required by Ohio law.
Ohio had been vying with Nevada, Minnesota and
other states to becom.e the 38th to ratify.
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43'.

Alabama
3/14/67

The final vote on Senate Joint Resolution 6
was unanirnous. No figures on the nurnber
voting or absent are available. The Senate
passed the Resolution of ratification in August
1966.
The Resolution died in the House Rules
Cornrnittee, apparently for lack of interest.

44.

North CaJ:olina
3/22/67

The final vote on H. B. 22 is not available.
There was no record of vote, opposition, de-bate or hearings.

45.

Illinois
3/22/67

The final vote on Joint Resolution No. 3 in
the Senate was 45 yeas, and 0 nays. The vote
in the House was 60 yeas, and 0 nays.

46.

Texas
4/25/67

The final vote on House Joint Resolution 1 in
the House was 146 yeas, 0 nays, and 3 absent.
The Amendment was approved in the Senate
through Senate Concurrent Resolution 39 'by
voice vote.

F'loricla

The final vote on House Concurrent Resolution
3 was by voice vote iri the House. HCR 3 was
adopted on m.otion in the Senate.

47.

5/25/67

Tb.e following states have not ratified the 25th Am.endment.
Georgia

House Resolution 57-97 was adopted by a vote
of 162 ayes, and 2 nays in the House. The
reason ratification was not con1pleted by the
Senate is not clear.

North Dakota

It appears that the mernbers of the North Dakota House of Representatives desired that
thei.l: state be the 38th or final state necessary
to complete ratification. When it was discovered tl"}at the Legislature had delayed too long or
miscounted the states which had already ratified,
it was decided that any action by North Dakota
would have no legal effect. Thus no vote was
taken.

South Carolina

A bill of ratification was introduced in both the
1966 and 1967 Legislat.i ve Ses~3 i.ons, but did not
pass in either. There appears to have been no
organized opposition, but there was also no
great interest in passage of the Amendment. It
was feLt that after the Amendrnent was ratified
by a sufficient number of states, there was no
longer any need for South Carolina to take action.

